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Abstract
This dissertation addresses how the literary genre of the philosophical dialogue was used by Latin
authors in late antiquity (300–700 AD) to negotiate ongoing anti-heretical debates. ❧ Traditional
scholarship on this topic has focused mostly on the Greek dialogues. When the Latin material
received attention, it was read in terms of its appropriation of and deviation from classical models.
More recent scholarship has acted as a corrective to this model, and one key question that has
emerged is whether true dialogue persisted into late antiquity at all. Some scholars have
provocatively suggested that the democratic aims of the dialogue are inconsistent with the
totalitarian discourse characterized by the Christian Roman Empire. Is late antiquity, in fact, the
end of the dialogue? ❧ This thesis is an answer to this ongoing discussion. It argues that late
antique Latin dialogues provide important evidence against a teleological understanding of the
formation of Christian orthodoxy. This public discourse, though often characterized as
authoritarian and monolithic, was lively, fragile, and actively interested in engaging with dissent.
In addition to tracing the evolution of this subgenre of Latin literature and situating it within the
context of classical rhetorical theories, this thesis includes close readings of two dialogues as casestudies: Jerome’s Contra Luciferianos (4th century) and John Maxentius’ Contra Nestorianos (6th
century) ❧ Chapter One provides an overview of the genre of dialogue in both Greek and Latin
literature, from Plato through Cicero. It illuminates the non-linear nature of the history of this genre
and cautions against a derivative model for understanding the late antique dialogue. It concludes
with a definition: “A dialogue is a text, written in either mimetic or narrative form, whose intention
is to relate the verbatim conversation of two or more interlocutors and shows a self-awareness of
its place within the genre.” ❧ Chapter Two establishes the first exhaustive catalogue and
discussion of the twenty-one controversial dialogues from late antiquity. In addition to providing
a synoptic view of the entire corpus, it also treats the historical context and argumentation for each
individual dialogue. ❧ Chapter Three illustrates how Jerome used both the form and content of his
dialogue to address the Luciferian controversy in the late fourth century. By contrasting the
methods of eristic and didactic dialogue and connecting them with contemporary events, Jerome
models not only what arguments can solve the impasse, but just as importantly, how they must be
presented. ❧ Chapter Four sheds light on how John Maxentius used and defied genre-expectations
in his Dialogus Contra Nestorianos to defend what was widely understood to be a heterodox
position. Self-deprecation, humor, anger, and even sympathy towards its opponents are all tactics
used by this dialogue, which concludes with the absurd situation where both sides agree but refuse
to acknowledge it. A commentary on contemporary politics, this dialogue demonstrates the
dangers that pride and partisanship present to the truth. ❧ Appendix A complements Chapter Two,
including a digestible catalogue of the late antique controversial dialogues composed in Latin. ❧
Appendix B includes the first translation of the Dialogus Contra Nestorianos into any modern
language.
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Chapter 1: Prolegomena for the Latin
Dialogue of Late Antiquity
Cuius [operis] stilum ideo uerti in dialogum quia summis philosophis,
Socrati scilicet et Platoni ac Tullio nec non nostro Augustino et Boetio,
uisum est id genus docendi quam maximam uim optinere introducendi.
I composed this work as a dialogue because the greatest philosophers—
namely Socrates, Plato, and Cicero, but no less our own Augustine and
Boethius—believed that this method of instruction possessed the greatest
power for introducing [a subject].
–Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis Physicae, 1.8–111

Introductions
In this passage from his Clavis Physicae, itself a summary-commentary in dialogue form
on another dialogue, Eriugena’s Periphyseon, the twelfth-century theologian Honorius
Augustodunensis2 makes a number of observations that serve as a useful starting point for
introducing the Latin dialogue. First, he provides a genealogy, well attested in both ancient and
modern sources, for the history of the literary form of the dialogue. Socrates “invented” the
elenchic, dialectical method of the dialogue, and Plato was the first to compose these dialogues
as texts. Cicero followed them, translating (in more than one sense) this philosophical genre into
the literary consciousness of the Latin-speaking Roman world. After the Christianization of this
Roman world, Augustine and Boethius, then, loom over their contemporaries as the figureheads
representing the height of achievement for dialogues in Christian Latin literature. Honorius also

Quoted in Alex J. Novikoff, The Medieval Culture of Disputation: Pedagogy, Practice, and Performance.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013, p. 57, n. 23 (p. 243), though he cites it as “Clavis Physicae,
3.” Novikoff’s recent book is similar in some of its aims to my project here, though the time period of his study is
much later. He begins with Lanfranc of Pavia and Anselm of Canterbury and only looks backwards at the earlier
tradition. As a rule, all translations in this thesis are my own unless otherwise noted. The only exception is when I
cite the Bible, in which case I use the NRSV.
2
Otherwise known as Honorius of Autun, among many other names. See Novikoff, ibid. and PL 172.13ff.
1
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makes a claim about both the content and function of the dialogues. On the one hand, dialogues
are philosophical and naturally those who write them are philosophers (summi philosophi). On
the other hand, Honorius points out that there is consensus among these philosophers that the
form of the dialogue is conducive for teaching, especially when introducing new materials to
students.
Honorius’ portrait of the ancient dialogue is classical and traditional, and it is also
accurate insofar as it represents this traditional view. Yet one of the fundamental claims of this
thesis and this chapter in particular is that the traditional ways of reading and understanding
dialogues are poorly equipped for approaching the numerous and variegated texts that constitute
the entire corpus of Latin dialogues from Late Antiquity. There are about fifty Latin dialogues
from this period,3 and Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues and Boethius’ Consolatio, though
justly lauded, represent only a minority of these texts. Other examples from these authors include
Boethius’ dialogic commentary on Porphyry’s Eisogoge and Augustine’s De Musica and De
Grammatica.4 There are hagiographical dialogues such as John Cassian’s Conlationes, Gregory
the Great’s Dialogi, and the Life of Saint Helia.5 Literary criticism was sometimes written in the
form of a dialogue, such as Fulgentius the Mythographer’s Expositio Vergilianae Continentiae
and Macrobius’ Saturnalia. Furthermore, there is a great number of “controversial” dialogues,
which constitute an agonistic debate between a representative of Christian orthodoxy (according
to the author at least), and a member of a heretical Christian sect or follower of a non-Christian
religion, including examples such as Minucius Felix’ Octavius, Jerome’s Dialogus Contra

See appendix A for the relevant details for these dialogues, including critical editions and translations. This
appendix, however, cannot be said to be exhaustive yet.
4
For what is known about Augustine’s De Grammatica and its potential form as a dialogue, see Guillaume Bonnet,
Abrégé de la grammaire de Saint Augustin. Série latine, 405. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013, at xvii–xviii.
5
My thanks to Professor Lucy Pick for bringing this latter text to my attention.
3
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Pelagianos, and the anonymous Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae. Honorius’ portrait of the
dialogue, therefore, represents only a partial picture of the dialogue, and in order to see the
dialogue more clearly, it is first necessary to dismantle some thinking on the dialogue.
After disassembling the structure, in a sense, the ground will be clear and the foundations
ready. Then bricks must be made so that new construction can commence. To accomplish this, I
shall first discuss the current state of scholarship on dialogues composed in Late Antiquity,
especially those in Latin, pointing out biases similar to those held by Honorius above. Then, I
shall turn to the topic of the dialogue itself, addressing the various approaches and literary tools
used by writers and interpreters of dialogues, both ancient and modern, to create a grammar and
syntax for articulating the structure of these complex texts. These include the following:
Diogenes Laertius’ definition of (Plato’s) dialogues, the intersection of the liteary form of the
dialogue with rhetorical theory and figures, the “philosophical” content of the dialogue, the
structural makeup that differentiates dialogues from other written texts , and the historical
tradition of dialogue-writing represented by authority figures such as Plato and Cicero. A holistic
and inclusive approach, I shall argue, is essential for reading ancient dialogues. Dialogues meant
different things to different authors at different (and even the same) times. It is imperative,
therefore, to be familiar with the diversity found among ancient writers of dialogues in order to
understand more fully the variety of texts that we read.

Previous and Recent Work on Dialogue
Dialogues have always generated interest, and this is no exception for modern
scholarship in the fields of Classics, History, Philosophy, and other academic disciplines.6 Much

For ancient reception, see the note below under “Literary Form of the Dialogue,” which contains Demetrius’
discussion of this subject.
6
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of the work on dialogue as a literary form both in the Classical Period and also for Latin
Dialogues of Late Antiquity in particular was done in Germany in the late nineteenth through the
middle of the last century. Most notably this includes Rudolf Hirzel’s magisterial two-volume
study that attempts to treat the history of dialogues as a whole, as well as the later work of Voss,
Hoffman and Schmidt that focuses more closely on the Latin dialogues of Early Christianity and
Late Antiquity in particular.7 Vittorio Hösle’s recent work on the poetics and hermeneutics of the
philosophical dialogue deserves mention too.8 All of these studies are of great value for their
almost encyclopedic attempt to systematize and catalogue the texts of the dialogues themselves
and subdivide them into thematic groupings. In fact, Chapter 2 of this thesis owes a great debt to
of Schmidt’s discussion of the “controversial dialogues.” At the same time, the underlying
assumptions of some of these scholars about the period of Late Antiquity shaped their findings
and conclusions. The long-standing view that the “Later Roman Empire” was in a state of
decline, including not only political but also social and cultural decline, is pervasive, for
example. This longstanding historical narrative has led to interpretations of late antique
dialogues that can be characterized as the following: it is not that dialogues were not composed
during this period, but there are few, if any, worth reading. Minucius Felix’s Octavius and
Augustine’s Cassiciacum Dialogues stand alone like rare beacons shining through the mist of
mediocrity.9

Rudolf Hirzel, Der Dialog: ein literarhistorischer Versuch. 2 vols. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1895; Peter L. Schmidt,
“Zur Typologie und Literarisierung des frühchristlichen lateinischen Dialogs.” In Christianisme et formes littéraires
de l'Antiquité tardive en Occident: 23-28 août 1976 : huit exposés suivis de discussions. p. 101–190. Entretiens sur
l'Antiquité classique (Series) vol. 23 Vancouver-Geneva: Fondation Hardt, 1977; B. R. Voss, Der Dialog in der
frühchristlichen Literatur. Munich: Fink, 1970; and Manfred Hoffman, Der Dialog bei den christlichen
Schriftsstellern der ersten vier Jahrhunderte. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966.
8
Vittorio Hösle, The Philosophical Dialogue: A Poetics and Hermeneutics. Steven Rendall, trans. Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.
9
Cf. Schmidt’s summary of mid-twentieth century views on Latin dialogues of this period: “We arrive at the literary
rank of Latin that culminates with the Octavius of Minucius Felix and in the Cassiciacum Dialogues of Augustine,”
Schmidt, “Zur Typologie,” 101.
7
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Following in the footsteps of these more structural approaches has been the recent work
of English and French scholars on dialogue or rather the “dialogic” literature of Late Antiquity.
The beginning of the conversation was a collection of essays edited by Simon Goldhill, The End
of Dialogue in Antiquity (2008), which was the result of a 2006 colloquium on dialogue at
Cambridge. This controversial volume has spurred further discussion and in some cases, even
backlash. Following shortly thereafter was a similar colloquoy of French scholars at the 2012
Celtic Conference of Classics in Bordeaux, which was published in 2015 by Sandrine Dubel and
Sophie Gotteland, who are affiliated with the related DIALOGOS research group.10 Finally,
Averil Cameron’s short book, Dialoguing in Late Antiquity (2014), which is in part a direct
response to the Goldhill collection,11 remains the only single-authored study of dialogues in late
antiquity, although this slim volume is concerned primarily with the Greek or “Byzantine”
material.12
The focus of the analyses throughout these more recent pieces seesaws from dialogue qua
literary genre to dialogue qua social discourse with the Bakhtinian notion of the “dialogic”
hiding somewhere in between. What results is a series of crisscrossed arguments, many of which
are accurate, but which never actually intersect because of the different angles of their approach.

Formes et genres du dialogue antique. Sandrine Dubel & Sophie Gotteland, eds. Scripta antiqua, 71. Bordeaux:
Ausonius Éditions, 2015. The DIALOGOS group is affiliated with the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme de
Clermont-Ferrand. http://www.msh-clermont.fr/spip.php?article3489
11
Averil Cameron, Dialoguing in Late Antiquity. Washington D.C.: Center for Hellenic Studies, 2014. For this book
as a response to Goldhill, see, p. ix.
12
This excludes a number of very good studies on individual authors or subgroups of dialogues written by an
individual author. See Brian Stock, Augustine’s Inner Dialogue: The Philosophical Soliloquy in Late Antiquity.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010; Catherine Conybeare, The Irrational Augustine. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006; and Seth Lerer, Boethius and Dialogue: Literary Method in The Consolation of Philosophy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985. Furthermore, Cameron along with Niels Gaul have recently published
an edited volume on this topic, but because it was published only a few weeks ago I have not been able to read it
myself. Averil Cameron and Niels Gaul, eds. Dialogues and Debates from Late Antiquity to Late Byzantium.
London: Routledge, 2017. None of the chapters from this volume is focused on a Latin text, and most of the texts
were composed significantly later than Late Antiquity.
10
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Goldhill’s provocative suggestion, for example, that “Christians didn’t do dialogue,” that is, the
quasi-totalitarian Christian Roman Empire suppressed the dissenting voices of minority views,13
is not necessarily contradicted by the counterclaim of Cameron that there is a rich corpus of
debate in the Greek, Latin, and Syriac dialogues from Late Antiquity, and that dialogues
continued to be composed, or even experienced a rejuvenation, in the Christian period.14 To
summarize then, dialogue has served, and appropriately so, as an arena for different scholars to
investigate different problems, a crossroads that can and has been taken in divergent directions,
and it is the aim of this thesis to continue the conversation, giving attention to the Latin dialogues
of Late Antiquity (300–700).

What is a Dialogue? Diogenes Laertius’ Definition of (Plato’s) Dialogue
The first question then to be answered is the most fundamental: what is a dialogue? This
is appropriate, as the first order of business for many ancient dialogues was to provide, or at least
attempt, a definition of the term in question.15 However, the definition of dialogue immediately
becomes murky the closer one looks. For example, the concept of dialogue destabalizes
somewhat when juxtaposed with the related studies of disputation and dialectic,16 and sometimes
it becomes unclear about what exactly is being talked about.

Goldhill, “Introduction: Why don’t Christians do dialogue?,” (p. 1) in Simon Goldhill, ed. The End of Dialogue in
Antiquity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
14
Cf. the chapter title, “Did Christians ‘Do Dialogue’” in Cameron, Dialoguing, 7–21, & K. Cooper and M. Dal
Santo, “Boethius, Gregory the Great and the Christian ‘afterlife’ of classical dialogue,” in Goldhill, Dialogue, 188–
9.
15
Often, finding this definition is the entire enterprise of the dialogue. Cf. Evodius’ desire to know “what we are,”
(quid simus nos) at the beginning of De Quantitate Animae, I.1.
16
Richard Lim, Public Disputation, Power, and Social Order in Late Antiquity. Berkeley, CA: University of
California Press, 1995; D. V. Nikulin, Dialectic and Dialogue. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010; &
Alex J. Novikoff, Disputation. The connections between dialogue, disputation, and dialectic will, I hope, become
clearer as this dissertation progresses. Defining “disputation” and “dialectic” is no easier task than defining
“dialogue.” Cf. Dialectica est bene disputandi scientia. De Dialectica 1.1 (possibly by Augustine), and ego uero
plura [de dialectica] quam de quauis parte philosophiae [scio]. Contra Academicos 3.13.
13
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One of the most useful passages for clearing this muddy water and shedding some light
on approaches to dialogues in the postclassical world comes from Diogenes Laertius (fl. third
century). In this passage, Diogenes provides a thorough and roughly contemporaneous definition
and description of (Platonic) dialogues at the advent of Late Antiquity, and although his Life of
the Eminent Philosophers is composed in Greek, his discussion of Plato and his dialogues serves
as a representative example of thinking about dialogues just prior to this period. It also happens
to be the most often cited passage in the modern scholarship about dialogues from all periods. Its
overall great importance justifies quoting it in full.17
It is said that Zeno of Elea first wrote dialogues, but Aristotle in the first
book of his On the Poets says that it was Alexamenos, either of Styra or
Teos. Favorinus says the same in his Memorabilia. Plato, it seems to me,
perfected the form (εἶδος) and would rightly carry first prize, both for his
aesthetic sophistication (κάλλους) and for his invention (εὑρέσεως). A
dialogue (διάλογος) is <a discourse (λόγος)>18 consisting of question and
answer (ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως) about philosophical and political
topics (περί τινος τῶν φιλοσοφουμένων καὶ πολιτικῶν) with the
appropriate personification (ἠθοποιίας) of the characters involved and the
choice of language. Dialectic is the art of discourse (διαλεκτικὴ δ’ ἐστὶ
τέχνη λόγων) by which we confirm or deny something through the
questioning and answering of interlocutors.
The Platonic dialogue has two general types, the expository type
(ὑφηγητικός) and the investigative type (ζητητικός). The expository type
is subdivided into two subtypes, the theoretical (θεωρηματικόν) and
practical (πρακτικόν). The theoretical [is further subdivided] into physical
(φυσικόν) and logical (λογικόν); the practical into ethical (ἠθικόν) and
political (πολιτικόν). Of the investigative type, there are also two main
subtypes, the pedagogical (γυμναστικός) and the antagonistic
(ἀγωνιστικός). The midwifery-type or maieutic (μαιευτικός) and the
experimental (πειραστικός) [are the subtypes] of the pedagogical. Of the
antagonistic there are the probative (ἐνδεικτικός) and the refutative or
anatreptic (ἀνατρεπτικός).

It would be futile to attempt an exhaustive list. See Andrew Ford, “The beginning of dialogue: Socratic discourses
and fourth-century prose,” in Goldhill (2008), p. 29 n. 1, Nikulin (2010), pp. 4–5, and Sandrine Dubel, “Avantpropos: théories et pratiques du dialogue dans l’Antiquité.” in Dubel & Gotteland, eds. (2015), p. 11.
18
Some authorities omit the word λόγος.
17

15

I am not unaware that others claim that the dialogues can be categorized
differently. They say that some of them are dramatic (δραματικοί), others
are narrative (διηγηματικοί), and others are a mixture of the two (μεικτοί),
but they label the dialogues in a literary fashion (τραγικῶς) rather than
philosophically (φιλοσόφως).
The Timaeus is the example of the physical. The Statesman, the Cratylus,
the Parmenides, and the Sophist are examples of the logical. Examples of
the ethical are the Apology, the Crito, the Phaedo, the Phaedrus, the
Symposium, the Menexenus, the Clitophon, the Epistles, the Philebus, the
Hipparchus, and the Rival Lovers. Of the political are the Republic, the
Laws, the Minos, the Epinomis, and the Atlantis (Critias). Of the maieutic
are the Alcibiades I & II, the Theages, the Lysis, and the Laches. Of the
experimental are the Euthyphro, the Meno, the Ion, the Charmides, and the
Theaetetus. The Protagoras is the example of the probative. The
Euthydemus, the Gorgias, and the Hippias I & II are examples of the
anatreptic.
Διαλόγους τοίνυν φασὶ πρῶτον γράψαι Ζήνωνα τὸν Ἐλεάτην·
Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἐν πρώτῳ Περὶ ποιητῶν Ἀλεξαμενὸν Στυρέα ἢ Τήιον, ὡς
καὶ Φαβωρῖνος ἐν Ἀπομνημονεύμασι. δοκεῖ δέ μοι Πλάτων ἀκριβώσας τὸ
εἶδος καὶ τὰ πρωτεῖα δικαίως ἂν ὥσπερ τοῦ κάλλους οὕτω καὶ τῆς
εὑρέσεως ἀποφέρεσθαι. ἔστι δὲ διάλογος <λόγος> ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ
ἀποκρίσεως συγκείμενος περί τινος τῶν φιλοσοφουμένων καὶ πολιτικῶν
μετὰ τῆς πρεπούσης ἠθοποιίας τῶν παραλαμβανομένων προσώπων καὶ
τῆς κατὰ τὴν λέξιν κατασκευῆς. διαλεκτικὴ δ’ ἐστὶ τέχνη λόγων, δι’ ἧς
ἀνασκευάζομέν τι ἢ κατασκευάζομεν ἐξ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως τῶν
προσδιαλεγομένων. Τοῦ δὴ <δια>λόγου τοῦ Πλατωνικοῦ δύ’ εἰσὶν
ἀνωτάτω χαρακτῆρες, ὅ τε ὑφηγητικὸς καὶ ὁ ζητητικός. διαιρεῖται δὲ ὁ
ὑφηγητικὸς εἰς ἄλλους δύο χαρακτῆρας, θεωρηματικόν τε καὶ πρακτικόν.
καὶ τῶν ὁ μὲν θεωρηματικὸς εἰς τὸν φυσικὸν καὶ λογικόν, ὁ δὲ πρακτικὸς
εἰς τὸν ἠθικὸν καὶ πολιτικόν. τοῦ δὲ ζητητικοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ δύο εἰσὶν οἱ
πρῶτοι χαρακτῆρες, ὅ τε γυμναστικὸς καὶ ἀγωνιστικός. καὶ τοῦ μὲν
γυμναστικοῦ μαιευτικός τε καὶ πειραστικός, τοῦ δὲ ἀγωνιστικοῦ
ἐνδεικτικὸς καὶ ἀνατρεπτικός.
Οὐ λανθάνει δ’ ἡμᾶς ὅτι τινὲς ἄλλως διαφέρειν τοὺς διαλόγους φασί—
λέγουσι γὰρ αὐτῶν τοὺς μὲν δραματικούς, τοὺς δὲ διηγηματικούς, τοὺς δὲ
μεικτούς—ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνοι μὲν τραγικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφως τὴν διαφορὰν
τῶν διαλόγων προσωνόμασαν.
εἰσὶ δὲ τοῦ μὲν φυσικοῦ οἷον ὁ Τίμαιος· τοῦ δὲ λογικοῦ ὅ τε Πολιτικὸς καὶ
ὁ Κρατύλος καὶ Παρμενίδης καὶ Σοφιστής· τοῦ δ’ ἠθικοῦ ἥ τε Ἀπολογία
καὶ ὁ Κρίτων καὶ Φαίδων καὶ Φαῖδρος καὶ τὸ Συμπόσιον Μενέξενός τε καὶ
Κλειτοφῶν καὶ Ἐπιστολαὶ καὶ Φίληβος Ἵππαρχος Ἀντερασταί· τοῦ δὲ
πολιτικοῦ ἥ τε Πολιτεία καὶ οἱ Νόμοι καὶ ὁ Μίνως καὶ Ἐπινομὶς καὶ ὁ
16

Ἀτλαντικός· τοῦ δὲ μαιευτικοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδαι Θεάγης Λύσις Λάχης· τοῦ δὲ
πειραστικοῦ Εὐθύφρων Μένων Ἴων Χαρμίδης Θεαίτητος· τοῦ δὲ
ἐνδεικτικοῦ ὡς ὁ Πρωταγόρας· καὶ τοῦ ἀνατρεπτικοῦ Εὐθύδημος Γοργίας
Ἱππίαι δύο. καὶ περὶ μὲν διαλόγου τί ποτέ ἐστι καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί,
<τοσαῦτα> ἀπόχρη λέγειν.19
Similar to the quotation from Honorius Augustodunensis that began this chapter, Diogenes’
discussion of (Platonic) dialogues serves as a useful example for understanding thinking in Late
Antiquity about the literary genre of dialogue. If ancient dialogues are a meadow filled with
beautiful flowers, then Diogenes’ account is a sophisticated ecphrasis describing them. As to be
expected with any written description of an object that exists in reality, the description is
incomplete and necessarily has a subjective, partial bias. It is not surprising that Diogenes
focuses on certain varieties of flowers, his favorites, and only makes passing reference to others
that are less to his taste. Yet even what he mentions only in passing is illuminating. It is useful
here to examine his observations about dialogue more closely.
First and like Honorius, Diogenes highlights the importance of authority for dialogues,
that is, that certain authors are associated with dialogue, and also that some are better than others.
Plato, of course, is undeniably the best (cf. κάλλος and εὕρεσις), and as Honorius points out
centuries later, this view persists well into the Middle Ages. This picture can be contrasted with
the entirety of the corpus of late antique dialogues, and the fact that many of these dialogues are
anonymous or spurious should not be dismissed too quickly as insignificant to their later
readership (or lack of it). Second, there is a method to dialogue according to Diogenes, and it is
none other than dialectic or “question and answer.” This is ostensibly so obvious that is should
merit no comment, but this issue is not so simple.The power dynamics and the (in)equality of the
interlocutors in any given dialogue often play out in the demarcation between that of the
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Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 3.48–51.
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questioner and the answerer. It is often true that there is the understanding that all interlocutors
are equal, but this ideal usually breaks down.20 For example, there is an awkward shift of power
in Plato’s Protagoras when Socrates and the eponymous interlocutor switch roles,21 and in
Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, the most critical moment of the dialogue coincides
with the Luciferian’s submission to the Orthodox’ authority, agreeing to ask him simple
questions rather than to attack him antagonistically.22 Third, Diogenes limits the content of
dialogue to topics that are philosophical or political. This is both helpful and frustrating for the
reader of dialogues as both of these terms are fuzzy and variously defined throughout the
tradition.23 It suffices to say that defining the limits of what can be discussed in dialogues too
narrowly falls short of the actual content of dialogues themselves as will be discussed below.
Fourth, Diogenes couches his definition of dialogue in language associated with rhetorical
literature, here ἠθοποιία or personification.24 The connections between literary dialogues and
rhetorical theory are intricate and bilateral. The title of Augustine’s “dialogue” Soliloquia
provides an example of how innovations made in literary dialogues were later adopted in the
rhetoric literature as a figura.25 Fifth, the corpus of dialogues, Diogenes claims, can be divided
into many subtypes such as dialogues that contain mostly exposition (ὑφηγητικός), dialogues
whose subject is natural philosophy or science (φυσικός), and dialogues that are contentious in

See the note below on Augustine’s De beata uita (2.16), and Conybeare’s discussion of it.
Cf. “(Socrates speaking) εἰ μὴ βούλεται Πρωταγόρας ἀποκρίνεσθαι, οὗτος μὲν ἐρωτάτω, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποκρινοῦμαι,
καὶ ἅμα πειράσομαι αὐτῷ δεῖξαι, ὡς ἐγὠ φημι χρῆναι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι,” Protagoras, 338C9–D3.
22
This will be discussed at length in Chapter 3.
23
See the subsection below.
24
Cf. “Ἠθοποιία ἐστὶ μίμησις ἤθους ὑποκειμένου προσώπου, οἷον τίνας ἂν εἴποι λόγους Ἀνδρομάχη ἐπὶ Ἕκτορι,” Hermogenes, Progymnasmata, 9.
25
Isidore of Seville, for example, includes it in his Etymologies: “Peusis, id est soliloquium, cum ad interrogata ipsi
nobis respondemus,” Etymologiae, 2.21.47. Cf. “Ridiculum est si te pudet, quasi non ob id ipsum elegerimus
huiusmodi sermocinationes: quae quoniam cum solis nobis loquimur, soliloquia uocari atque inscribi uolo; nouo
quidem et fortasse duro nomine, sed ad rem demonstrandam satis idoneo,” Augustine, Soliloquia, 2.14. See also
below.
20
21
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nature (ἀγωνιστικός). This variety is an important reminder that not all dialogues are the same—
they should not be in fact according to Diogenes. Returning to the Altercatio discussed above,
Jerome exploits these categories to make a philosophical point when the dialogue shifts from the
ἀγωνιστικός-type to the γυμναστικός-type.26 Sixth, Diogenes points out, via praeteritio, that
other readers divide the dialogues differently from him (ἄλλως διαφέρειν τοὺς διαλόγους).
Diogenes’ view then is only one perspective on dialogues, and though shrugging off the
importance of this alternative view, he articulates the enduring tension between literature
(τραγικῶς) and philosophy (φιλοσόφως). Does the dialogic form itself have an essential impact
on the meaning of the text, or does it add merely literary delight? Seventh and finally, Diogenes
concludes by meticulously categorizing all of Plato’s extant dialogues (including those
traditionally attributed to him) into his system of dialogic subtypes. One way this list can inform
the reader of Latin dialogues is through contrast. Unlike Diogenes, many late antique writers of
Latin dialogues had very limitied access to Plato, namely the translations of the Timaeus by
Cicero (partial) and Calcidius.27 The Timaeus of course is a dialogue that—besides its
introduction (which Cicero omits completely)28—contains only a lengthy, unbroken exposition
by Timaeus about the cosmos. When the discrepancies between these two views of Plato are
triangulated with our modern perspective, Plato’s importance on the late antique tradition is
destabilized, and perhaps even our own thinking about the content of Plato’s dialogues is
challenged.
The brief discussion of this rich passage is not meant to be exhaustive, and in some cases,
it raises more questions than it answers. This is not unwanted. Through this process, a number of
See Chapter 3 below.
John Magee, ed. and trans. On Plato’s Timaeus. DOML 41 Washington, D.C.: Harvard University Press, 2016,
pp. vii–viii.
28
See note below.
26
27
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the elements and issues relevant to dialogues have emerged, demanding further exploration. This
is the task of the subsections that follow where many of these issues will be treated at greater
length. Through the exercise of grappling with the most important elements of dialogues, a fuller
picture will hopefully emerge, which will be utilized in the subsequent chapters of this thesis.
Latin Rhetorical Definitions of Dialogue
The intersection between the rhetorical literature and the literary dialogue is profound,
and an understanding of this relationship is useful for elucidating the “make-up” of the
dialogues. In fact, the word “dialogue” itself (διάλογος in Greek, usually sermocinatio in Latin)
is one of the rhetorical figurae. Quintilian describes it in the following way.
A bolder figure and requiring, according to Cicero, greater rhetorical
power,29 is personification, which [the Greeks] call prosopopoeia. For this
figure adds both diversity and excitement to oratory. By its use we can
include the thoughts of our adversaries as if they were speaking with
themselves—but their thoughts will only be credible if we have them
speak words that would be appropriate for them to think—and we can also
introduce our conversations with others or others’ mutual conversations,
advancing personas that are conducive to persuasion, reproach, complaint,
praise, and compassion. Moreover, it is also permissible in this figure to
bring down the gods and raise the dead; even cities and entire peoples can
take on a voice. Now there are those who restrict the term “prosopopoeia”
to the combination of bodies and words that we compose, preferring to
call the fabricated speeches of humans “dialogues,” which some call
“sermocinationes” in Latin. I, however, follow the accepted norm and call
both by the same name, for no speech can be composed without a persona
being created to give it.
Illa adhuc audaciora et maiorum, ut Cicero existimat, laterum, fictiones
personarum, quae προσωποποιίαι dicuntur: mire namque cum variant
orationem tum excitant. his et adversariorum cogitationes uelut secum
loquentium protrahimus (qui tamen ita demum a fide non abhorreant, si ea
locutos finxerimus, quae cogitasse eos non sit absurdum), et nostros cum
aliis sermones et aliorum inter se credibiliter introducimus, et suadendo,
obiurgando, querendo, laudando, miserando personas idoneas damus. quin
deducere deos in hoc genere dicendi et inferos excitare concessum est.
urbes etiam populique uocem accipiunt. ac sunt quidam, qui has demum
29

Literally, “greater lung power.”
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προσωποποιίας dicant, in quibus et corpora et uerba fingimus: sermones
hominum adsimulatos dicere διαλόγους malunt, quod Latinorum quidam
dixerunt sermocinationem. ego iam recepto more utrumque eodem modo
appellaui: nam certe sermo fingi non potest, ut non personae sermo
fingatur.30
As Quintilian states at the end of this quotation, a number of rhetorical experts use the
terms “dialogue” and “conversation” (sermocinatio) to describe the moment when orators adopt
the persona of another speaker and speak in his, her, or its voice. As expected, different thinkers
subdivide these figures differently. There is “personification” (elsewhere called “conformatio,”31
composed speech of fictitious persons or inanimate objects) and “dialogue/sermocinatio”
(composed speech of historical persons), among many other nuanced and slightly varied
systems.32 An important related figure, for example, is what Isidore of Seville calls soliloquium,
“Peusis, that is soliloquium, is when we respond to our own questions,”33 and Longinus provides
a more extensive, and mimetic, discussion of this figura, which he calls “πεύσεις καὶ
ἐρωτήσεις,”in his treatise On the Sublime.34
The discussion of sermocinatio, conformatio, interrogatio, soliloquium, and other related
terms found in the rhetorical literature is productive for understanding elements of the literary
dialogue, and the presence of such figures has already been noted in Diogenes’ definition of
dialogue.35 It is not surprising that these figurae can be found in abundance in the literary

Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX.2.30.
A word that is used to make a point of theological significance by the “Nestorian” in Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos. See Contra Nestorianos, 1.10.
32
See, Rhetorica ad Herennium, IV.51.65–66; Cicero, Orator, 25; Publius Rutilius Lupus, Schemata Lexeos, II.6;
Aquila Romanus, De Figuris sententiarum et elocutionis, 3–4, Priscian’s translation of Hermogenes’
Progymnasmata, 9; and Isidore of Seville, De rhetorica, XIII–XIV.
33
Isidore of Seville, De rhetorica, XXII.47 Isidore of Seville himself composed a soliloquy, the Synonyma.
34
Longinus, On the Sublime, 18.1.
35
Especially, “A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question and answer about philosophical and political topics
with the appropriate personification of the characters involved and the choice of language.” For more on this, see
Andrew R. Dyck, “Cicero the Dramaturge: Verisimilitude and Consistency and Consistency of Characterization in
Some of His Dialogues,” in Qui Miscuit Utile Dulci. Festschrift Essays for Paul Lacklan MacKendrick. Wauconda,
IL: Bolchazy-Carducci, 1998. pp. 151–164.
30
31
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dialogues themselves, and their relationship to the mimetic structure of the dialogue is explicitly
acknowledged.36 Perhaps the earliest example is when the Laws of Athens take on a voice of
their own and question Socrates in the Crito.37 In fact, many authors of dialogue, who also
happened to be professional teachers of rhetoric, are explicit in their application of these
elements to their own works. Cicero explains his decision to remove Scaevola from the scene
after the first book of the De re publica as one of appropriateness. Scaevola’s participation in the
conversation in the subsequent books, as Cicero writes to Atticus, would not have been
consistent with his character and would therefore have detracted from the persona’s believability,
one of the requirements of sermocinatio.38 In a similar vein, Augustine implies that the
conversations contained within the Cassiciacum Dialogues are not simply representative of the
characters of the interlocutors but based upon the records kept by stenographers,39 though
Augustine often plays with this “reality” throughout these dialogues, insinuating that there were
some modifications to this record.40 Finally, the accurate and sincere portrayal of the
philosophical and theological views of one’s opponent was seen as essential for the success of
the controversial dialogues, which was also true for rhetorical “dialogue” (cf. Quintilian’s claim

For a good example of this, see my extended discussion in Chapter 4, where Cicero (through the persona of
Laelius) discusses the implications of prosopopoeia within his friend Terence’s comedies, creating a Russian dolllike structure of self-reference.
37
Plato, Crito 50A–54D.
38
Epistulae ad Atticum, IV.16.3. Cicero makes similar remarks about including Cato in his dialogue De Senectute
and Laelius in his De Amicitia, De Amicitia, I.4–5.
39
Cf. “Adhibito itaque notario, ne aurae laborem nostrum discerperent, nihil perire permisi,” Augustine, Contra
Academicos, I.1.4.
40
The most obvious example is the beginning of De Ordine, where, immediately after informing Zenobius of his
practice of using stenographers, Augustine begins the dialogue with an auspicious conversation that occurred in the
dead of night when no stenographers could be present (De Ordine, I.2.5f). This issue was the preoccupation of
scholarship a century ago. See B. L. Meulenbroek, “The Historical Character of Augustine's Cassiciacum
Dialogues” Mnemosyne, Third Series. Vol. 13.3 (1947): 203–229; and John J. O’Meara, “The Historicity of the
Early Dialogues of Saint Augustine.” Vigiliae Christianae. Vol. 5.3 (July, 1951): 150–178.
36
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that fictive personae are useful only if they are portrayed accurately: qui tamen ita demum a fide
non abhorreant, si ea locutos finxerimus, quae cogitasse eos non sit absurdum).41
To summarize, the stipulations about διάλογος/sermocinatio found in the rhetorical literature are
often found within literary dialogues, and an awareness of this corpus is essential to the reader of
dialogues.
Furthermore, rhetorical theory and figurae can also provide the reader of dialogues with
some much needed perspective on what constitutes the “Socratic method,” that is, whether the
presence of question and answer is essential for dialogue and if so, what question and answer
entails. When discussing the proper methods for questioning or cross-examining witnesses
(interrogatio) in Roman legal cases, Quintilian discusses a number of strategies for questioning
the witness in order to get not only the right answer, but also the right answer in the right way.
Emotion and general temperaments (and the manipulation thereof), Quintilian claims, can
sometimes play an important role. Irascible witness can be brought to anger for benefit;
unintelligent witness can be deceived and befuddled; the ambitious flattered and pandered to.
Other times, orators need to question in such a way so as to minimize the witness’ prejudice, and
sometimes interrogatio must be abandoned entirely for continuous speech (interlocutio),
especially when the witness is too clever.42 Quintilian’s motives, of course, are either nefarious
or practical depending on one’s view of strategies for coercing witnesses and winning
arguments: “The [prudent and constant, or inimical and clever witness] must be refuted by a brief
speech (breui interlocutione), not by question and answer (interrogatione).”43 Just after this

Quoted above. The sincerity in representing the opinions and thoughts of the heretical other is a possibility that is
is often too quickly dismissed in scholarship.
42
Institutio oratoria, IV. 7.3–26.
43
Prudens vero et constans vel tamquam inimicus et pervicax dimittendus statim vel non interrogatione, sed brevi
interlocutione patroni refutandus est. ibid., V.7.26.
41
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remark, Quintilian then explicitly makes the claim that dialogic literature should be read by
lawyers to imporve their rhetorical skills (the influence between rhetorical and literary
“dialogue” is bilateral!). Lamenting the fact that neither the theory nor the practice of the crossexamining of witnesses is taught in schools, Quintilian’s only advice for improving at this craft is
to read the Socratic dialogues of Plato, though Plato, I think, would not be pleased with
Quintilian’s assessment of his methods.44
Negative appraisals of this one-sided “dialogue” (interlocutio) are common in some
modern scholarship, and this is particularly true for moments of long-winded expositions of
orthodox belief against a heretic.45 Such modes of communication and their appropriatenss to
dialogues, however, were viewed as normative among ancient writers. In the prologue of the
Tusculan Disputations, for example, Cicero less contentiously explains the value of the format of
the dialogue to Brutus, the dedicatee of this text, in the following way:
So I included the discourses, as the Greeks call them, of five days into as
many books. They are so arranged that after my interlocutor gives his
opinion, I then oppose it. For this, as you know, is the old Socratic method
of opposing the views of one’s opponent. Socrates believed that this was
the easiest way for the “verisimilitude” to be discovered. But so that our
discussions might be expressed in a more readable format, I shall write
them this way—as if they were being performed, not narrated.
Itaque dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appellant, in totidem libros
contuli. Fiebat autem ita, ut, cum is, qui audire uellet, dixisset quid sibi
uideretur, tum ego contra dicerem. Haec est enim, ut scis, uetus et
Socratica ratio contra alterius opinionem disserendi. Nam ita facillime
quid ueri simillimum esset inueniri posse Socrates arbitrabatur. Sed quo
commodius disputationes nostrae explicentur, sic eas exponam, quasi
agatar res, non quasi narretur. 46

Eius rei sine dubio neque disciplina ulla in scholis neque exercitatio traditur, et naturali magis acumine aut usu
contingit haec virtus. si quod tamen exemplum ad imitationem demonstrandum sit, solum est quod ex dialogis
Socraticorum maximeque Platonis duci potest: in quibus adeo scitae sunt interrogationes, ut, cum plerisque bene
respondeatur, res tamen ad id, quod volunt efficere, perveniat. ibid. V.7.28–9.
45
Cf. Cameron, Dialoguing, 8 et passim.
46
Tusculan Disputations, I.4.8.
44
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A number of Cicero’s dialogues take the format of a series of long opposing speeches rather than
the back-and-forth of the elenchus. The Tusculan Disputations are a case in point, and De
Finibus is another good example. But this format is not particular to Cicero. Once again,
Diogenes Laertius’ division of Plato’s dialogues is helpful here. According to his system, the
primary divisions of the dialogues are the expository (ὑφηγητικός) and the investigative
(ζητητικός) types, meaning that one of the major subdivisions of Plato’s dialogues is for those
containing sets of long speeches (expository). A number of Plato’s take this form,47 and they
served as models for later authors in Late Antiquity.48 Most importantly and relevant to Latin
literature, the Timaeus contains the eponymous interlocutor’s lengthy excursus on the physical
universe. As the only Platonic dialogue that had a Latin translation available in late antiquity, it
is significant that this dialogue contained no real dialogue at all. Cicero’s translation, in fact,
omitted the opening dialogue among Socrates, Timaeus, Hermocrates, and Critias, but began
with Timaeus’ speech.49
An awareness of ancient rhetorical theory, therefore, advances our understanding of the
literary dialogues in many ways. It sheds light on the structure of these dialogues, giving a rich
context within which ancient authors might have understood their own works and how they
might understand the effectiveness of these texts. Relatedly, these insights can ground the
modern reader of dialogue, bridging the cultural distance between our understanding and their
understanding of these issues.
The Symposium is famous for its sets of speeches on the subject of eros, a dialogue that was imitated through Late
Antiquity. Also the there is the Menexenus, a “dialogue” in which Socrates that he can give a better funeral than
what was just given at Pericles’ home.
48
Methodius’ own Symposium is the most obvious example. Like the late antique dialogues in general, interest in
Methodius’ works has increased in the past few years, though its connections with Plato have long been noted. See,
L. G. Patterson. Methodius of Olympus: Divine sovereignty, human freedom, and life in Christ. Washington, D.C.:
Catholic University of America Press, 1997; Jason König, “Sympotic dialogue in first to fifth centuries CE.” in
Goldhill, Dialogue, 85–133, esp. 102–106; and Cameron, Dialoguing, 39–44.
49
See above.
47

25

Expected (Philosophical) Content
Next, Diogenes makes the ostensibly uncontroversial claim that a dialogue is “a discourse
consisting of question and answer about philosophical and political topics with the appropriate
personification of the characters involved and the choice of language.” Averil Cameron also
begins her recent book about dialogues from late antiquity with this comment about the
connection between dialogues and philosophical discourse, “This book is about a particular form
of writing by Christians in late antiquity, sometimes referred to as ‘the philosophical dialogue’—
although by no means all the dialogues in question can be regarded as philosophical.”50
Likewise, Peter Schmidt divides the Christian Latin dialogues into a five different categories:
controversial dialogues, philosophical dialogues, pedagogical dialogues, hagiographical
dialogues, and introspective dialogues.51 For Schmidt, Augustine’s dialogues and only a subset
of them receive the appellation “philosophical.”52 These observations, with which I disagree to
varying degrees, are illustrative of a problem concerning many traditional readings of the
“Christian” dialogues from Late Antiquity.
The historical narrative that these two scholars, among others, are reacting to and have
done their part to reshape through their work goes something like this: during the period of late
antiquity, dialogues, if they did in fact continue to be written in this period, lost their rigorous
philosophical nature with the exception of a few notable outliers such as Augustine or Gregory
of Nyssa.53 In response to this bias, Schmidt and Cameron both emphasize the differences

Cameron, Dialoguing, 1.
Kontroversdialoge, philosophische Dialoge, didaktische Dialoge, hagiographische Dialoge, and selbstbetrachtende
Dialoge, Schmidt, “Zur Typologie,” 174–180.
52
Contra Academicos, De beata vita, De ordine, De quantitate animae, De libero arbitrio, and De magistro, ibid.
53
Gregory of Nyssa’s De Anima, a Phaedo-inspired dialogue between Gregory and his beloved sister Macrina, is
often cited as the standard-bearer for classically influenced Byzantine dialogues, though understandably so. See
Hubertus R Drobner, “Gregory of Nyssa as Philosopher: De anima et resurrectione and De hominis opificio.”
Dionysius. 18 (2000): 69–102.
50
51
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between the later dialogues and their earlier classical predecessors. By carving out this new
literary space through contrast, room is created for the Christian dialogues to exist and be read.
To summarize Cameron’s point in her recent book, it is not that Christians “didn’t do dialogue,”
but they did it differently. This is not untrue, but the similarities between the classical models
and the “philosophy” of the dialogues from Late Antiquity need to be reexamined. The content
of the dialogues of Late Antiquity, mutatis mutandis, is in fact consistent with the traditional
themes found in classical dialogues in both Greek and Latin (and described succinctly by
Diogenes above).
A first step in making this realization is to distinguish between the meaning of philosophy
in antiquity and how it is used today, and a good place to start is with Augustine himself and the
period in which he wrote the majority of his dialogues, 386–389, or rather his retrospective view
on this period of his life. In one of his final works, the Retractationes, whose title evokes his
understanding of dialogue when he was a young man,54 Augustine recounts his other literary
activity, much of which is lost, while he was in Milan preparing for baptism. He writes:
At the same time, when I was in Milan preparing for baptism, I also
attempted to compose books about the liberal arts, questioning those who
were with me and who were not opposed to studies like this, because I
desired to arrive, as if by logical steps, from corporal matters to
incorporeal matters, and lead [others to them]. Of these arts, I only
completed the book De grammatica, which I lost from our library later on,
and the six-volume De musica, insofar as it pertains to what is called
“rhythm.” . . . of those works about the other five liberal arts that I
began—De dialectica, de rhetorica, de geometrica, de arithmetica, and de
philosophia—only the beginnings remain, and I lost even those, though I
think some still have them.
Per idem tempus, quo Mediolani fui baptismum percepturus, etiam
disciplinarum libros conatus sum scribere, interrogans eos qui me cum
Cf. Soliloquia 2.14, where Ratio reminds Augustine that one of the benefits of inner-dialogue is the ability to
retrace one’s steps and correct one’s errors. The Retractationes are also an inner-dialogue in a sense, the
conversation between Augustine’s present self and his former self via correction of his written errors.
54

27

erant atque ab huiusmodi studiis non abhorrebant, per corporalia cupiens
ad incorporalia quibusdam quasi passibus certis uel peruenire uel ducere.
sed earum solum de grammatica librum absoluere potui, quem postea de
armario nostro perdidi, et de musica sex uolumina, quantum attinet ad eam
partem quae rithmus uocatur. . . . de aliis uero quinque disciplinis illic
similiter inchoatis—de dialectica, de rethorica, de geometrica, de
arithmetica, de philosophia—sola principia remanserunt, quae tamen
etiam ipsa perdidimus; sed haberi ab aliquibus existimo.55
Instantly recognizable are the (mostly) complete collection of the traditional seven liberal
arts, which are famously portrayed in Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii,
sometimes also called De septem disciplinis.56 In this text, the bride Philology receives seven
maidens as her wedding gifts, each of whom personifies one of the seven liberal arts. This
division, however, is much more ancient than Late Antiquity. Augustine almost certainly has
Varro’s now lost Disciplinarum libri IX in mind in his project,57 and the divisions can be traced
to similar systems found in Plato’s dialogues, or even Pythagoras.58
But what do the seven liberal arts have to do with philosophy? The nature of this
relationship can begin to be understood in the quotation from Augustine above, and it is further
brought into focus by recalling the meticulous divisions described by Diogenes: “The Timaeus is
the example of the physical. The Statesman, the Cratylus, the Parmenides, and the Sophist are
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Retractationes 1.6. With regard to the survival of these texts, fairly convincing arguments posit that the beginning
of De dialectica and an abridgement of De grammatica are in fact extant. See B. Darrell Jackson, Augustine: De
Dialectica. Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1975, and Guillaume Bonnet, Abrégé de la grammaire de Saint Augustin.
Série latine, 405. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2013. Jackson argues that what remains of the De Dialectica indicates
that Augustine intended the final version to take the form of a dialogue, pp. 27–9, and Bonner suggests that the
unabridged original of the De Grammatica was also a dialogue, p. xx. The extant De Musica is also composed as a
dialogue. There are fragments of a De rhetorica, printed in PL 32, col. 1439–1443, but they are very unlikely to be
written by Augustine.
56
For a thorough discussion of this passage and Augustine’s views on the liberal arts, see Danuta R. Shanzer,
“Augustine’s Disciplines: Silent diutius Musae Varronis?” (pp. 69–112) in Augustine and the Disciplines: From
Cassiciacum to Confessions. Karla Pollmann and Mark Vessey, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, and
Hessbrüggen-Walter, Stefan. “Augustine’s Critique of Dialectic: Between Ambrose and the Arians,” (pp. 184–205)
in ibid.
57
B. Darrell Jackson, Augustine: De Dialectica, 2, and Shanzer, “Disciplines,” passim.
58
For Plato, see Plato’s Republic VII.525a–530d, and for this system originating with Pythagoras, see Plato’s
Republic VII.530d and Proclus’ Commentary on the first book of Euclid’s ‘Elements,’ xii.
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examples of the logical,” and so forth.59 For Diogenes, it is completely unremarkable that the the
subject of the Timaeus is natural science or “natural philosophy,” that the subject of the Cratylus
is grammatical and etymological, and that the subject of the Sophist and Stateman is dialectical.
For Diogenes, they are parts of philosophy, and for Augustine, if they are not parts, they are
steps to philosophy (cf. per corporalia cupiens ad incorporalia quibusdam quasi passibus certis
uel peruenire uel ducere).60 Much the same can be said for the subjects found in the dialogues of
Cicero such as the discussions of rhetoric in De Oratore and the Brutus; likewise for Early
Christian dialogues. Even ostensibly unphilosophical outliers such as Gregory the Great’s
“hagiographical” dialogues have a deeply philosophical purpose.61
It is dangerous, therefore, to retroject a modern understanding of philosophy onto ancient
dialogues, using these modern categories in order to mark differences between the contents of
ancient and late antique dialogues. As will hopefully become clear, the dialogues from Late
Antiquity are better understood as a continuation of rather than an aberration from the classical
model of the dialogue.
Literary Forms of the Dialogue
Diogenes Laertius’ dismissiveness of subdividing the dialogues via literary (τραγικῶς)
criteria represents an extreme view on an issue noted by critics and writers of dialogue since
antiquity. This dismissiveness points to the relationship between form and content in the literary
dialogues. For some, the dialogic form of the text is merely a vehicle to facilitate enjoyment, a
Quoted above.
Quoted above.
61
I have recently argued at the 2017 annual meeting of the SCS that Gregory the Great used the hagiographical
material contained in Book IV of his Dialogues in order to make an argument about the immortality of the soul,
perhaps the “classic” subject of the philsophical dialogue. It has come to my attention that Kate Cooper and
Matthew Dal Santo make a somewhat similar observation in Goldhill’s volume. See Kate Cooper and Matthew Dal
Santo, “Boethius, Gregory the Great and the Christian ‘afterlife’ of classical dialogue,” (pp. 173–189, at185–7), in
Goldhill, 2008.
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spoonful of sugar to help the philosophical medicine go down more easily. For others, the
dialogic form has an essential and powerful impact for advancing the argument of the dialogue.62
To put it another way, “Would something be ‘lost in translation’ if a dialogue were converted
into a treatise?” That dialogues commonly produced enjoyment and wonder in the reader is
attested both second-hand and even within many of the dialogues themselves, from antiquity
onward. The third century BC theorist Demetrius of Phalerum recounts that the dialogues of
Plato and Aeschines met with great popularity when they were introduced, astounding readers
with their lifelike vividness and their ability to instruct.63 (The personas of) Evodius and John
Cassian also speak of their astonishment at the words of their interlocutors.64 Henry Aristippus,
the twelfth-century translator of some of Plato’s dialogues into Latin, remarks on the literary
dialogue’s ability to entertain (in addition to its utility for teaching) in a letter that accompanied
his translation of the Phaedo.65 But leaving the enjoyment or delight caused by the structure of
dialogues aside for the moment, it is appropriate first to discuss the two basic literary structures
of the dialogue to which Diogenes Laertius alluded, and through this discussion the potential
“usefulness” of the dialogic form will become clearer.

See A. E. Douglas, “Form and Content in the Tusculan Disputations,” (pp. 197–218) in Cicero the Philosopher. J.
G. F. Powell, ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
63
Εὐημέρησαν δ’ οἱ τοιοῦτοι λόγοι τότε ἐξευρεθέντες τὸ πρῶτον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐξέπληξαν τῷ τε μιμητικῷ καὶ τῷ
ἐναργεῖ καὶ τῷ μετὰ μεγαλοφροσύνης νουθετικῷ. Demetrius, On Style, 289.
64
Ego uero et hac oratione tua ita sum adfectus. Augustine, De Quantitate animae, XXXVI.81; Ad haec
obstupefactos nos [Iohannem et Germanum] intuens senex et ad uerba narrationis suae inexplebili ardore succensos.
John Cassian, Conlationes, I.23.
65
Cf. Humanam scienciam duo articuli iugem servant, docere et doceri, labentem duo erigunt, redarguere et
redargui; quorum utraque tam laudabilia quam iocunda et utilia . . . inuenies in presenti dialogo [Fedone], in quibus
te meditari plurimum oblectabit, subtilissima . . . argumenta . . . de morte Socratis, de reliquis altissime philosophe
articulis tam admiracione quam studio dignis. Epistula Henrici Aristippi ad Roboratum, 89, lines 1–3; 90, lines 18–
4.
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The two basic forms that dialogues take are the mimetic form and the narrative form.66
The former, which is more common than the latter, can be thought of as the script of a play or the
notarized copy of a public debate. For these texts, only the direct speech of each interlocutor is
represented on the page, and the speakers’ names or initials are often included in the margins in
order to assist the reader in identifying the changes between the speakers.67 Sometimes, though,
these markers are absent, resulting in some obscurity. Isidore of Seville’s Synonyma, a soliloquy
between himself and his soul, is a frustrating example of this problem.68 Because this form only
includes the direct words of the interlocutors, its major limitation is that most extralinguistic
information is absent, including the mise-en-scène, the posture or positioning of the actors, their
emotions, and the pacing of the conversation (more on this below).
The second form, the narrative dialogue, records the conversation through the lens of a
single person’s perspective. In Latin literature, the narrator is often the author, or the persona of
the author. Instead of the changes of speaker being marked in the margins as in the mimetic
dialogues, these dialogues constitue a narrated, continuous prose text, the composition of which
is sometimes portrayed by authors as a more burdensome task because the conversations must be
divided by phrases such as “he said,” “she said,” and “I said” (for example, Latin, dixit, inquam;
Greek, ἔφη, εἶπον).69 Despite the ostensible annoyance sometimes expressed within the dialogues

Other names are found in the scholarship, the most common alternative being direct (for mimetic) and indirect for
(narrative).
67
For explicit discussions of this practice by Cyril of Alexandria and Theodoret of Cyrus, see Chapter 4, under
“Literary Precedents.”
68
This dialogue is frustrating for the reader because, though it is clearly a dialogue, one must intuit the divisions
between speakers. Though Schmidt lists this text, he does not give any extended treatment of it. See his discussion
of der selbstbetrachtende Dialog (pp. 124–126).
69
Plato, Theaetetus 143B–C is the locus classicus. Eucleides tells his interlocutor Terpsion that he composed a
dialogue containing the conversation that he heard Socrates have with Theodorus and Theaetetus “not as Socrates
related it to me,” but “as if he was speaking with those with whom he originally spoke,” in order that the digressions
between speeches (αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις) might not be an annoyance. For Latin literature, the prologue of
Cicero’s De Amicitia has had similar influence. Cf. De Amicitia, I.3. Even Petrarch, who wrote a dialogue in which
he conversed with Augustine, quotes this passage as his justification for using the mimetic form. Cf. Hunc nempe
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themselves about this form, the attitude towards this form of the dialogues is more nuanced than
has been treated in scholarship—there are great advantages for using this form as well, and the
ancient authors were aware of this. In my view, the disdain expressed about this form is more a
rhetorical excuse than an expression of a real belief.
In fact, these advantages can be seen throughout the tradition. In Plato’s Lysis, a dialogue
related in the first-person by Socrates, the narrative frame allows Plato to cue the reader to
Hippothales’ nonverbal reaction when he is asked about his handsome companion (in addition to
what his interlocutor actually said). For example, the reader is told that the young Hippothales
blushes, not unexpectedly, at Socrates’ question about his lover, and as the questioning
progresses, he continues to redden with embarrassment.70 Read out of context this may seem to
be no more than a playful joke, but because the central theme of the Lysis is love, these
extralinguistic cues are essential for interpreting how the conversation and the entire dialogue
play out. Throughout the text, Socrates also takes note of the positioning of the interlocutors:
who is within whose sightline (especially significant for the erastes and the eromenos), and what
emotional reactions various persons have to the dialogue. Such observations, it has been argued,
as well as the great detail devoted to describing the scenery and locale of the Lysis, are integral to
reading the dialogue as a whole. The Lysis would be a very different dialogue—both
aesthetically and philosophically—were its form different.71

scribendi morem a Cicerone meo didici; at ipse prius a Platone didicerat. De secreto conflictu curarum mearum, 26,
cited in Vittorio, Philosophical Dialogue, 168–9.
70
Cf. Καὶ ὃς ἐρωτηθεὶς ἠρυθρίασεν . . . καὶ ὃς ἀκούσας πολὺ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἠρυθρίασεν. Lysis, 204B–C.
71
For a fuller discussion of the Lysis in particular, especially the importance of its prologue for the content of the
rest of the dialogue, see Francisco J. Gonzalez, “How to read a Platonic Prologue: Lysis 203A–207D.” in Plato as
Author: The Rhetoric of Philosophy. Ann N. Michelini, ed. Leiden: Brill, 2003. For a more general discussion of this
topic in the Platonic corpus and dialogues in general, see Vittorio Hösle, The Philosophical Dialogue, 48–68.
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The embarrassment, or inequality, of some of the interlocutors is also an important factor
in Augustine’s Cassiciacum dialogues, which are also narrative in form. Perhaps most famously,
during the banquet set for Augustine’s birthday—the setting of the De beata uita is not unrelated
to his mother Monica’s important role in the dialogue72—Augustine notices that the others
present have missed the intellectual joke that he and Licentius had just shared.73 Licentius and he
had laughed, but the rest remained mum in awkward silence. The awkward situation is resolved
when Augustine shares a smile with his mother, who then dispels the dilemma with a quip
simultaneously wise and “vulgar.”74 Monica explains who the obscure Academics are by calling
them epileptics (caducarii). To add to the interest of this remarkable passage, Augustine also
breaks the frame of the dialogue during this episode, directly addressing Theodore who was the
work’s dedicatee. By connecting the inner dialogue with the outer—that is, his conversation with
Theodore or any other reader—Augustine allows the reader to reflect on his own knowledge or
lack thereof and what this means within the context of the discussion of the blessed life.75 Once
again, the narrative form, as well as its interaction with the frame impacts the meaning of the
text, and were the De Beata Vita composed in the mimetic form, Augustine would not have been
able to perform this multilayered conversation.
Finally, Diogenes Laertius’ third category requires brief comment. The “mixed” form, as
the name suggests, is simply a dialogue that utilizes both of the aforementioned forms, the
mimetic and the narrative. For the entire history of the dialogue, the mixed form can almost

See Conybeare, Irrational, 64ff.
Cf. animaduerti ceteros rei totius ignaros et scire cupientes, quid inter nos solos tam iucunde ageretur, sine risu
nos intueri. De beata uita, 2.16.
74
See Conybeare, Irrational, 76–80, 76 n. 48 for the “vulgarity” of Monica’s comment.
75
The most natural reading of this passage might be to assume that every reader shared Augustine and Licentius’
joke, but I must admit that when I first read the De beata uita, I had a poor understanding myself of the Academics,
and I, like Navigius, sat in silence while Licentius and Augustine laughed.
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exclusively be limited to some of Plato’s dialogues, and therefore does not have much impact on
the Latin dialogues of late antiquity.76 The most famous example is the Symposium, where
Apollodorus relates to his companion the story, which was partially but incorrectly related to the
companion by a certain Phoenix, an account he received from Aristodemus, who was actually
present at the party but supplemented by Socrates’ later testimony.
If there is a good example of the mixed form in dialogues from Late Antiquity, it is
perhaps found in the dialogues attributed to Gregory the Great. Composed in four books, this
dialogue, which is mimetic in form, includes the discussion between Gregory and his student
Peter, a conversation that is mostly one-sided. Gregory, at Peter’s request, related what he knew
about the saints who lived in Italy, sometimes speaking at great length about conversations
related to him by others. Of additional interest is the rich discussion between Peter and Gregory
that serve as interludes between Gregory’s stories, providing a second layer of analysis and sort
of meta-commentary to the dialogue as they discuss why the lives of the saints should be
recounted in the first place. Because of this format, Gregory’s dialogic persona inevitably relates
the words and deeds of many other people, which approaches some of the mixed dialogues.77
One might also add those dialogues that are framed as letters. While discussing the
diction appropriate for letter-writing, Demetrius of Phalerum includes a comment that Artemom,
the editor of Aristotle’s letters, made about the form of a letter. He wrote, “A letter should be
considered as half of a dialogue” (εἶναι γὰρ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν οἷον τὸ ἕτερον μέρος τοῦ διαλόγου).78
It is compelling sometimes to use this model when reading some of the later Latin dialogues

For a discussion of these dialogues, see William A. Johnson, “Dramatic Frame and Philosophic Idea in Plato.”
The American Journal of Philology. Vol. 119.4 (Winter 1998): 577–598. See also, Vittorio, Philosophical Dialogue,
167.
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For a fuller discussion of this dialogue and related bibliography, see the final section of this chapter.
78
On Style, 223. This observation is by no means unique to Demetrius. See Gillian Clark, “’Let’s (not) talk about it’:
Augustine and the control of epistolary dialogue,” in Goldhill (2004), pp. 135–148.
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composed as letters, for example, Faustinus’ letter to the Empress Flaccilla, the dialogue De
Trinitate, and Evagrius’ letter to Valerius, Altercatio legis inter Simonem Iudaeum et Theophilum
Christianum.
In summary, it should not be forgotten that writing dialogues was a choice, which
according to the evidence was made by authors with the expectation that the form of the dialogue
would shape how their texts were read and understood. The benefits offered by the narrative
form have been disproportionately discussed here, but in the following chapters, the special
clarity that the mimetic form of the dialogue brings will be discussed at length.79
The Importance of Plato and Tradition in the History of Dialogues
Finally, something must be said about the importance of authority figures within the
tradition. First stands Plato and to some extent rightly so. Plato’s impact on the western
understanding of the literary dialogue is nearly impossible to overestimate. Although the abovequoted passage from Diogenes Laertius’ Lives of Eminent Philosophers is from the book that is
entirely devoted to the Athenian philosopher and is therefore Plato-centric in its discussion of
dialogue, this gravitation toward Plato with respect to dialogue is representative of nearly all
discussion of dialogue since antiquity. Plato is synonymous with dialogue. Plato is dialogue.
Even among authors who have never read a word of Plato, his name represents the wellspring of
dialogue-writing. (A persona of) Augustine, for example, is pitched against Plato in the sixthcentury anonymous dialogue, Contra Philosophos, though the author almost certainly had little
or no direct knowledge of Plato’s writings.80

For one example, see Chapter 4, under “Method of Interpretation: quo facilius obiectionum absolutio legentibus
elucescat.”
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For issues of dating and other relevant information about Contra Philosophos, see its corresponding section in
Chapter 2.
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That said, Plato is not the only name associated with this form, and it is necessary for the
reader of later dialogues, especially those composed in Latin, to swim against the Platonic
current. Over time, other authors also became known for their compositions of dialogues, and
shortly after the period known as Late Antiquity, a sort of “Mt Rushmore of Dialogue” can be
seen to have developed among Christian authors, a grouping which is still active and meaningful
in modern scholarship. These four monumental figures are Plato, Cicero, Augustine, and
Boethius. Their importance can be seen clearly in the quotation from Honorius Augustodunensis
with which I began this chapter, and just as clearly in the volume of essays edited by Goldhill a
few years ago, as this book is subdivided into five parts, the first four of which correspond
closely to these four authors.81 Not only that, but scholars have made an effort to connect each of
the latter three authors with his immediate predecessor, revealing not only their individual
importance but also creating a sort of genealogy of dialogue writers.82 There is certainly some
evidence to support this picture as well. Cicero is explicit about his debt to Plato. Many of his
dialogues are modelled after Plato’s, and he often elaborates on Plato’s influence in many of his
letters to his friends.83 Likewise, Augustine often refers to Cicero’s works, notably remarking at
the beginning of the Contra Academicos, the first of the Cassiciacum Dialogues, that he and his
81

Part 1, entitled “Classical Models,” contains two chapters (of three total) on Plato: Andrew Ford, “The beginnings
of dialogue: Socratic discourses and fourth-century prose.” pp. 29–44, and Alex Long, “Plato’s dialogues and a
common rationale for dialogue form.” pp. 45–59. Part 2, entitled “Imperial Models,” contains one chapter (of two
total) on Cicero: Malcolm Schofield, “Ciceronian Dialogue.” pp. 63–84. Part 3, entitled ‘Christianity and the
Theological Imperative,’ contains two chapters (of two total) on Augustine: Gillian Clark, “Can we talk? Augustine
and the possibility of dialogue.” pp. 117–134, and Richard Miles, “‘Let’s (not) talk about it’: Augustine and the
control of epistolary dialogue.” pp. 135–148. Part 4, entitled “Christianity and the Social Imperative,” contains one
chapter (of two total) about Boethius: Kate Cooper and Matthew Dal Santo, “Boethius, Gregory the Great and the
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Examples are numerous, but see the following. Thelma B. Degraff, “Plato in Cicero.” Classical Philology. vol.
35.2 (Apr., 1940): 143–153. Michael P. Foley, “Cicero, Augustine, and the Philosophical Roots of the Cassiciacum
Dialogues.” REAug vol. 45 (1999): 51–77.
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Cf. “Sed nosti genus dialogorum meorum . . . sed feci idem quod in πολιτείᾳ deus ille noster Plato,” Cicero,
Epistulae ad Atticum IV.16.2–3. See also Phillip Levine, “Cicero and the Literary Dialogue.” The Classical Journal.
Vol. 53 No. 4 (January 1958): 146–151.
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students had just recently read Cicero’s Hortensius.84 Only the connection between Boethius’
Consolatio and Augustine’s dialogues is on less than firm ground, though this connection has
still been made.85
This narrative, although useful for speaking about the history of dialogue-writing in
broad terms, is too narrow and linear for understanding the late antique Latin dialogues. First, it
gives more credit than is due to Plato. Some Latin authors certainly had a meaningful
conversation with Plato’s original Greek texts—Macrobius and Boethius are the obvious
examples, but even Jerome shows some familiarity with Plato86—but for the majority of Latin
authors, Cicero was their primary inspiration. Not only did Cicero represent the birth of Greek
philosophy in Latin,87 but the birth of the Latin dialogue. Cicero’s offspring, however, did not
have only one forefather in its lineage. As often as Plato’s dialogues are mentioned by Cicero, so
also are Aristotle’s. In fact, Cicero often remarks that he follows the form of Aristotle’s
dialogues more closely than Plato’s.88
This Aristotelian influence can be seen in two main elements of Cicero’s dialogues (and
by extension in subsequent Latin literature): the inclusion of proems, often in the form of a
epistolary address, before the “main text” or even individual books of the dialogue; and Cicero’s

Cf. “Uolui temptare pro aetate quid [Licentius et Trygetius] possent, praesertim cum Hortensius liber Ciceronis
iam eos ex magna parte conciliasse philosophiae uideretur,” Augustine, Contra Academicos, I.4.
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Edmund T. Silk, “Boethius’ Consolatio Philosophae as a Sequel to Augustine’s Dialogues and Soliloquia.”
Harvard Theological Review vol. 32 (1939): 19–39.
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For Boethius, cf. “Omnesque Platonis dialogos uertendo uel etiam commentando in Latinam redigam formam,”
Boethius, In librum Aristotelis ‘Peri hermeneias’ commentarii (editio secunda), II.3. For Macrobius, cf. “Nec mihi
fraudi sit, si uni aut alteri ex his quos coetus coegit matura aetas posterior saeculo Praetextati fuit: quod licito fieri
Platonis dialogi testimonio sunt,” Saturnalia, I.1.5. See my discussion of Jerome’s Contra Pelagionos in Chapter 2.
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Cf. Tusculan Disputations, II.1.5, quoted in Lerer, Boethius, 32–3.
88
Anton-Hermann Chroust was one of the leading voices in the discussion of Aristotle’s dialogues in the middle of
the twentieth century. See Anton-Hermann Chroust, “Aristotle’s Politicus: a Lost Dialogue.” Rheinisches Museum
für Philologie vol. 108.4 (1965): 346–53, and “Eudemus or On the soul: A Lost Dialogue of Aristotle on the
Immortality of the Soul. Mnemosyne. Fourth Series, vol. 19.1 (1966): 17–30. For the fragments of Aristotle’s
dialogues, see Ricardus Walzer, ed. Aristotelis dialogorum fragmenta in usum scholarum. Hildesheim : G. Olms,
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inclusion of himself as an interlocutor in some of his dialogues. Cicero’s letters are the richest
source of information for understanding his state of mind in composing dialogues as he speaks
explicitly about his thinking during the composition of these texts. In one of his letters to his
friend Atticus, Cicero says that he composed his dialogue, De re publica, in the manner of
Aristotle, that is, by including proems for each individual book, a point he makes more than
once.89 In evidence of the second point, Cicero recounts a rebuke that he received at the hands of
Sallust at his villa in Tusculum during a private reading of the aforementioned De re publica.
Cicero tells his brother Quintus that Sallust, although approving of his decision to distance
himself from the discussion of rhetoric in the De oratore, criticized him for excluding himself
from the discussion of state matters, which would have given “greater authority” to the
dialogue.90 Both of these two elements are ubiquitous in the extent Latin corpus,91 and these two
examples serve as an important reminder that thinking of the history of dialogue as represented
by only a few select individuals, in this case Plato, can be dangerous and misleading. This is
particularly true for Latin dialogues because of their usually indirect connection to Plato (and
Aristotle).
Moreover, this narrative that focuses on the four aforementioned figures inevitably
pushes the “other” dialogues to the periphery. I make this point not to criticize previous
scholarship nor to deny the importance of these four figures, four of the greatest authors from
antiquity. It is important to realize, however, that a retrospective view of literary history can

Itaque cogitabam, quoniam in singulis libris utor prohoemiis ut Aristoteles in iis quos ἐξωτερικοὺς uocat, aliquid
efficere ut non sine causa istum [Scaevolam] appellarem. Ad Atticum IV.16.2. Cicero makes a similar comment
about his De Oratore in Ad familiares 1.9.23.
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Hi libri cum in Tusculano mihi legerentur audiente Sallustio, admonitus sum ab illo, multo maiore auctoritate illis
de rebus dici posse, si ipse loquerer de republica . . . Aristotelem denique, quae de republica et praestante uiro
scribat, ipsum loqui. Ad Quintum III.5.1.
91
Though it must be noted that like Cicero it is far from guaranteed that the author inserts himself explicitly into the
text.
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sometimes be obfuscating. Literary genres, in this case dialogues, are not preexisting categories
of production at which any given text can “succeed” or “fail,” be it zero-sum or by degree.
Contra Bahktin,92 it is my view that the literary genre of dialogue from its very inception did,
does, and will always continue to develop. Each individual dialogue, therefore, is an answer or
response to the ongoing discussion, invariably continuing, stretching, expanding, and
experimenting with the status quo at its respective moment in time. That Augustine and Boethius
are exemplars of dialogue from Late Antiquity, especially of the meditatio or interior dialogue,
for the subsequent Christian literary tradition is historical fact.93 One needs only to look to
Anselm of Canterbury, Catherine of Siena, Terese of Ávila, and Thomas Merton to see this.94
But this does not imply that we should forget that Augustine and Boethius were not de facto
models of dialogue in their own time, much less the only writers of dialogues from their time. It
is often said that history is written by the victors, but it might be more accurate to say that
literary history is written about the victors.
To speak of texts and their authors in competitive terms is doubly appropriate for
dialogues, and in a sense it is ironic that the texts less often read or “the losers” of this literary
history actually represent the majority of Latin dialogues from late antiquity, namely the
controversial dialogues or οἱ ἀγωνιστικοὶ διάλογοι to use Diogenes Laertius’ terms.95 Like the
first Christian dialogue, Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho, and the first Christian dialogue
composed in Latin, Minucius Felix’s Octavius, this group of dialogues sets a Christian against

“The novel is the sole genre that continues to develop, that is yet uncompleted.” p. 3. M. M. Bakhtin. The
Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist, trans. Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press, 1981.
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See Brian Stock, “Self, Soliloquy, and Spiritual Exercises in Augustine and Some Later Authors,” The Journal of
Religion vol. 91, no. 1, The Augustinian Moment (January 2011): 5–23.
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Cf. Monologion, Dialogues, Interior Castle, and The Seven Storey Mountain respectively.
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Often called disputationes, conflictus, and altercationes in Latin.
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some sort of philosophical opponent, usually a Jew, a pagan, or a member of a heretic Christian
sect.96 At the end of fourth century, Faustinus wrote a letter to the Empress Augusta Flacilla that
contained a debate between himself and an Arian so that she could better understand the issues at
stake in the heresy.97 In the middle of the fifth century, Arnobius the Younger composed the
Conflictus Arnobii catholici cum Serapione, which sets himself against his Egyptian
Monophysite opponent Serapion.98 In the early sixth century, the Scythian monk John
Maxentius, who participated in the ongoing discussion after the Council of Chalcedon, composed
a dialogue Contra Nestorianos, which pitches an “orthodox” Christian against a follower of
Nestorius. There are many more dialogues like these, and they represent the majority of Latin
dialogues from the period of late antiquity.99 In terms of authority or literary models for these
texts, the dialogues of Jerome, not Augustine, better represent the extant corpus of Latin
dialogues from late antiquity,100 and these texts will be the primary focus of the subsequent three
chapters of this thesis. In summary then, the reader of dialogues must both embrace and be wary
of the importance of authority figures associated with the tradition of dialogues. These figures
have cast a long shadow on ancient literature, but at the same time, they do not necessarily
represent the actual extant corpus of late antique Latin dialogues.

Cf. Incipiamus ergo, oboedientes religiosissimis praeceptis tuis, collidere cum aduersario, non quidem de nostris
uiribus praesumentes, sed habentes fiduciam de patrocinio Saluatoris, aduersus quem more gentilium et furore
Iudaeorum bellum exagitat impietas haereticorum,” Faustinus, De Trinitate, 1.34–38. The aforementioned Dialogue
with Trypho and Octavius are good examples of Jewish and pagan interlocutors respectively. Jerome’s Altercatio
Luciferiani et Orthodoxi is one of the earliest heretical example. More will be said about this type of dialogue later.
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Faustinus, De Trinitate I, 2. For this passage see Chapter 2 below.
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Though the authorship is sometimes disputed. See Chapter 2 below.
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For a complete discussion of these texts see Chapter 2.
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Jerome wrote two dialogues: Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi (composed around 380), which personifies the
subsequent reception of the disastrous Council of Ariminum, and Dialogi aduersus Pelagianos (composed in 415),
which contains a debate about the relationship between free will and God’s grace.
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My Definition of Dialogue
As has been shown throughout this chapter, there are a number of lenses with which to
perceive the structure of the dialogue, and relatedly authors of these dialogues make use of these
very structures in a variety of ways to facilitate meaning and advance their literary goals. For
example, an author can use the form of the dialogue to distance or hide himself from the issues at
stake within the text. This phenomenon is infamous in Plato’s case and has created endless
discussion about what doctrines can be associated with Plato himself.101 This distance was also
found to be useful in many of the controversial dialogues. Jerome, for example, uses generic
personae in his dialogue against the Pelagian heresy in order to portray objectivity in the debate
in utraque parte.102 In a similar vein, a dialogue can be a clever way to tackle the prickly
situation of an intellectual superior writing to a political superior. Exactly how one should advise
a king or queen has had a long history among intellectuals. One of the answers to this question
seems to have been the dialogue.103
More of these strategies will be explored at length below, but now that the relevant parts
of the dialogue have been discussed, it is time to proffer my own attempt at a definition. It is as
follows: “A dialogue is a text, written in either mimetic or narrative form, whose intention is to
relate the verbatim conversation of two or more interlocutors and shows an awareness of its
place within the genre of dialogic texts, with respect to both its expected form and contents.”
Definitions are necessary and useful, and though mine is not significantly different from

The literature is endless on this topic and will continue to be so. See Ann N. Michelini, “Plato’s Socratic Mask,”
(pp. 45–65) in Michelini (2003), and Eleanor Dickey, “Me autem nomine appellabat: Avoidance of Cicero's Name
in his Dialogues.” Classical Quarterly. Vol. 47.2 (1997): 584–588.
102
Cf. Jerome, Dialogus aduersus Pelagianos, Prologue.2.
103
Faustinus, for example, utilizes the dialogue in order to educate the Empress Flaccilla about the intricacies of the
Arian heresy. See the further discussion of this dialogue in Chapter 2.
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Diogenes’ definition,104 the path that led to this definition is markedly different from Diogenes.
What I have hoped to show is that the background behind the definition is more important than
the definition itself. It is good to know that dialogues are “philosophical” and have “literary
qualities,” but it is better to know what this meant to ancient authors, and that it did not always
have the same meaning. It is for this reason that I have spent some time unpacking these terms.
On a more mundane note, my definition will serve an important if basic function for the
remainder of this thesis by determining which texts are included in and excluded from this study.
As just two examples, Augustine’s Conlatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo, which is a
record of a public debate copied by notaries, and Endelechius’ bucolic dialogue poem, De morte
boum (as called, De uirtute signi crucis Domini), which is a Virgilian-inspired dialogue-poem
dedicated to the emperor, are excluded, despite their textual forms, because their authors would
not have recognized these texts as composed within the genre of literary dialogues.105 The scope
of this thesis is the topic with which this chapter will conclude.

The Scope of This Thesis, Why Latin Dialogues?
This decision to focus on only Latin dialogues needs some justification. One could
inquire, for example, why there is no treatment given to the extensive corpora of Greek and
Syriac dialogues from precisely this period. Late Antiquity, in addition to being a time of
transition as it is commonly understood, was also a period of intense cultural dialogue. Why not
investigate the entire literary genre that is especialy self-conscious of the power and utility of

“A dialogue is a discourse consisting of question and answer about philosophical and political topics with the
appropriate personification of the characters involved and the choice of language.” Quoted above.
105
Such statement are problematic, but this issue as it pertains to the stenographic records of public debates will be
discussed at greater length in Chapter 2. For Endelechius, see Margaret Schatkin, “Endelechius’ Eclogue and the
Conversion of Constantine,” Andover Newton Quarterly 15 (1975): 228–37.
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acknowledging “the other side” (ex utraque parte)? There are two answers to this question, one
practical and the other more theoretical, which will be treated in turn.
First, the choice of Latin dialogues is one of practicality and need. As mentioned above,
there has been a recent resurgence of interest in Greek dialogues, most notably by Cameron and
those who have answered her call to action.106 The Greek texts, therefore, are currently
generating an appropriate amount of interest, and their absence from this study is not a problem
as far as coverage goes. Syriac literature, however, is a different story. Syriac dialogues are a
favorite group of texts for Hellenists and even Latinists interested in dialogues to mention in
passing.107 Many of these Syriac dialogues, such as the majority of Ephrem the Syrian’s dialogic
homilies or memre, to which Romanos the Melodist’s own homilies or kontakia can be
compared,108 are of a different category from the texts with which this work is concerned. A
number of Syriac dispute poems and prose dialogues, however, are strikingly similar to the Latin
(and Greek) material, adopting, for example, the same structure of the controversial dialogues
that are the subject of the following three chapters. Furthermore, even the significantly later (12th
century) Jacob Severus bar Shakko’s Book of Dialogues (Ktobo d-Dialogu), a series of dialogues
containing instructions about the quadrivium and the other liberal arts, is an intriguing
comparandum for late antique and medieval Latin dialogues.109 Regrettably, many of these texts

See notes above.
The importance of Syriac to Latinists was recently shown by Columba Stewart during a symposium at the
Institute for Advanced Study (24 February 2017). Over the course of his talk, he discussed Syriac manuscripts with
extensive explanatory marginalia in Latin, indicating the linguistic exchange between speakers of Syriac and Latin.
Egeria makes a similar connection while describing her experiences in Jerusalem. See Travels, 47.3–5.
108
See P. Maas and C. A. Trypanis, eds. Sancti Romani Melodi cantica: Cantica Genuina. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1963; and Sebastian Brock, “From Ephrem to Romanos,” in Studia Patristica 20, E. A. Livingston, ed. Leuven:
Peeters, 1989: pp. 139–152.
109
For a brief overview of some of the literature on these Syriac dialogues, see R. Murray, “Aramaic and Syriac
dispute poems and their connections,” in M.J.Geller, J.C.Greenfield, and M.P.Weitzman, eds. Studia Aramaica
(Supplement 4, Journal of Semitic Studies (1995): 157–87, and Sebastian Brock, “The Syriac dispute poems: the
various types”, in G.J.Reinink and H.L.J. Vanstiphout, eds. Dispute Poems and Dialogues in the ancient and
Mediaeval Near East Orientalia Lovaniensia Analecta 42 Louvain: Peeters Publishers, 1991: pp. 109–19.
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must still be read in manuscript form, not to mention the fact that Syriac is uncommonly studied
by classicists.110 Greek, therefore, is actively being worked on, and although Syriac dialogues
remain a desideratum, especially with respect to their relationship with the Latin and Greek
material, the same can be said for many of the Latin dialogues.
This leads to the next answer, which touches upon a historiographical and disciplinary
problem concerning the study of Late Antiquity and even Classics more broadly. In this context,
the question, “Why only Latin dialogues?,” can be understood to mean, “Is late antique Latin
literature, Latin dialogues in particular, a meaningful and self-contained field of study that yields
positive results for the scholar interested in the literary, intellectual, political, and social cultures
of the Later Roman Empire?” “Is there not the possibility,” one might interject, “that important
comparanda will be ignored merely because they were written in another language?” These
questions can be partially answered by looking to the previous studies of the dialogue mentioned
earlier. Peter Schmidt, for example, can write on the “Early Christian Latin Dialogue” without
comment, and in her recent book on ancient dialogues, Averil Cameron, can “confine [herself]
here to late antiquity, and mainly to Christian writing in Greek.”111
These decisions are entirely justifiable, it seems, but sometimes these very decisions can
have the negative consequences raised above, namely forcing a commentator into a myopic
reading of a text whose network of influences and interests might span traditional linguistic and
political boundaries. Cameron immediately follows the above quotation with words of caution,
adding that she does not “mean to suggest an artificial divide” [between Greek and Latin

This traditional separation between Classics and Near Eastern Studies, for example, is beginning to evaporate as
disciplinary lines are beginning to blur.
111
Cameron, Dialoguing, x.
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dialogues],112 and she emphasizes the importance of contextualized readings.113 Yet in her
subsequent discussion of Theodoret’s Eranistes, which is one of the three dialogues that are
discussed at length in her recent essay,114 she discusses only the earlier dialogues composed in
Greek, most notably Cyril’s De Trinitate, as comparanda, and there is no mention of the later
Latin dialogues composed by John Maxentius and Rusticus the Deacon.115 Though it is hard to
fault Cameron for omitting the immediate reception of Theodoret’s dialogue, I shall argue in
Chapter 4 that much can be gained by reading the Latin Dialogus Contra Nestorianos alongside
the Greek Eranistes; in fact, there might even be an intertextual relationship between them.
Furthermore, Rusticus the Deacon, who was pro-Theodoret despite the condemnation of some of
Theodoret’s writings at the Second Council of Constantinople (553), composed a Latin dialogue,
Disputatio Contra Acephalos, which seems to have much in common with the Eranistes,
especially considering Rusticus’ personal opinion of Theodoret.116 One answer to the question
above is that a focus on Latin dialogues alone can sometimes prove to be problematic.
On the other hand, Latin literature in general and the Latin dialogues of Late Antiquity in
particular merit attention and study as a united whole. Ever since Horace noted that Graecia
capta ferum victorem cepit,117 a tendentious relationship, already felt, was explicitly articulated
between Greek and Latin literature and cultures, and scholarship has endlessly traced this

ibid.
And she criticizes others for failing to do so. “The Symposium is a strange text. Vittorio Hösle find in Methodius
some fertile material for comparison, but he does not attempt to square the circle by putting the dialogue in its
historical or theological context,” Cameron, Dialoguing, 42.
114
The other two are Methodius’ Symposium and an unnamed dialogue that takes place between Gregentius, the
archbishop of Taphar and a Jew named Herban. See Cameron, Dialoguing, 39, 52.
115
ibid., 44–50. The closest someone has come to making such a connection, of which I am aware, is Patrick Gray.
He writes, “The Scythian Monks were clearly thinking of Theodoret and his sort when they spoke of an
“insufficent” exposition of Chalcedon,” Defending Chalcedon, 64.
116
See Chapter 4, under “Literary Precedents.”
117
Horace, Epistles II.1.63.
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tension.118 As described above, the person and authority of greatest importance for Latin
dialogues is Cicero, whose numerous dialogues are the earliest examples of the genre in Latin.
His importantance as a unique and original philosophical thinker, however, has only gained
traction since the 1990s.119 This significant contribution to how we read and understand Cicero
can be attributed, in part, to a willingness of scholars to treat philosophical Latin literature on its
own terms, not as a rehash of ancient Greek philosophy. Honorius’ statement given at the
beginning of this chapter once again is a helpful reminder for thinking about the continuity
among writers of Latin dialogues. Recall that after Cicero, Honorius refers to noster Augustinus
et Boetius. There is no mention of Gregory of Nyssa, Methodius, or Theodoret.120 This fact is
apparent from the Latin dialogues themselves. Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, for
example, is modelled closely after Minucius Felix’ Octavius, and the precedent set by the earlier
dialogue is built upon and modified in order that Jerome can make a particular literary and
political point with this text. Another answer to this question, then, is that there is much to be
gained by focusing on Latin literature alone.
It will be my practice throughout the rest of this thesis to keep my focus on the large
corpus of dialogues composed in Latin, though with an awareness of the limitations of this
approach. In the next following chapters, I shall first narrow this focus to the subtype of Latin
dialogues, which I shall call the “controversial dialogues,” and then in the following two
chapters, I shall take a closer look at two dialogues in particular, Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani
et Orthodoxi (Chapter 3) and John Maxentius’ Dialogus Contra Nestorianos (Chapter 4). The

It is fruitless to list even a representative group. Because he discusses Horace’s Epistles at length in his
introduction, see Gordon Williams, Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.
119
See J. G. F. Powell, ed. Cicero the Philosopher: Twelve Papers. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
120
He does, however, refer to them in other contexts. Cf. “De Greca summi theologi Dionisius Ariopagita,
Gregorius Nazanzenus et Gregorius Niseus eiusque frater Basilius, Iohannes Crisostomus nec non Maximus
monachus precipuus philosophus et episcopus auctoritatem prebeant,” Clavis Physicae, 3.7–10.
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background given to dialogue in this chapter, however, will constantly move to the foreground as
it provides the physical material with which individuals authors built their texts.
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Chapter 2: The Controversial Dialogues
Qui non est mecum, contra me est; et qui non congregat mecum, spargit.
Matthew 12:30
Et ait ad illum Iesus: Nolite prohibere; qui enim non est aduersum uos, pro
uobis est.
Luke 9:50
Over the course of the history of Christianity there has been no shortage of disagreement.
The fourth through the seventh centuries are no exception. Ecumenical councils, often called by
the emperor himself, played an enormous role in shaping the ongoing theological debates, which
in this period focused especially on the status of the second person of the trinity. The Council of
Nicaea (325), the Council of Ephesus (431), the Council of Chalcedon (451), and the Second
Council of Constantinople (553), for example, are the pillars upon which orthodox belief on
these issues was built, and the proceedings of these councils were circulated and could be read
throughout the empire.121 These moments, though greatly influential, did not arise
spontaneously. Rather, the mixture of smaller synods, meetings, epistolary correspondence,
homilies, public debates, and private conversations were a cauldron always at risk of boiling
over. When they did, the councils were called to clean up the mess.
This chapter will focus on a subset of texts that were composed within this context,
namely the controversial dialogues or “Kontroversdialoge” as Schmidt called them.122 These
dialogues can be further subdivided into three groups, determined by the status of the non-

Jerome, for example, states that any who doubts of his account of the Council of Ariminum (359) can read the
Acts himself (cf. Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 18). Good introductions and translations of some of these
councils have recently been published in Liverpool’s Translated Texts for Historians Series. The Acts of the Council
of Chalcedon . 3 vols. Richard Price and Michael Gaddis, ed. and trans. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press: 2007
(revised edition). The Acts of the Council of Constantinople of 553: with related texts on the Three Chapters
Controversy. Richard Price, ed. and trans. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2012. See Averil Cameron, The
Mediterranean World in Late Antiquity: AD 395–700. Second Edition. London: Routledge, 2012, p. 9.
122
See Schmidt, “Zur Typologie,” 109–114, 174.
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Christian interlocutor: Pagan, Jew, or Heretic.123 The majority of the controversial dialogues in
Latin consists of the Christian-Heretic-type, and they will receive the most treatment in this
thesis, especially Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi (composed 378–9)124 in Chapter 3
and John Maxentius’ Dialogus contra Nestorianos (composed c. 520)125 in Chapter 4 because of
the wealth of contextual material that allows for a rich and nuanced reading. One of the
arguments of this thesis is that late antique authors found the form of the dialogue to be an
essential tool for framing and presenting their arguments, that is, that form impacts content.
Paradoxically, the so-called “controversial” dialogues often adopt a conciliatory tone, and argue
for and conclude with mutual agreement between the interlocutors. The baptism of pagans and
Jews, and the repentance of heretics are stock endings for some of the dialogues, for example.126
Before these dialogues can be explored further in particular cases, the corpus of material must be
defined.

The Controversial Dialogues
Schmidt begins his discussion of the controversial dialogues with the following comment,
“In terms of number, here [sc. In the controversial dialogues] lies the focus of the production of
dialogues in Latin.”127 He is certainly correct. By my count, of the forty-five extant Latin

The dialogues themselves often make reference to these three categories and blur their boundaries. Cf.
“[Athanasius dixit:] Nam cum tres sint in mundo, Iudaeorum, paganorum et Christianorum religiones,” Dialogus
contra Arianos etc., PL 62.181. See also, Faustinus, De Trinitate, 1.19 and Jerome, Altercatio Luciferiani et
Orthodoxi, 2.31–2.
124
See A. Canellis, ed. Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi. CCSL 79B Turnhout: Brepols, 2000, p. vi; and A.
Canellis, “La composition du Dialogue contre les Lucifériens et du Dialogue contre les Pélagiens de saint Jérôme.”
REAug 43.2 (1997): 247–288, at 247–8.
125
See Matthew Joseph Pereira, Reception, Interpretation and Doctrine in the Sixth Century: John Maxentius and
the Scythian Monks. Columbia University Academic Commons, 2015, Dissertation, Columbia University, at 93–94.
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Careful attention must be paid to the conclusion of each individual dialogue. Aporetic and ambiguous endings of
the dialogues are common as well, and they are far from insignificant.
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dialogues from Late Antiquity, twenty-one of them are of this type.128 This figure becomes even
more one-sided if Augustine’s dialogues, which are less representative of the subsequent
production of dialogues than might be expected,129 are excluded from consideration: in that case
about two-thirds of all Latin dialogues are of the controversial type. It remains to define what the
controversial dialogues are; who wrote them; and their form.
For the purposes of this chapter, a controversial dialogue is “a literary text that takes the
form (or claims to take the form) of a dialogue, either mimetic or narrative, and whose argument
or topic (quaestio) can be understood in terms of negotiating orthodoxy and heresy loosely
construed.” As mentioned above, the extant Latin dialogues can be neatly divided into three
general subtypes of this conflict: the Orthodox-Heretic, the Christian-Pagan, and the ChristianJew subtypes respectively, each ostensibly consisting of a representative of Christian orthodoxy
defending the catholic view against one of its three most notable opponents.130 Despite this
observation, it is important to note, however, that there is nothing inherently “Christian” qua
orthodoxy or qua religion about the definition of the controversial dialogues per se, though the
extant dialogues do represent orthodox Christian thinking almost without exception. This simply
means that one should not forgot that defining and creating orthodoxy against heresy is a process
that consists of a number of individual acts whose success or failure may change over time and is
rarely met with unanimous consensus. With regard to literary texts and dialogues in particular,
this means that the dialogues articulating a position later understood to be orthodox were more
likely to survive,131 though some of the extant Latin controversial dialogues, in fact, are of

See Appendix A for a catalogue of all late antique Latin dialogues and below for a summary of each of the
twenty controversial dialogues.
129
See above in Chapter 1.
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For this subdivision see the note on the previous page.
131
A good example is Faustus’ dialogue, parts of which survive only in Augustine’s refutation of this text. See the
discussion of Augustine’s Contra Faustum below.
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dubious or partial orthodoxy,132 and dialogues such as John Maxentius’ Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos were only seen as orthodox in retrospect.133 Furthermore, it is important to note that
the separation between religious and philosophical orthodoxy is more relevant in a modern than
an ancient context. Were Cicero’s De Finibus, a dialogue that investigates the validity of three
competing philosophies (Epicureanism, Stoicism, and Academic Platonism), composed in Late
Antiquity, for example, it would also be included within the corpus of controversial dialogues by
definition. Once again, Diogenes Laertius’ subdivisions of the Platonic dialogues are useful. The
Latin controversial dialogues are examples of ἀγωνιστικοὶ διάλογοι.134 It is important, therefore,
not to overemphasize the “Christianity” or the “orthodoxy” in the definition of the extant
controversial dialogues as these are aspects pertaining more to the history of transmission and
preservation rather than to the meaning of the texts themselves. This issue will be discussed in
more detail below as the definition of the controversial dialogues is unpacked further.
Some of the elements of the definition given above for the controversial dialogues need
further explanation. The first issue is the meaning of “literary text.” Dialogues, perhaps more
than any other genre of ancient literature, constantly play with the boundary between reality and
the imaginary: did these conversations really happen? This is especially apparent in the frequent

One can look to the dialogue associated with the Luciferians, that is, the follows of Lucifer of Cagliari (d. 370 or
371), the De Trinitate of Faustinus Luciferianus, and the Disputatio contra Acephalos composed by Rusticus the
Deacon The classic study of Lucifer of Cagliari and the so-called Luciferians is Gustav Krüger, Lucifer, Bischof von
Calagaris und das Schisma der Luciferianer. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1969 (originally published 1886), especially pp.
58–96 for the Luciferians. See also, Lester L. Field, Jr. Liberty, Dominion, and the Two Swords: On the Origins of
Western Political Theology (180–398). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1998, particularly Chapter 8,
“Lucifer of Cagliari and the Luciferians.” Rusticus the deacon composed a dialogue, Contra Acephalos, in Latin that
defended a traditional interpretation Chalcedon against the Neo-Chalcedonian position advanced by the Scythian
monks. See, Roberto Spataro, Il diacono Rustico e il suo contributo nel dibattito teologico postcalcedonese. Rome:
Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 2007, and Sara Petri, La Disputatio Contra Acephalos di Rustico. Studi Sulla
Tardoantichit, 5. Pisa: Fabrizio Serra Editore, 2010.
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For John Maxentius’ Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, see Chapter 4.
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Diogenes Laertius gives the Gorgias, Euthydemus, and the Hippias I & II as examples of this subtype. Jerome,
for example, seems to be consciously responding to the Euthydemus in his Dialogus Contra Pelagianos. See the
entry for this dialogue below.
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claim that the texts are no more than stenographic records of an actual debate, even when they
clearly are not.135 The force of the word “literary” in this definition, then, serves to separate,
ironically, the texts whose personae are the literary creations of a single author from the texts
that record the polyvocal utterances of two or more parties from a historical debate (the
stenographic records). Augustine’s Conlatio cum Maximino Arianorum episcopo and Contra
Felicem Libri Duo, therefore, will be excluded from the controversial dialogues discussed below
because they constitute unedited stenographic records of actual public debates (more on this
below).136 Some flexibility or at least uncertainty, however, is required because there are some
dialogues whose origin or status is unknown. The Altercatio Heracliniani laici cum Germinio
episcopo Sirmiensi is a good example. This text purports to be the recorded minutes of a debate
that took place in 366 at Sirmium between three laypersons (though only Heraclinianus speaks)
and three clerics, one of whom is Germinius.137 Although it is likely true that the text is based
upon the stenographic record of a real debate, there is evidence that the record was edited and
modified afterwards by a Catholic redactor to portray Germinius and his companions as “more
Arian,” thereby creating a literary dialogue from the framework of an actual one.138 As a final
point on the decision to separate the stenographic records from the rest of the dialogues, even
though these two groups of texts probably circulated and were read in much the same way, the
distinction between them is important because of the different intentions behind the text. For the

Cf. “Domino fratri Valerio Euagrius salutem. Gratissimam tibi referam quaestionem factam nuper sub oculis
nostris, quam tu quoque, cum cognoueris, gratanter accipies. Fuit igitur altercatio legis inter quendam Simonem
Iudaeum et Theophilum Christianum,” Altercatio legis, 1.1–5. In the middle of the twentieth century, this issue
received much attention in Augustine’s early dialogues.
136
For the Conlatio, see Roland J. Teske, S. J., ed. and trans. The Works of Saint Augustine: Arianism and Other
Heresies. Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995, pp. 175–187. For Contra Felicem, see Caroline Humfress,
Orthodoxy and the Courts in Late Antiquity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 246f.
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See Daniel H. Williams. Ambrose of Milan and the End of the Nicene-Arian Conflicts. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1995, p. 66f.
138
See M. Simonetti, “Osservazione sull’ Altercatio Heracliniani Cum Germano.” Vigiliae Christianae vol. 21
(1967): 39–58, at 43.
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stenographic records, the dialogic text is merely a structural necessity representing the reality of
public dispute in late antiquity and practiced in Roman education, but for the authors of
controversial dialogues, this literary form is a conscious choice. As I shall argue, the authors of
the controversial dialogues made this choice in order to impact their argument and the reception
of their argument by readers, and it is for this reason that the two related sets of texts should be
distinguished, though this distinction is not meant to suggest that both sets of texts do not share
similar strategies of exposition.
Next is the issue of “claiming to write a dialogue” in the definition given above. This
concern pertains to only two dialogues: the De Trinitate of Faustinus Luciferianus and the De
Trinitate of Eusebius of Vercelli.139 In Faustinus’ De Trinitate, which is a text composed for and
dedicated to the Empress Aelia Flaccilla (d. 386), the first wife of Theodosius I, he informs
Flaccilla that she must be aware, as she reads the work, that he has not written her a treatise-like
book but a dialogue (Hoc autem non ut librum scribimus sed quasi cum praesente aduersario
certis disputationibus dimicamus).140 Faustinus claims that he composed the letter as a dialogue
so that she would not become bored by his uneducated writing (squalido sermone), but could
focus on the merits of the arguments instead (rerum uirtutibus). Most importantly, he also
implies that the dialogic form will provide Flaccilla with the opportunity to discover the truth of
the matter for herself (da calculum ueritati), which is a pervasive theme in describing the power
of the controversial dialogues within the dialogues themselves. The text of De Trinitate itself,
however, can only be called a dialogue in a loose sense, as it wavers between literary dialogue
proper and dialogue (or sermocinatio) as it is defined by Quintilian, that is, the occasional
The authenticity of this text has been hotly contested, but I cautiously accept that it is authentic. For this debate,
see Williams, Ambrose, 239–242, and Vincent Bulhart, ed. Eusebius Vercellensis et al. CCSL 9 Turnhout: Brepols,
1967, pp. xxx–xxxi.
140
De Trinitate, 3.6–7.
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conjuring of opposing viewpoints by using various interjections such as the following: quidam
dicat, and inquit.141 Then there is Eusebius’ De Trinitate, whose own modern editor judged it as
a failed dialogue: “Eusebius wrote, or rather attempted to write, his work as a dialogue. His
intention [to make the truth apparent and lay bare the falsity of the heretics], which he claimed
burned like fire at [De Trinitate] 1.1, was stronger than his efforts for following through with his
intention.”142 In saying this, Bulhalt makes a similar observation to that made about Faustinus’
homonymous text above, albeit in less charitable terms. In both of these cases, the decision
between inclusion or exclusion of a text within a literary genre, which is by nature ill-defined, is
at stake. It is my practice to accept a broader interpretation of dialogues in these cases, both
because they are explicit in their intention to write dialogues, and because their reasons for
composition are consistent with the majority of the other dialogues.
Finally, the presence of orthodoxy and heresy in the definition needs some elaboration. It
must first be stated that the aims of this thesis and this chapter are not to reshape the methods of
analyzing the concepts of orthodoxy and heresy in the world of Late Antiquity, though a close
reading of the controversial dialogues, I think, will shed some light on a particular approach that
ancient authors used, at specific and individual moments in time, in their personal negotiation of
the boundaries of “orthodox” and “heretic,” “us” and “them.” A model that emphasizes the
performative nature of constructing orthodoxy and heresy is especially useful when reading the
controversial dialogues.143 Labeling the discourse of the hegemonic orthodox machine as
Cf. Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, IX.2.30ff, and see the discussion of the interstection between rhetorical theory
and the composition of dialogues in Chapter 1.
142
“Eusebius opus suum in dialogo conscripsit uel potius conscribere conatus est; impetus enim ille animi, quem
ipse 1.1 exarsisse uelut ignem dicit, fortior fuit quam cura propositi seruandi,” Bulhart, ed. CCSL 9, p. xxix.
143
See Humfress, Orthodoxy, 217–223; Virginia Burrus, “‘In the Theater of This Life’: The Performance of
Orthodoxy in Late Antiquity.” in The Limits of Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor
of R. A. Markus. William E. Klingshirn and Mark Vessey, eds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999: pp.
80–96; and Karen L. King, What is Gnosticism? Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
2003, pp. 20–54.
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“monologic” and the apparently subversive voices of resistance as “dialogic” is attractive but too
simplistic. Such an understanding overemphasizes the final result of a multifaceted debate, when
the process of this debate is much more important and dynamic. One must remember, as Karen
King points out, that “constructing a heretical other simultaneously and reciprocally exposes the
partial, mutable, and irregular character of orthodoxy.”144 It is also worth noting that the socalled heretics were no less invested in the idea that their own interpretation of Christian doctrine
represented the simple and artless truth, and that their “Orthodox” opponents were in fact the
heretics. The rhetoric, therefore, cuts both ways. For Faustus, Augustine and his ilk were merely
semichristiani, and for Augustine, Faustus and his contingent were pseudochristiani.145 As
another example, the Theopaschite formula proposed by John Maxentius and the other Scythian
monks that “Christ our Lord, the Son of God, ‘one from the Trinity,’ was crucified in the flesh
for our salvation” (Christum filium Dei Dominum nostrum pro nostra salute carne crucifixum
unum de trinitate), was initially offensive to both sides of the Christological debate of the early
sixth-century and was harshly attacked by both the pro-Chalcedonians and the antiChalcedonians.146 One must remember that this position was formally confirmed to be orthodox
only after a number of years and after it was initially rejected in both Constantinople and Rome.
Had circumstances happened differently, the Scythian monks and the Dialogue contra
Nestorianos would be ranked among the “heretics” and their blasphemous “literature.”

King, Gnosticism, 25.
Augustinus respondit: Tu semichristianos cauendos putas, quod nos esse dicis; nos autem pseudochristianos
cauemus, quod uos esse ostendimus. Contra Faustum, 3.
146
See Patrick T. R. Gray, The Defense of Chalcedon in the East (451–553). Studies in the History of Christian
Thought vol. 20 Leiden: Brill, 1979, pp. 48–50. The fullest treatment of this Theopaschite position is contained
within the dialogue, Dialogus contra Nestorianos. See Chapter 4 below.
144
145

55

The Corpus of Controversial Dialogues
Now that the Controversial dialogues have been defined, it remains to gather and
summarize the texts that fit this definition. One will notice a few oddities in the list below, such
as Augustine’s Contra Faustum Manichaeum, the Acta Archelai, and the Adamantii Dialogus.
Augustine is usually understood to have abandoned the dialogic form with his De Libero Arbitrio
(composed 387–396),147 but this protracted work (a grande opus as he later called it) against
Faustus the Manichaean meets all the criteria given above. It is a literary text in the form of a
dialogue—the entire work is subdivided into Faustus’ claims (Faustus dixit) and Augustine’s
responses (Augustinus respondit) that refute Manichaean claims. Augustine himself is
ambiguous in referring to the form of this work. He initially calls them “thirty-three
disputations” before settling on the more generic “thirty-three books.”148 The Adamantii
Dialogus and Acta Archelai are noted for being Latin translations of presumably Greek
originals,149 the former by Rufinus and the latter by an unknown translator. The fact that a text is
a translation is no reason to exclude it from the corpus of the controversial dialogues. As Jerome
attests about the Greek Acta Archelai, this dialogue was read widely (habetur a multis), and the
fact that an effort was made to translate these two texts into Latin indicates that they were read
and understood to be important by readers of Latin.
Below a synopsis of each dialogue will be given. The dialogues are arranged in
chronological order, though both the uncertainy and scholarly debate surrounding some of the

Simon Harrison, Augustine’s Way into the Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. vi. See also,
Retractationes, 1.8.
148
Cf. Contra Faustum Manicheum blasphemantem legem et prophetas et eorum Deum et incarnationem Christi,
scripturas autem noui testamenti, quibus conuincitur, falsatas esse dicentem scripsi grande opus, uerbis eius
propositis reddens responsiones meas. triginta et tres disputationes sunt, quos etiam libros cur non dixerim?
Retractationes, 2.33.
149
Jerome wrongly believed that the Acta Archelai was originally composed in Syriac, “Syro sermone conposuit, qui
translatus in Graecum habetur a multis,” De Uiris Illustribus, 72. See also Quasten, Patrology, vol. 2, pp. 357f.
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dialogues necessitates that this ordering can make no claim of authoritative chronology. Two
related points deserve mention. The translated dialogues have been included according to the
time of their translation, not their original composition, and finally, the pseudo-Augustinian
Contra Felicianum has been included after the De Trinitate of Vigilius of Thapsus, both because
of its occasional attribution to Vigilius himself and because the post-Chalcedonian discussion of
Christ’s natures fits Vigilius’ late fifth-century context.
Octavius, Minucius Felix
Minucius Felix, about whom very little is actually known,150 composed the earliest extant
postclassical Latin dialogue sometime around 200.151 The dialogue, written from the narrative
perspective of Minucius (Cogitanti mihi et cum animo meo) and the only controversial dialogue
to take the narrative form (rather than the mimetic), recounts a conversation between Octavius,
who had come to Rome to visit Minucius and Caecilius, one of Minucius’ friends. After
Octavius criticizes Caecilius’ religious devotion to one of the statues that they encounter on a
walk, the latter challenges the former to a debate. Minucius acts as arbiter as Caecilius and
Octavius give speeches defending Paganism and Christianity respectively. At the conclusion of
these two speeches and before Minucius can come to a final decision, Caecilius admits his own
defeat, though he simultaneously claims victory because Octavius has conquered his error. In
terms of the dialogue’s frame and literary setting, the Octavius stands as an outlier among the
other controversial dialogues. Unlike other controversial dialogues, Minucius Felix is greatly
Jerome only records that he was a notable lawyer in Rome and that two texts, a De Fato and a Contra
Mathematicos, circulated under his name but were significantly different in style from the Octavius. Cf. “Minucius
Felix Romae insignis causidicus, scripsit dialogum Christiani et ethnici disputantis, qui Octauius inscribitur. sed et
alius sub nomine eius fertur de fato uel contra mathematicos, qui, cum sit et ipse diserti hominis, non mihi uidetur
cum superioris libri stilo conuenire,” De Uiris Illustribus, 58.
151
See G. Quispel, “A Jewish Source of Minucius Felix.” Vigiliae Christianae. vol. 3 (1949): 113–122; and Michael
Von Albrecht, “Minucius Felix as a Christian Humanist.” Illinois Classical Studies. vol. 12.1 (1987): 157–168, at
157f.
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concerned with establishing the circumstances and locale in the dialogue’s introduction. This
scenery is more than poetic adornment though, as it is illustrative of how the argument should be
read. This format, however, is unique among the Latin dialogues, as every other dialogue adopts
the mimetic form, mostly eschewing this scene setting.
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, Jerome
Jerome’s first dialogue, composed 378–379,152 contains a discussion between a so-called
Luciferian and an Orthodox Christian. Purported to be the stenographic record of a debate that
took place in a private portico,153 the debate concerns the question of whether “Arian” bishops
should be reaccepted into the fold and more importantly, whether their status as bishops should
be preserved.154 The dialogue can be divided into two parts. In the first part, the Orthodoxus and
the Luciferianus spar, in eristic fashion, in order to overcome each other. Martial and agonistic
language abound until the Luciferian agrees to become a student (discipulus) instead of an
opponent (aduersarius).155 The rest of the dialogue contains the Orthodox’s rational arguments
to the Luciferian’s questions about the issues concerned. Like the Octavius, this dialogue
concludes with the opponent’s paradoxical claim of victorious defeat (Non solum aestimes te
uicisse: uicimus).156

See A. Canellis, ed. Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi. CCSL 79B Turnhout: Brepols, 2000, p. vi; and A.
Canellis, “La composition” 247–8. Alternative dates have been suggested. R. P. C. Hanson has suggested 392. See
R. P. C. Hanson, The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy 318–381. Grand Rapids, MI:
Baker Academic, 1988 (reprinted 2005).
153
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 1.
154
Both are questions pertaining to the Luciferian Schism. See Chapter 3 for the historical background for this
controversy.
155
See Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 506–525 for the critical moment of reversal.
156
ibid., 1010.
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Altercatio Heracliniani laici cum Germinio episcopo Sirmiensi, Anonymous
This text purports to be the recorded minutes of a debate that took place in 366 at
Sirmium between three laypersons, though only Heraclinianus speaks, and three clerics including
Germinius.157 As mentioned above, this text seems to have been modified by some redactor, who
was motivated to portray Germinius and his companions as “more Arian.”158 Heraclinianus
debates with three clerics in succession: Girminius, Theodore, and Agrippinus.159 At the end of
the debate, after Heraclinianus has professed his faith, Girminius erupts in anger and demands
his exile.160 The crowd of listeners, however, rises in a violent frenzy and demands more serious
punishment, namely that Heraclinianus and his companions be put to death on the spot.
Germinius, somewhat surprisingly, prevents this bloodshed, which is where the text concludes.
De Trinitate, Eusebius of Vercelli
Nearly every aspect of this De Trinitate, a dialogue of which two recensions are extant,
has been the subject of disagreement. Although it was traditionally attributed to Vigilius of
Thapsus or Athanasius,161 Vincent Bulhart, in the middle of the twentieth century, reintroduced
the possibility of Eusebian authorship and defended it in his critical edition of the text,162 and this
position was independently supported by D. H. Williams.163 Though many manuscripts and

Carl Paul Caspari, ed. “Altercatio Heracliniani laici cum Germinio, episcopo Sirmiensi, de fide Synodi Nicaenae
et Ariminensis Arianorum. Quod gestum est in ciuitate Sirmiana coram omni populo, Idus Ianuariae, vi feria,
Gratiano et Dagalaifo consulibus.” Kirchenhistorische anecdota: nebst neuen Ausgaben patristischer und kirchlichmittelalterlicher Schriften. Vol. 1 Lateinische Schriften: die Texte und die Anmerkungen. Oslo, Christiania: Malling
(1883): 133–147. This edition is reprinted in A. Hamman, Patrologiae Latinae Supplementum, vol. 1, Paris, 1958,
345–350. Dagalaifus was consul in 366; cf. Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, XXVII.2.1.
158
See Daniel H. Williams, Ambrose of Milan, 66f, and M. Simonetti, “Osservazione,” 43.
159
Neque presbyter sum, neque diaconus, sed tanquam minimus omnium Christianorum pro uita mea loquor, PL
Supplementum I, 345.
160
Et iureiurando iurabat, ut eum exilio deportaret. ibid., 350.
161
In the Patrologia Latina, this text is included under the works of Vigilius; see PL 62.237–334. Both of these
attributions have been convincingly shown to be impossible. See G. Morin, “Les Douze Livres sur la Trinité
attribués à Vigile de Thapse,” Revue Bénédictine 15 (1898): 1–10.
162
Bulhart, Eusebii Vercellensis, vii–xxviii.
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Williams, Ambrose, 96–102, and 239–242.
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compilations contain a text of twelve libelli, only the first seven are original and authentically
Eusebian. Like Faustinus’ De Trinitate, the dialogic form of this text is also loose but is certainly
sufficient for inclusion within the corpus, especially because it activates language found in the
prefaces of controversial dialogues used to justify the choice of using dialogue.164 This text is
exceptional evidence for the Homoian-Nicene debate prior to the 380s,165 and like many of the
dialogues, deserves greater attention.
Adamantii Dialogus, pseudo-Origen, (translated by Rufinus)
The Adamantii Dialogus, originally composed in Greek around 330 (though this is
controversial),166 is a dialogue composed in five books, in which Adamantius defends the
orthodox faith against the heresies of Marcion and Bardensanes. The arbiter Eutropius, of course,
names Adamantius victorious.167 Rufinus translated this dialogue into Latin in the late fourth
century, and this translation has generated additional interest beyond the content of the dialogue
because it was used by Rufinus, perhaps nefariously, to defend Origen during the Origenist
controvery.168 To accomplish this, Rufinus connects Origen with the persona of Adamantius in a
way that is unsupported in the Greek, making Origen the mouthpiece of orthodox doctrine
contained in the text.169 Ironically, the original Greek dialogue is explicitly anti-Origen in nature,
using Methodius’ anti-Origen work, On the Resurrection, to refute his ideas.170 Scholarship is

Cf. Williams, Ambrose, 98.
ibid.
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Elizabeth A. Clark, The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 170 and Judith Lieu, Marcion and the Making of a Heretic: God and
Scripture in the Second Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 115.
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See Quaesten, Patrology vol. 2, 146–7.
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Cf. Alios quidem quam plurimos uideo, cum ad fontes ac flumina librorum uenerint, bibere quidem et sitim
propriae cupiditatis explere, sed mutorum animalium more conculcare pedibus pocula, quibus fuerant delectati, et
fluenta limpidissima ab imis commota uadis probrorum coeno temerare. Prologus in Adamantii, 1–4. Origen’s
writings are, of course, the pocula, and his teachings are the fluenta limpidissima.
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Clark, The Origenist Controversy, 168
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divided as to the extent that Rufinus was personally aware of the significance of his actions—
inscribing Origen into anti-Origen literature in order to defend Origen.171 This move cuts against
the grain of the usual preference for anonymous interlocutors in the Latin dialogues, a choice
usually explained as made to create distance and prevent ad hominem invective.172
Acta Archelai, attributed to Hegemonius
The Acta Archelai, originally composed in Greek 330–348,173 contains a legendary
debate between Mani (or Manes) and Archelaus, the bishop of Carchar in Mesopotamia, before
learned judges. The Acta is a unique document as it contains narrative (almost hagiographical),
epistolary, and dialogic elements, though the dialogic part is by far the longest. At the beginning,
Mani, who has learned of the Christian Marcellus’ piety, travels to the Mesopotamian city of
Carchar to convert him, but upon arriving, he realizes that Marcellus has arranged for him to
debate with the local bishop Archelaus. This debate occupies the majority of the text. After the
bishop soundly defeats Mani, the latter flees the city and is eventually thrown into prison. Later
on, Mani and Archelaus’ paths cross a final time before Mani meets a gruesome and terrible
death.174 Although originally composed in Greek, the Acta deserve a place among the Latin
controversial dialogues for two reasons: the only complete version of the text exists in Latin, and

Vinzenz Buchheit has suggested that Rufinus’ intentions were less than innocent. See V. Buchheit, Tyranni
Rufini librorum Adamantii Origenis aduersus haereticos interpretatio. Munich: Fink, 1966, pp. xl et passim.
172
Cf. Unde ut omnibus approbarem me non odisse homines, sed errores, nec aliquorum infamiam quaerere,
magisque dolere uicem eorum qui falsi nominis scientia supplantantur, Attici et Critobuli nomina posui, per quos et
nostra pars et aduersariorum quid sentiret, expromerem. Jerome, Dialogus aduersus Pelagianos, Prologue 2.22–26.
As will be discussed below, Rusticus the Deacon’s Disputatio Contra Acephalos is another example of a named
interlocutor.
173
Jerome states in his De Viris Illustribus (72) that it was originally composed in Syriac, but that has almost
entirely dismissed by scholars. See Acta Archelai (The Acts of Archelaus). Mark Vermes, trans. Samuel N. C. Lieu,
ed., with the assistance of Kevin Kaatz. Leuven: Brepols, 2001, pp. 13–16.
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For more thorough readings of the Acta Archelai, see Jason BeDuhn and Paul Mirecki, “Placing the Acts of
Archelaus,” in Frontiers of Faith: The Christian Encounter with Manichaeism in the Acts of Archelaus. Jason
BeDuhn and Paul Mirecki, eds. Leiden: Brill, 2007, pp. 1–22, and Vermes and Lieu, Acta, 1–34.
171

61

Jerome, who may have been personally responsible for the fourth-century Latin translation,175
comments that this text was read widely (habetur a multis). Furthermore, the conclusion of the
text is of great interest to readers of Latin, as it was almost certainly composed by the translator,
not the original author. In this conclusion, the author compares the rhetoric of the Manichaeans
with that of other fourth-century heresies, most notably with the Luciferians, and one can see
here the adaption of the original Greek text to fit within the ongoing theological debates as found
in Latin literature.176
De Trinitate, Faustinus (the Luciferian)
As Simonetti writes in his introduction to this work, “we know very little about
Faustinus,” and although Gennadius seems to add a few details about him in his De Viris
Illustribus, they are certainly gleaned from Faustinus’ writings themselves.177 Interest in
Faustinus and the De Trinitate has been mostly concerned with the fact that he was a member of
the Luciferian sect.178 This dialogue, or dialogue contained within a letter, was written by
Faustinus the Luciferian to the Empress Flaccilla, seemingly at her request,179 sometime before
386 (the year of her death).180 Faustinus’ follows Hilary, Athansius, and Ambrose in his
Trinitarian theology. As mentioned above and similar to Eusebius’ text, this letter is only loosely
a dialogue, but Faustinus is explicit in denoting the form of his text—it is composed as a

Vermes and Lieu, Acta, 33.
Et quod faciunt Luciferiani eminentibus sacerdotibus, hoc illi [Manichaei] faciunt in omnibus ecclesiis. Acta
Archelai, 68.14. (Reading “eminentibus” for “monentibus,” following Vermes’ suggestion ad loc.)
177
M. Simonetti, Faustini Opera. CCSL 69 Turnhout: Brepols, 1967, pp. 287–8.
178
See Michel Meslin, Les Ariens d’Occident 335–430. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1968, pp. 33–4, and Simonetti, De
Trinitate, 288.
179
Cf. Sed quia haec ipsa non studio librum scribentis exsequimur, sed ueluti in scida certas summas quasi
properantes deliniamus, ut tuo qualitercumque uideamur oboedisse praecepto, ceterae uoces praetereundae sunt. De
Trinitate, I.7.
180
Gregory of Nyssa composed a beautiful funeral oration for Flaccilla. A. Spira, ed. Gregorii Nysseni opera vol.
9.1. Leiden: Brill, 1967, pp. 475–490.
175
176

62

dialogue.181 This dialogue, like the majority of the controversial dialogues, ends with a call to
reconciliation, but it also, in the spirit of Lucifer of Cagliari’s own writings, concludes with an
expression of doubt whether heretics can ever return to orthodoxy.182 Finally, this text can be
compared to other dialogues that were written to emperors, empresses, and other high ranking
officials, such as Consultationes Zacchei Christiani et Apollonii philosophi and Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos. The dialogic form, it seems, was understood to be useful for instructing political
superiors because it deflects the argumentation away from the addressee. Instead of being told
what to think, Flaccilla can see the truth for herself by reading the dialogue (da calculum
ueritati).183
Consultationes Zacchei Christiani et Apollonii philosophi, Anonymous
The origin and chronology of the Consultationes were long in doubt. Originally thought
to be composed by the same author as the Altercatio legis inter Simonem Iudaeum et Theophilum
Christianum,184 it was later attributed to Firmicius Maternus.185 M. A. Claussen, however, has
written a convincing article situating the Consultationes in Rome in the late 380s or early
390s.186 The dialogue is divided into three books, the first of which follows one of the normal
patterns of the controversial dialogues, concluding with the common trope of Apollonius’

Hoc autem non ut librum scribimus, sed quasi cum praesente aduersario certis disputationibus dimicamus. De
Trinitate, 3.6.
182
Faustinus quotes Titus 3:10, “Haereticum hominem post unam correptionem deuita, sciens quoniam peruersus
est huiusmodi, et peccat et est a semetipso damnatus,” which is one of the many biblical citations marshalled by
Lucifer of Cagliari in his anti-heretical rhetoric. Cf. “‘Haereticum hominem post unam correptionem deuita, sciens
quoniam peruersus est et peccat, cum sit a semet ipso damnatus.’ Cum haereticis a semet ipsis damnatis non
potueramus congregari. Lucifer of Cagliari, De non conueniendo cum haereticis, 14.42–45.
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De Trinitate, 3.4.
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Adolf Harnack, Die Altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1883.
185
Jean Louis Feiertag, Les Consultationes Zacchaei et Apollonii: étude d'histoire et de sotériologie. Fribourg:
University Press, 1990, pp. 1–11.
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Zacchaei et Apolloni.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History. 46.4 (1995): 589–614, see especially 606–613 for the date
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baptism by his Christian interlocutor. The latter two books, however, recount further discussion
after Apollonius’ moment of conversion, and they can be seen as the inclusion of a discussion
that is usually only suggested at the end of the controversial dialogues. This is the declaration by
the newly converted that he is convinced of the general tenets of Christianity but still needs to
discuss and understand a number of specific details in the days to come.187 This is exactly the
purpose that the final two books serve. In Book II, Zacchaeus answers various questions on the
nature of the Holy Spirit and various contemporary heresies, while Book III is devoted to the
Christian way of life, particularly monasticism. This “departure” from the basic structure of the
other controversial dialogues is in fact reminiscent of another subset of the early Christian
dialogues, namely those of John Cassian, Sulpicius Severus, and Gregory the Great. The
Consultationes, therefore, contain a unique combination of philosophical argument and
discourses on practical Christian living.
Contra Faustum Manichaeum, Augustine
Though rarely recognized as one of Augustine’s dialogues, the Contra Faustum
Manichaeum meets every stipulation in the definition given above. Faustus of Milevis (a town
about one hundred miles west of Thagaste in western Numidia) is famously known from
Augustine’s Confessions, where he is characterized as a sophistic Manichaean, a man of
seductive outward charm but little substance.188 Shortly after the Confessions was circulated in
the early fifth century, Faustus’ own dialogue, the Capitula, seems to have been brought to

The precedent for this is the conclusion of the first Latin dialogue, Minucius Felix’ Octavius. Cf. Itaque quod
pertineat ad summam quaestionis, et de providentia fateor et <de> Deo cedo et de sectae iam nostrae sinceritate
consentio. Etiam nunc tamen aliqua consubsidunt non obstrepentia ueritati, sed perfectae institutioni necessaria, de
quibus crastino, quod iam sol occasui decliuis est, ut de toto congruentius promptius requiremus. Octavius, 40.2
188
Cf. Confessiones 5.3.3 and 5.6.11. For the importance of dialogue in this passage, see Mark Vessey, “Conference
and Confession: Literary Pragmatics in Augustine’s Apologia contra Hieronymum.” JECS 1.2 (1993): 175–213, at
201–203.
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Augustine’s attention, and it became the basis for his composition of the Contra Faustum.189
This text is of great interest because of its hybrid nature. Half of this dialogue is original
material, mostly verbatim but to some extent adapted, from Faustus’ earlier Capitula.190 Faustus
composed this work in the 380s, in order to provide his followers with the correct answers to
refute their opponents (in this case Catholic Christians, whom he calls semichristiani).191
Augustine then took the liberty of inserting his own answers in place of those given in Faustus’
original text, creating the current text of the Contra Faustum. This dialogue, therefore, provides a
unique glimpse of the use of dialogue by the “other side” of orthodoxy, here Manichaeanism,
and provides an example of how works of dialogic literature could be put in dialogue, quite
literally, with each other. One wonders if Augustine’s own personal experience with Faustus
influenced his decision to retain this literary form, since in the Confessions Augustine recounts
that when he was finally allowed to converse with Faustus in face-to-face dialogue, he found his
interlocutor’s dialectical faculties lacking.192

Jason David BeDuhn, Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma, Conversion and Apostasy, 373–388 C.E. vol. 1
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvanian Press, 2010, pp. 106–7. Dating the Contra Faustum to the 380s, which
was formerly the communis opinio, is incorrect, as Augustine refers to the recently published Confessiones in the
prologue of the Contra Faustum: Noueram ipse hominem, quemadmodum eum commoraui in libris Confessionum
mearum.
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Johannes van Oort, “Augustine’s Manichaean Dilemma in Context.” Vigiliae Christianae 65 (2011): 543–567, at
559–562, and BeDuhn, Dilemma, 110–1.
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Faustus dixit: Satis superque in lucem iam traductis erroribus ac Iudaicae superstitionis simul et
semichristianorum abunde detecta fallacia a doctissimo scilicet et solo nobis post beatum patrem nostrum
Manichaeum studendo Adimanto non ab re uisum est, fratres carissimi, haec quoque breuia uobis et concinna
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“heretics.”
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Dialogus Aduersus Pelagianos, Jerome
Jerome’s second and final dialogue was composed after 415, near the end of his life.193
As he says at the beginning of the dialogue, this text is the fulfillment of his promise to expound
all of the issues contained in a letter he had previously sent to Ctesiphon.194 The debate is staged
between a certain Atticus and Critobulus (“doctrine-chooser”)195—Jerome explicitly states that
he chose generic names so as not to slander anyone—and the major issues at stake in the
Pelagian heresy are investigated. This dialogue concludes with a less than joyous departure,
which is a rarer but not uncommon conclusion to the controversial dialogues. The Pelagian
interlocutor remains steadfast in his belief and refuses to submit despite the weakness of his
arguments. This text is of additional interest, as it contains excerpts from a number of Pelagius’
lost works.
Altercatio legis inter Simonem Iudaeum et Theophilum Christianum, Evagrius
The Altercatio is the oldest extant Jewish-Christian dialogue composed in Latin.196 Very
little is known about Evagrius, who has occasionally been associated with one of the followers of

See A. Canellis, “La composition,” 247–8.
Scripta iam ad Ctesiphontem epistola, in qua interrogata respondi, crebra fratrum expostulatio fuit, cur
promissum opus ultra differrem, in quo pollicitus sum me ad cunctas eorum, qui ἀπάθειαν praedicant,
quaestiunculas responsurum. Dialogus aduersus Pelagianos, prologue 1.
195
These “generic” names are reminiscient of the two of the characters found in Plato’s Euthydemus: the Athenian
(Atticus) Socrates and Critobolus, Crito’s son. Cf. καὶ μάλα πολύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιδεδωκέναι μοι ἔδοξεν, καὶ τοῦ
ἡμετέρου οὐ πολύ τι τὴν ἡλικίαν διαφέρειν Κριτοβούλου. Euthydemus, 271B2–4. Raymond Kibansky’s discovery
of the third book of Apuleius’ De Platone, a Latin summary of all of Plato’s dialogues, might provide a potential
context for Jerome’s awareness of these details. See Justin A. Stover, A New Work by Apuleius: The Lost Third Book
of the ‘De Platone.’ Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
196
See William Varner, Ancient Jewish-Christian Dialogues: Athanasius and Zacchaeus, Simon and Theophilus,
Timothy and Aquila. Lewiston, NY: The Edwin Mellon Press, 2004, p. 87; and Lawrence Lahey, “Evidence for
Jewish Believers in Christian-Jewish Dialogues through the Sixth Century (excluding Justin),” in Jewish Believers
in Jesus. Oskar Skarsaune & Reidar Hvalvik, eds. Peabody, MA: Henrickson Publishers, 2007, p. 596.
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Martin of Tours.197 The dialogue is usually dated to the early fifth century,198 and the best
evidence for this is the fact that Gennadius says, in his continuation of Jerome’s De Viris
Illustribus, that this dialogue was “known to nearly everyone.”199 The Latin text of the Altercatio
is most probably based upon a Latin translation of the second-century Dialogue of Jason and
Papiscus,200 which was a model for many of the later Jewish dialogues in both Latin and Greek.
It has been debated in the scholarship on the Altercatio whether Simon’s arguments represent
sincere Jewish objections or stand simply as a rhetorical foil to Theophilus’ anti-Jewish
rhetoric.201 Regardless, like many of the other Controversial dialogues, after an argument about a
number of theological points between the two interlocutors, the Jew is converted to Christianity,
and is baptized.
Conflictus Arnobii Catholici cum Serapion, Arnobius the Younger
The Conflictus is a dialogue, in two books, that recounts the fictional debate between
Arnobius, a Roman, and Serapion, an Egyptian, which took place over the course of two days.
Two judges, Constantius and Ammonius, presided over the debate and ultimately named
Arnobius victorious. Probably composed in the mid- to late-fifth century,202 the antiMonophysite, Christological arguments found in this dialogue can be seen as precursors to the
dialogues of the Scythian monks described below. Of interest in Arnobius’ Conflictus are the

Lahey, “Evidence,” p. 596 n. 66. This association is supported by a single statement made in Severus Sulpicius’
Dialogue, which is a sort of sequel to his Life of Martin of Tours. Cf. Haec me loquente, Gallo iam ad narrandum
parato, inruit turba monachorum, Euagrius presbyter, Aper, Sabbatius, Agricola. Sulpicius Severus, Dialogus, 3.1.4.
198
Varner, Ancient Jewish-Christian Dialogues, 87.
199
Euagrius alius scripsit Altercationem Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani, quae paene omnibus nota est. De
Uiris Illustribus, 51.
200
F. C. Conybeare, Dialogues of Athanasius and Zacchaeus and of Timothy and Aquila. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1898, pp. li–lvii; and see Lahey, “Evidence,” 594.
201
Arnos B. Hulen, “The ‘Dialogues with the Jews’ as Sources for Early Jewish Argument against Christianity.”
Journal of Biblical Literature. vol. 51.1 (1932): 58–70.
202
F. Gori, ed. and trans. Disputa tra Arnobio e Serapione. Turin: Società Editrice Internazionale, 1992, pp. 1–3.
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contents of Book II, which venture beyond the simple debate found in many of the other
Controversial dialogues. Here, Arnobius quotes two African, patristic texts to prove to the
Egyptian Serapion that their thinking is consistent with Pope Leo’s Tome,203 namely an Easter
homily of Cyril of Alexandria (translated into Latin)204 and a Christmas homily of Augustine.
Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae, Anonymous
Unique among the Controversial dialogues, the anonymous Altercatio Ecclesiae et
Synogogae is the only dialogue to eschew human personae. The entire text is a continuous
example of the rhetorical figure of prosopopoeia.205 Formerly believed to be the work of Bishop
Severus of Minorca, who was infamously involved in a mass conversion of Jews on the island of
Minorca in the early fifth century,206 this dialogue is currently understood to originate from fifth
century North Africa, certainly after 438 and probably before 476.207 It is often said that the
author is generally unaware of Jewish culture and thought,208 although the argumentation is
consistent with other aduersus Iudaeos dialogues. Because the two interlocutors are portrayed as
personified speakers, the common trope of the Jewish interlocutor’s conversion and baptism is
omitted. Instead, the dialogue concludes more contentiously as the Ecclesia claims victory for
herself (as opposed to Synogoga’s claim for double victory).

The orthodoxy of this work was non-negotiable to Christians in Italy in the fifth and sixth centuries. See Gray,
Chalcedon, 9f.
204
The agreement between Cyril and Leo was an issue of great importance. Their agreement was confirmed in the
second session of the Council of Chalcedon, “Leo et Cyrillus similiter docuerunt. Anathema sit qui sic credit. Haec
uera fide,” ACO, Actiones II–IV vol. 2, 23.
205
That is, giving voice to or personifying the dead or even inanimate objects. Cf. Quin deducere deos in hoc genere
dicendi [προσωποποιιῶν] et inferos excitare concessum est; urbes etiam populique uocem accipiunt. Quintilian,
Institutio Oratoria, IX.2.31. Quintilian then quotes ones of the most famous examples of this figure, when Cicero
has the Patria speak to Catiline: Quae [patria] tecum, Catilina, sic agit et quodam modo tacita loquitur: “Nullum iam
aliquot annis facinus exstitit nisi per te.” Cicero, In Catilinam I, 18.
206
J. N. Hillgarth, Altercatio Ecclesiae et Synagogae. CCSL 89A Turnhout: Brepols, 1999, pp. 5–6.
207
Ibid. 7–11; and A. Lukyn Williams. Adversus Judaeos: A Bird’s-eye View of Christian ‘Apologiae’ Until the
Renaissance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937, p. 337.
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Lahey, “Evidence,” 598; Hillgarth, Altercatio, 6; and Williams, Adversus Judaeos, 336.
203

68

Dialogus Athanasio, Ario, Sabellio, Photino, et Probo iudice, interlocutoribus, Vigilius
of Thapsus
Very little is known about Vigilius of Thapsus and his dialogue.209 Vigilius was an
important African bishop during the time of Vandal rule in the late fifth century and seems to
have been exiled at some point.210 His corpus includes a number of anti-heretical treatises,
mostly against Eutyches and Nestorius. This dialogue attributed to him also exists, in which a
famous cast of characters—Athanasius, Arius, Sabellius, and Photinus—meet together in one
place, so that a winner might be crowned by the generically and appropriately named Probus.
The author claims that he composed this dialogue so that he could refute the many and numerous
objections of the heretics in a way that his readers could easily follow.211 The dialogue or debate
takes place over three days, and on the fourth day (which corresponds to Book IV) Probus gives
his final verdict (Athanasius wins obviously), which also serves as a summary of the positions of
Arius, Sabellius, Photinus, and Athanasius discussed over the course of the work. Because of the
obscurity of the circumstances of composition, it is difficult to create a context for this work, but
it stands as a unique example of the Latin Dialogue because of its symposiastic nature.

The only study of which I am aware is G. Ficker, Studien zu Vigilius von Thapsus. Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1897.
See “Vigilius of Thapsus,” in Early Christian Greek and Latin Literature A Literary History, vol. 2 From the
Council of Nicea to the Beginnings of the Medieval Period. Claudio Moreschini and Enrico Norelli, eds. Matthew J.
O’Connell, trans. Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2005, pp. 426–7.
211
Cf. Sabellium ergo, Photinum, Arium, atque ad nostras partes Athanasium introduxi, ut ueritas, summo
confligentium certamine eliquata, ad omnium notitiam perueniret, et diuersitate personarum uel responsionum ac
interlocutionum huius operis uariata digestio fastium legentibus amputaret. Dialogus, PL 62.180; and cf. Quod ut
facilius cognoscere possem, singillatim eos fidei suae feci proferre sententias, easdemque documentis probabilibus
roborare mea interlocutione flagitui; obuiantibus sibi scilicet et refellentibus his qui contrauenerint, ut aliis
defendentibus, aliis obuitentibus, lucidissimae ueritatis agnitio panderetur. PL 62.229
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Contra Felicianum Arium, pseudo-Augustine
Similar to the dialogue above, this dialogue, sometimes attributed to Vigilius of
Thapsus,212 is another pseudo-Augustinian dialogue, first realized as such by Erasmus of
Rotterdam.213 The major theme of this debate is also the status of the term homousius (ὁμούσιος
in Greek),214 but the issue discussed at the greatest length is the nature of Christ’s soul with
regard to his death, which also leads to the question of the nature of human souls in general since
Christ died according to his human nature. The dialogue concludes with the discussion of two of
Christ’s statements prior to his death and how they pertain to this issue: his words to the penitent
thief, “Hodie mecum eris in paradiso” (“Today you will be with me in Paradise,” Luke 23:43),
and his words in the garden, “Tristis est anima mea usque ad mortem” (“Sorrowful is my soul,
even to death,”215 Matthew 26:38). The tone of the dialogue is also worth mentioning. Although
Felicianus explicitly separates himself from Augustine,216 the tone of the dialogue is polite, and
like many of the Controversial dialogues, its conclusion emphasizes reconciliation and
agreement, not refutation and alienation.
Collatio cum Pascentio Ariano, pseudo-Augustine
This fictional dialogue between Augustine and Pascentius is not without some semblance
of historical reality. It was composed, probably at the end of the fifth century, by an anonymous
author using Augustine’s Epistles 238–241 and a reference from Possidius’ Vita Augustini as
material for his own work.217 This short dialogue, set as a debate between Augustine and
See PL 42.1158 and Ficker, Studien, 77–9.
See PL 42.1156. This dialogue was probably confused with Contra Felicem Manicheum; see Retractationes, 2.8.
214
Ergo, inquit, quoniam otiosi sumus, ad homousii uestri quaestionem, de quo non inter nos tantum, sed etiam inter
maiores nostros plerumque tractatum est, ueniamus. Contra Felicianum, PL 42.1158.
215
The NRSV renders the verse as the following, “I am deeply grieved even to death.”
216
Cf. “ad homousii uestri quaestionem” vs. “rationem nostrae fidei.” PL 42.1158.
217
Uta Heil, “Augustin-Rezeption im Reich der Vandalen. Die Altercatio sancti Augustini cum Pascentio Arriano.”
Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum 11.1 (2007): 6–29, especially 12–18.
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Pascentius with Laurentius as arbiter, is mostly concerned with the contested word ὁμούσιος and
its validity because of its absence in scripture, a basic problem in this Trinitarian controversy.218
It is also of interest because of its discussion of issues pertaining to the translation of theological
terms across languages, notably how various translations and languages represent uerba, which
only make reference to what really exists (res ipsa). Included as justification is the argument that
even Gothic prayers are spoken by both native Gothic and Latin speakers in Rome, the Gothic
incipit of the “Domine miserere” even being cited as an example.219
Disputatio XII Capitulorum Cyrilli Alexandrini et sic Dictorum Nestorii Anti
Anathematismatorum, John Maxentius
The Disputatio is a dialogue composed by John Maxentius (sometimes styled John of Tomis),220
who is associated with the so-called Scythian monks, though it was previously attributed to
Marius Mercator, an attribution that still persists occasionally in scholarship today.221 Its date of
composition has the same uncertainty as the Dialogus contra Nestorianos below, though the
Disputatio has a different structure. Rather than two interlocutors, there are three, namely Cyril,
Nestorius, and the “Catholic.” Each chapter has the following cyclical structure: Cyril makes a
statement (Cyrillus dixit), Nestorius makes a counterclaim (Nestorius dixit), and finally the
Catholic responds with a refutation (Catholicus contradicit).222 The purpose of the dialogue is

Cf. [Augustinus dixit] Ecce quid est ὁμούσιον, quod exprobratur iniuste? Non enim uerbum solum, sed res in
uerbo; nec solus sermo sonans auribus, sed substantia una est Dei credenda in mentibus. PL 33.1159–60.
219
Si enim licet dicere, non solum Barbaris lingua sua, sed etiam Romanis, Sihora armen, quod interpretatur,
Domine miserere; cur non liceret in conciliis Patrum in ipsa terra Graecorum, unde ubique destinata est fides, lingua
propria ὁμούσιον confiteri, quo est Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti una substantia? PL 33.1162. This very issue
arises during Jerome’s Altercatio, which will be the subject of the following chapter.
220
The seminal article on this issue is William C. Bark, “John Maxentius and the Collectio Palatina.” Harvard
Theological Review. vol. 63 (1943): 93–107.
221
Bark, “John Maxentius,” 101ff. Pereira suggests that authorship may be attributed to Mercator, strangely, on
linguistic grounds, Pereira, Defense of Chalcedon, 99–101.
222
Note the tenses of the verbs of speaking. The Catholic speaks in the present, while Cyril and Nestorius speak in
the past, creating a further dialogue between the present and the past.
218

71

twofold. First, it attempts to provide a translation of the positions of Cyril and Nestorius, two
figures of great importance in the post-Chalcedonian controversy, into Latin.223 Second, the
dialogue emphasizes the importance of the ongoing Christological debate by inserting the
solutions to this problem into the mouth of the anonymous Catholicus. Within the context of the
political careers of the Scythian monks and their literary corpus, the Disputatio serves as an
earlier example of their efforts to promote a Theopaschite, Neo-Chalcedonian theology.
Maxentius alludes to this and other texts at the conclusion of the Dialogus Contra Nestorianos,
and it can be gathered that the Disputatio did not achieve its intended effect.224
Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, John Maxentius
The Dialogus Contra Nestorianos is the other of two dialogues composed by John
Maxentius. It was presumably composed sometime between 518, when John and his fellow
Scythian monks traveled to Constantinople to lobby on behalf of the Theopaschite formula, and
519, when some of them traveled to Rome to do the same.225 In the first of the the dialogue’s two
books, two generic interlocutors (Catholicus and Nestorianus) review the major theological
statements of two Ecumenical council from the fifth century, the Council of Ephesus (431) and
the Council of Chalcedon (451), discuss the validity of Mary’s epithet Theotokos (Ephesus), and
the meaning and applicability of the terms natura and persona to Christ, God the Word, and the
Trinity (Chalcedon).226 Book 2 then develops the Theopaschite theology of the Scythian monks,

Cf. Nunc episcopi Cyrilli priora posuimus quae Romana ecclesia approbauit uero iudicio, et posteriora Nestorii;
ex Graeco in Latinum utraque uersa. Disputatio, 1.1–3.
224
See Chapter 4, under “The Conclusion of the Contra Nestorianos.”
225
Cf. Gray, The Defense of Chalcedon, 48–50. To my knowledge, no scholar has made a definitive statement about
the chronology of the literature associated with the Scythian monks in general, or the Dialogus Contra Nestorianos
in particular.
226
Cf. Pereira, Reception, Interpretation and Doctrine in the Sixth Century, 93–4, but see my discussion of the
contents of the dialogue in Chapter 4.
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that is, that “one of the Trinity suffered according the flesh.”227 Like Jerome’s Dialogus
Aduersus Pelagianos, this text concludes with the “Nestorian’s” refusal to accept the Catholic
faith.228
Disputatio Contra Acephalos, Rusticus the Deacon
The Disputatio Contra Acephalos is another important dialogue for understanding the
importance of Latin-speaking theologians in the Neo-Chalcedonian debates in the early sixth
century through the Second Council of Constantinople (553).229 This dialogue, composed shortly
after the aforementioned council when Rusticus was exiled by Justinian,230 represents the views
of a vocal dissident of the theological formulae adopted by the council, specifically the Three
Chapters. Rusticus, who is most famous for translating some of the Ecumenical Acta in Latin,231
seems to have been partially motivated to compose this dialogue in order to explain to Western
bishops the doctrines contained in the Monophysite writings to which they did not have linguistic
access. This dialogue is the only extant Latin controversial dialogue in which the author has

Cf. Catholicus: Catholicos non latet, a quibusdam ita unam personam dici Christum, ut tamen non ille, qui pro
nobis carne est crucifixus, una sit ex trinitate persona. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, 2.21.
228
This dialogue will be discussed at length in Chapter 4 and a full English translation, the first in any modern
language, is included in Appendix B.
229
This dialogue only came to my attention very recently. For whatever reason it has been ignored in much previous
scholarship, even in cases where the text would seem to be relevant.
230
Claudio Moreschini, A Christian in Toga: Boethius: Interpreter of Antiquity and Christian Theologian.
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014, 60f, and cf. Rustius’ description of his circumstances of composition,
“Ego quidem et peccata et necessitates et mensuram meam sciens, saepe proposui taciturnitatem praehonorare
dogmatismo, maxime quoniam nunquam sic perturbata fuerunt quae ad Christianos pertinent, sicut nostris
temporibus.” Contra Acephalos, Praefatio.1–4.
231
See note below.
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explicitly included himself as the orthodox interlocutor.232 Significant work remains to be done
on this text.233
Contra Philosophos, Anonymous
The Contra Philosophos is a unique dialogue. The longest extant Latin dialogue from
Late Antiquity, it was composed by an anonymous author in Ostrogothic Italy in the sixth
century.234 Though the intellectual climate in sixth-century Italy has been called the Hellenic
renaissance,235 the author shows no awareness of this, nor does he, surprisingly, make use of
Boethius either.236 Divided into five books, the dialogue covers natural, civic, and mythological
theologies in the first three books respectively, and in the final two, its major concern is with
Neoplatonism, specifically on its “religious” aspects such as theurgy.237 Augustine is the sole
interlocutor representing Christian thought, while his opponents are numerous. They include
Cicero, Plato, Apuleius, Sallust, Porphyry, and Seneca among others. Marcia Colish has pointed
out the author’s misunderstanding of the thinking, mostly with regard to stoicism, of many of
these figures, even Augustine who is the author’s most important source. But she has also
stressed the author’s originality in his composition. The dialogue is no mere encyclopedia or
florilegium: “He manages to combine a certain fidelity to his sources with a more up-to-date

Cf. Rusticus: Ego a te alius quidem sum, sed non aliud: unum est enim secundum quod tu homo es et secundum
quod ego sum homo; anima uero mea a corpore tuo alterum et anima tua a corpore meo; et mea anima in meo
corpore et tua in tuo alterum quiddam intelligitur, quomodolibet haec ad inuicem comparentur. Disputatio Contra
Acephalos, 16.376. In the short time that I have spent with this text, it is remarkable for taking a significantly
different approach in its criticism of the Monophysites’ understanding of persona and natura.
233
There has been some recent work on him in Italian scholarship. See, Roberto Spataro, Il diacono Rustico e il suo
contributo nel dibattito teologico postcalcedonese. Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 2007, and Sara Petri, La
Disputatio Contra Acephalos di Rustico. Studi Sulla Tardoantichit, 5. Pisa: Fabrizio Serra Editore, 2010.
234
Diethard Aschoff, Anonymi Contra Philosophos. CCSL 58A Turnhout: Brepols, 1975, pp. v–vii, and Marcia L.
Colish. The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, vol. 2 Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought
through the Sixth Century. Leiden: Brill, 1985, pp. 290–1.
235
Pierre Courcelle. Late Latin Writers and Their Greek Sources. Harry E. Wedeck, trans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1969, p. 273.
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Colish, Stoic Tradition, 290.
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Cf. ibid. 291f.
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perspective that reflects his own contemporary knowledge and concerns.”238 Beyond Aschoff’s
introduction and critical edition of the text, there is not a single study devoted to this lengthy
dialogue.
Contra Iudaeos, Anonymous
Even more obscure than the Contra Philosophos is the related Contra Iudaeos. Like the
Contra Philosophos, this dialogue is also dated to the sixth or maybe seventh century, though
Heinz Schreckenberg has suggested it could be as late as the twelfth century. 239 The editor of the
text, Diethard Aschoff, does still tentatively set it in Ostrogothic Italy, the same milieu as the
Contra Philosophos.240 Divided into two books, the text takes a similar form to the other
anonymous dialogue. Augustine once again represents Christian thought, but this time there is
only one interlocutor, a sole “Iudaeus.” Much that has been said about the Contra Philosophos
can be said of the Contra Iudaeos, and like this dialogue, it is certainly more than a repetition of
contemporary adversus-Iudaeos literature. Its greatest influence is again Augustine. As one
example, the persona of Augustine ventures the (in)famous Erythraean Sibyl, whose prophecy
includes the acrostic ΙΗΣΟΥΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΘΕΟΥ ΥΙΟΣ ΣΩΤΗΡ, which is also found in the City
of God.241 Such argumentation, however, is rarely found in other Christian-Jewish Latin
dialogues of this time,242 and more work needs to be done before the significance of this text can
be fully understood.

ibid. 290.
Heinz Schrekenberg, Die christlichen Adversus-Judaeos-Texte (11.–13. Jahrhundert), vol. 2 Frankfurt:
veränderte Auflage, 1991, pp. 158–9.
240
Aschoff, Contra Iudaeos, viii–ix.
241
De Civitate Dei, 18.23.
242
Contra Iudaeos, II.1709, 1734–1744. The Latin incipit for this prophecy is “Iudicii signum tellus sudore
madescat.”
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Conclusions and Transitions
At this moment of transition between the first and second half of this study, it is good to
pause and assess what has been discussed thus far and how it is intended to be read in light of
what follows. In Chapter 1, the view of the dialogue was panoramic. A brief historiography of
previous work on literary dialogue was sketched, and it was suggested that some approaches to
this material overemphasized certain elements of dialogue with the result that some of the late
antique dialogues were understood to constitute a break from its literary tradition. To counteract
this view, much of Chapter 1 was then devoted to investigating the various approaches, histories,
and literary structures often associated with dialogues, including those articulated by both
ancient and modern readers of dialogues. In Chapter 2, the scope narrowed, concentrating more
closely on a subset of the late antique dialogues, namely the controversial dialogues. Again, a
definition was given for these texts, which are related to Diogenes Laertius’ subset of dialogues
know as the antagonistic dialogues (ἀγωνιστικοὶ διάλογοι).243 Using this definition, all of the
Latin controversial dialogues from Late Antiquity were organized chronologically and
summarized. This prose catalogue and summary, owing the greatest debt to Schimidt’s list,244 is
currently the most complete description of this material, and it can be used, I think, to guide
some avenues of future study concerning controversial dialogues in Latin.
In the two following chapters, the focus will narrow again, this time looking closely at
two controversial dialogues, Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi (Chapter 3) and John
Maxentius’ Dialogus contra Nestorianos (Chapter 4). On the one hand, one of the basic
questions guiding both of these chapters is what: what philosophical arguments, literary figures,

Though this point is constantly challenged and negotiated in the late antique material, which will become clear in
the following chapters.
244
See Schmidt, “Zur Typologie,” 174–77.
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and structual elements are contained with them. Neither of these texts has received significant
scholarly attention—Contra Nestorianos almost none at all—and such attention is useful for its
own sake. Yet this inquiry is secondary and serves more as a means of answering another more
interesting question: why Jerome and John Maxentius made the conscious decision to compose
these texts as dialogues. Answers to this questios can be found, I shall suggest, when these
dialogues are understood within their complex historical contexts, not least the personal
circumstances experienced by the authors themselves. Through this exercise it becomes clearer
that Jerome and Maxentius faced similar problems, and that both of them found the form of the
dialogue to be an especially useful tool for solving these problems. A brief summary of these two
historical readings is the following.
The Council of Nicea (325) created as many problems as it solved. Arius may have been
condemned, but various forms of “Arianism” prevailed, and one can look to the philosophical
language of homoousios, homoiousios, and the compromise homoios as symbols of how
(ostensibly) small differences could create such animosity and discord among fourth-century
Christians. Mistakes were made among believers about the correct language of orthodoxy,
notably at the Council of Ariminum (359) when a number of bishops unwittingly supported what
was understood to be an Arian formula, and there were different responses in how to treat these
“lapsed” persons. One particularly intractible character was Lucifer of Cagliari, who wrote a
series of invectives against Constantius II and was exiled by him. Known for his unwillingness to
compromise on reintroducing Arian Christians back into the fold, he infamously consecrated
Paulinus, the representative of the staunch anti-Arian party, as bishop of Antioch in defiance of
Meletius, the current orthodox bishop of the city.245 Jerome’s personal involvement in this
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There is some debate about this series of events. See Chapter 3 below.
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controversy is well known—Jerome was ordained a presbyter by Paulinus himself.246 As I shall
argue in Chapter 3, the Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi represents a conscious effort to
accomplish compromise. By using the form of the dialogue, Jerome both counters the
Luceriferian positions and even the tone and format of Lucifer’s literary output: invective-filled
treatises prohibiting conversation with the heretical other (cf. the title of one of Lucifer’s
treatises, De non conueniendo cum haereticis).247
The career of John Maxentius and his companions during the early sixth century can be
reconstructed fairly well. After the Council of Chalcedon called by Marcian in 451, a number of
related controversies, both far-reaching and localized, plagued the political and theological
stability of the Empire, including the Acacian Schism and the infamous addition to the Trisagion
hymn. It is within this climate that the Scythian monks found themselves supportinng their
version of Neo-Chalcedonianism, their so-called Theopascite theology. This position was
initially attacked and ridiculed from every side, and it is clear that sincere dialogue was lacking
in reality. As I shall argue in Chapter 4, the Dialogus Contra Nestorianos represents a major shift
in strategy for the Scythians, and the benefits often assoicated with the literary form of the
dialogue were used with great effect to counteract this negative reception of their ideas. 248
Throughout the close readings of these two controversial dialogues and their connection
to the historical context in which they were written, the contents found in Chapters 1 and 2 will
take on additional significance as they are applied to specific problems. In one of the most
important Latin dialogues circulated in Late Antiquity, Calcidius’ translation and commentary of
Plato’s Timaeus, Socrates compares his abstract discussion of the the perfect state (contained in

This detail is of some significance to some of Jerome’s arguments in his dialogue.
See the discussion of the historical background at the beginning of Chapter 3.
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See the discussion of the historical background at the beginning of Chapter 4.
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the Republic) to the experience of seeing painted animals or even real animals at rest (animalibus
pictis uel etiam uiuentibus quidem sed immobiliter quiescentibus).249 In the two dialogues that
follow the Republic, Timaeus’ discussion of the cosmos and Critias’ account of Atlantis sate
Socrates’ desire “to see these animals in motion and in conflict” (motus actusque et certamen
aliquod eorum spectare desideret),250 that is, an individual state at work in the real world. In a
sense, Socrates’ observation illustrates the connection between the first two chapters and the
latter two chapters of this thesis. The tools and approaches to dialogues discussed in the earlier
chapters—the painted animals—will always remain at rest in the background, but they will come
alive when the dialogues’ interlocutors enter into conflict. Then will their full significance be
made known. For example, Diogenes Laertius’ subdivision of Plato’s dialogues, particularly the
“antogonistic dialogue,” is first adopted and later rejected during a critical moment in Jerome’s
Altercatio—the genre-expectations of dialogic literature being manipulated by the author to
make an important philosophical and political point. Furthermore, rhetorical prosopopoeia, as
described by Quintilian, is used to good effect by John Maxentius. Often used by interlocutors
within a dialogue to dicusss ancient poetry, this rhetorical figure plays a similar role in Contra
Nestorianos in counteracting a heretical interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews. These are
just two examples, but they serve as reminders that a full toolbox for thinking about dialogue is
essential for further work on this corpus of late antique Latin literature, particularly the
controversial dialogues summarized in this chapter.

Cf. Ut si quis uisis eximiae pulchritudinis ac uenustatis animalibus pictis uel etiam uiuentibus quidem sed
immobiliter quiescentibus motus actusque et certamen aliquod eorum spectare desideret, sic ego nunc informatae
urbis adumbrataeque sermone populum agentem aliquid cum finitimis ciuitatibus in pace aut bello dignum tanta
fama et educatione magna quadam expectatione deposco. Calcidius, Timaeus, 19B–D.
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Chapter 3: Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani et
Orthodoxi, the Council of Ariminum, & the
Luciferian Schism
Augustinus: Quid tibi uidemur efficere velle, cum loquimur?
Adeodatus: Quantum quidem mihi nunc occurrit, aut docere aut discere.
Augustinus: Unum horum uideo et assentior: nam loquendo nos docere
velle manifestum est; discere autem quomodo?
Adeodatus: Quo tandem censes, nisi cum interrogamus?
De Magistro, I.1
The first dialogue to which I shall turn is Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi251
composed 378–379,252 which contains a fictional discussion between a so-called Luciferian and
an Orthodox Christian. In this dialogue, Jerome defends the decisions made at the Synod of
Alexandria (362) against a vocal minority of dissidents who considered the entire orthodox
church to be in a fallen state. These dissidents, known as the Luciferians (after their possible
founder Lucifer of Cagliari), were so persistent that, despite their small numbers, they created
problems in the decades to follow.
In order to give a full reading of this text, the theological and political background of the
dialogue must first be sketched. The primary focus will first be on the career of Lucifer of
Cagliari, especially his conduct in the city of Antioch while he was in exile by Constantius II,
then on the Council of Ariminum (359) where “the whole world was amazed to find itself
Arian,”253 and finally on what little is known about the sect of the Luciferians themselves.

Throughout this chapter, I shall refer to this text as Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi and Altercatio
interchangeably.
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Background to the Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi
Lucifer of Cagliari and the Synod of Alexandria (362)
No one seems to have liked Lucifer of Cagliari. Beginning his discussion of the bishop
from Sardinia, R. P. C. Hanson makes the following bald remark about the man, “Almost
everyone who writes about Lucifer finds him an intolerable bore and bigot.” On the same page,
he adds, “His [Lucifer’s] talents lay in producing vituperation rather than constructive
theology.”254 Prima facie, this may appear to be irrelevant to the matter and irreverent to the
person at hand, but it is not. From what is known, Lucifer was an abrasive character in nearly
every role that he played in the fourth century, and this fact should remain in the back of one’s
mind in order to measure the full weight of Jerome’s dialogue and its rhetorical and literary
strategies. The tone, method, and willingness to reconcile, found especially in the second half of
the dialogue, will mark a stark contrast to the figure of Lucifer and what is known of the socalled Luciferians. Jerome’s tone, I shall argue, was chosen to couteract the belligerent
temperament characterized by Lucifer and those with whom he was associated.
Lucifer, a friend and confidant of Pope Liberius (reigned 352–366), is first known to
history in the 350s when he is sent to Milan by the aforementioned pope to petition Constantius
II (reigned 337–361)255 that a council be called in Aquileia in order to discuss the condemnation
of Athanasius of Alexandria.256 A synod was held in Milan instead in 355,257 which constitutes

Hanson, The Search, 508 n. 4 and 508.
Henceforth I shall refer to Constantius II as “Constantius” unless noted otherwise.
256
ibid., 332.
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A letter from Lucifer exhorting Eusebius of Vercelli to attend Milan is extant; see CCSL 8, Epistula 7. Its
language is concordant with this temperament.The incipt reads, “Treading the devil’s neck and his depraved
whisperings” (calcato capite diaboli et suggestionibus prauis), and he continues his invective by comparing the
Emperor Valens to Simon Magus (cf. sicut in adunentu beatissimorum apostolorum glorificatur Dei nomen in ruina
Simonis, ita Valente expulso in aduentu tuo dissoluta blaphemantium Arrianorm machina penitus destruatur, Ep. 7.
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the first major event associated with Lucifer. As it is recounted, the eastern bishops first called
for a unanimous condemnation of Athanasius,258 which was not viewed favorably by the proNicene supporters of Athanasius in the West. Socrates reports that Paulinus the bishop of Treves,
Dionysius the bishop of Alba in Italy, and Eusebius of Vercelli all refused to sign, shouting their
angry dissent (ἐβόων μακρά) at the eastern bishops. Lucifer is not named by Socrates,259 but he
was among those who refused to agree to the terms proposed by the council, and he was then
sent into exile (in exilio sumus) for “desecrating Constantius’ council populated by his wicked
cronies” (quia concilium uestrum malignantium exsecremur).260 This exile lasted from 355–361
(Constantius died in 361), and it was spent in three locations: Germanicia in Cilicia,
Eleutheropolis in Palestine, and finally the Thebaid in Egypt.261 It is during this exile that his
career especially intersects with the concerns of this chapter.
For one, this was the period of Lucifer’s greatest literary activity. While in exile he
composed a series of caustic treatises against Constantius, including De Non Conueniendo cum
Haereticis (That we should not negotiate with heretics), De Regibus Apostaticis (Concerning
apostate rulers), De Athanasio, uel Quia absentem nemo debet iudicare nec damnare
(Concerning Athanasius, or That no one should pass judgment or condemn anyone in absentia),
De non Parcendo Delinquentibus in Deum (That mercy should not be shown to sinners before

Socrates, Ecclesiatical History, 2.36. Cf. Καθ’ ἣν συνελθόντων [πάνωτν ἐπισκόπων] οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀνατολῆς πρὸ
πάντων ψῆφον κοινὴν κατὰ Ἀθανασίου ἐκφέρειν ἠξίουν, ὅπως ἂν τούτου γενομένου τελείως ἄβατος ἐκείνῳ ἡ
Ἀλεξάνδρεια γένηται, ibid., 2.36.2. See Timothy D. Barnes, Athanasius: Theology and Politics in the Constantinian
Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, 117f.
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God), and Moriundum esse pro Deo Filio (One must be willing to die for God the Son).262 As the
titles suggest, Lucifer is less than friendly in his communication with the emperor. His fervor for
a strict observance of Nicea had no patience for Constantius’ Arian sympathies as he saw them.
The virtues of his fervor, it must be noted, were not lost on some of his contempories, including
Ambrose and Jerome. His sincere belief cannot be denied.263 At the same time, Lucifer’s
unwillingness to compromise, or even converse, was a noted problem. A passage from the De
non conueniendo serves as a representative illustration of his brand of rhetoric:
How can we, who are servants of God, come to any agreement with you,
who are servants of the Devil, especially when God wills that there be as
much separation between us and you as there is between light and
darkness, between life and death, between the sweet and the bitter, even
between God’s holy angels who eternally praise his mercy and those fallen
[angels] among whom you will see yourself tortured forever unless you
escape from their clutches?
Quomodo potueramus nos, cum simus serui Dei, uos uero serui diaboli, in
unum conuenire, quando sic inter nos et uos separatum esse uoluerit Deus,
quomodo inter lumen et tenebras, inter uitam et mortem, inter dulcem et
amarum, quomodo inter sanctos angelos Dei, qui sunt semper clementiam
eius magnificantes, et inter illos apostatas, quos in aeternum tecum uisurus
eris torqueri, nisi temet eripueris ab eis?264
Passages such as this can be unpacked in two ways, each making an important contribution to the
understanding of what is at stake. First, the doctrinal and philosphical position made by Lucifer
here can be emphasized. Through this lens, Lucifer’s position is not very different from nearly
any Christian writer or thinker from Late Antiquity, no matter their creed: the orthodox believers
and the heretics are in a state of meaningful difference from each other, and this difference has
real (or at least metaphysically conceived) consequences. On this point, readers of Lucifer have

Diercks notes the communis opinio of the chronology as the follow: De non conueniendo and De regibus (autum
358), De Athanasio (after August, 358), De no parcendo (359), and Moriundum (360 or 361), CCSL 8, xxiv. For a
discussion of some of these texts see, Hanson, The Search, 510f, and Field, Liberty, 148f.
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raised the issue that his theological sophistication was lacking and that this, therefore,
distinguishes his writings from those of Ambrose, Hilary, and Athanasius, with the resulting
view that their writings are philosophically significant and his constitute no more than a temper
tantrum.265 This might be true, but it is less important here because it marks a difference of
degree rather than a difference of kind. What matters is the conceptual consistency between
Lucifer’s and his contemporaries’ views on heresy.
The other way to read the passage is how it illustrates Lucifer’s general attitude and
response to disagreement, and here is where a significant contrast lies. Lucifer’s response is to
hurl insults and ridicule his opponent (Constantius’ mildness to Lucifer seems only to have
angered him all the more),266 placing the onus of change on Constantius (nisi temet eripueris ab
eis) and offering no common ground. To push this point too far for such a passage is unwise, but
it serves of an example of Lucifer’s active decision to thwart, not foster compromise and
reconciliation. This is especially true because Jerome, as will be discussed below, is much more
willing to give Constantius the benefit of the doubt in order to achieve concord.267
One of the most notable examples of Lucifer’s active promotion of discord is the
following. After the death of Constantius, which marked the end of Lucifer and Eusebius’ exile,
Julian published two edicts that reversed many of his predecessor’s policies. Athanasius was able
to return to Alexandria, and no time was wasted in calling a council in this city in 362, primarily
for the purposes of dicussing the fallout that had occurred in Ariminum and Seleucia (359),268
during which a number of bishops had agreed to what was considered an Arian creed. What to do

“This, apart from his attack on those whom he deems heretics, is all we can distil of Lucifer’s doctrine. It is not
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with these lapsed bishops (and the persons whom they had later baptized) was the question that
had to be answered. Lucifer and Eusebius were of course invited, and it is clear that they both
favored a harsh treatment of these personae non gratae. Lucifer, however, chose not to attend the
council, sending two delegates to represent him instead. He opted to travel immediately to
Antioch, and it has been posited that he felt that his presence in Alexandria would not be
necessary to achieve his desired result.269
The council, however, was decidedly lenient towards the lapsed, giving them conditional
clemency, and it is clear that Eusebius and Lucifer’s delegates were in agreement with this final
decision.270 Meanwhile, Lucifer was in Antioch where he performed his most notorious act,
taking the initiative to consecrate Paulinus as bishop of Antioch in defiance of the sitting bishop
Meletius, whom Lucifer viewed as lapsed, thereby creating a palpable rift among those partisan
to Meletius and those who supported Paulinus. Because of the significance of this event and
Socrates’ succinct description of it, it is worth quoting in full.
The bishop Eusebius of Vercelli set out for Antioch immediately after the
synod in Alexandria, but when he found that Paulinus had been
consecrated by Lucifer and that there was great strife among the people
(for the followers of Meletius assembled separately from everyone else),
he was distressed at the lack of harmony caused by the consecration. He
privately disagreed with what had happened, but out of respect for Lucifer
he remained silent and departed after proclaiming that matters should be
set right by a gathering of bishops. Afterwards, he made great efforts to
unite those in disagreement but he failed.
Εὐσέβιος δὲ ὁ Βερκέλλων ἐπίσκοπος εὐθὺς μετὰ τὴν σύνοδον ἐκ τῆς
Ἀλεξανδρείας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀντιόχειαν ὥρμησεν, εὑρών τε Παυλῖνον μὲν ὑπὸ
Λουκίφερος χειροτονηθέντα, τὰ δὲ πλήθη διεστηκότα (οἱ γὰρ Μελετίῳ
ἀκολουθήσαντες ἰδίᾳ συνήγοντο), ταραχθεὶς ὅτι τῇ γενομένῃ χειροτονίᾳ
μὴ πάντες συνῄνουν, κατέγνω μὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν τοῦ γενομένου, τῇ δὲ πρὸς
Λουκίφερα αἰδοῖ σιωπήσας ἀνεχώρησεν, ἐπαγγειλάμενος ἐν συνεδρίῳ
See Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, 3.5–6; Theodoret, Ecclesiastical History, 3.2; Williams, Ambrose, 62–68;
and Hanson, The Search, 155f.
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ἐπισκόπων τὰ γενόμενα διορθώσασθαι. Καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα πολλὴν σπουδὴν
θέμενος ἑνῶσαι τοὺς διεστῶτας οὐκ ἴσχυσεν.
Though the extent of collaboration between Eusebius and Lucifer after their departure from the
Thebaid is unclear, Eusebius’ reaction to Paulinus’ consecration at the hands of Lucifer is clear:
he was devastated at losing the opportunity of uniting the two anti-Nicene parties in Atioch
(πολλὴν σπουδὴν θέμενος ἑνῶσαι τοὺς διεστῶτας). This is, at least, the view of some interpreters
of these events, making the plausible assumption that Eusebius believed that Meletius could
remain the sole (Nicean) bishop of Antioch in light of the synod in Alexandria.271 Lucifer’s
reactions are known as well. According to Rufinus, he was in turn upset at Eusebius’
disappointment at his initiative (iniuriam dolens, quod episcopum a se ordinatum apud
Antiochiam non recepisset Eusebius); he was also put in a difficult political position because his
delegates in Alexandria had acted under his authority (constringebatur legati sui vinculo, qui in
concilio ipsius auctoritate subscripserat).272 Dismayed at this situation, Lucifer returned to
Sardinia where he died shortly thereafter, leaving a legacy of sincere devotion to the faith but
also of creating strife everywhere he went. His tombstone, with a legible epitaph still intact, was
discovered in July 1623.273
The Council of Ariminum (359)
To backtrack a bit, a brief sketch of the Council of Ariminum is necessary here because
of its prevalence in the Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi and its role in the events concerning
the synod at Alexandria just described above. As a preliminary caveat, there is not yet a clear
consensus among scholars of church history about the relationship between the motivations that
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actually guided the actors to make their decisions at this council and how their motivations were
portrayed by later Christian authors who had their own incentives for seeing things as they did.
These competing interpretations can be summarized as the following: that the events of this
council were the result of an Arian conspiracy, the Arian minority tricking the Nicean majority
into agreeing to a heretical creed (the view of later fourth-century Christians as well as of some
modern scholars), or that the subsequent distate for the creed of Ariminum was a symptom of
changing theological viewpoints later on (the view of some modern scholars).274 Answering this
question is of importance for understanding the theological climate in the West in the 340s and
350s, but because Jerome’s dialogue was composed in 387,275 it is of little consequence here.
The Luciferians had little concern for why these bishops lapsed—all that matters is that they did,
and Jerome, in fact, is one of the “later fourth-century Christians” who saw these events as a
nefarious trick by the Arian party. A brief discussion of the facts will suffice.
In 358 Constantius called two councils, one in the east and one in the west, in order to
bring unity to the church (ὁμοδόξους, a point important to Jerome below).276 The council in the
east was held in September 359 in Seleucia, delayed because of an earthquake in Nicomedia (the
originally proposed location).277 The western council was held in Ariminum in May, on schedule
unlike its eastern counterpart.278 The council had two general parts, and I shall treat each in turn.

For a description of the former, see Y.-M. Duval, “La ‘Manoeuvre frauduleuse” de Rimini à la recherche du
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During the first session, Valens and his supporters (understood by the orthodox to be
Arian sympathizers) made the proposition that all previous creeds ought to be abandoned and
that the so-called Dated Creed (a homoian creed, which uses the formula,“the Son is like the
Father in all things”)279 should be authorized by the council.280 This was rejected by the majority,
and the previous creeds were upheld, notably Nicea’s.281 Then Valens, Ursacius, Germinius, and
Gaius were excommunicated because of their unwillingness to compromise with the other
bishops, Sozomen adding the uncorroborated detail that these four even refused to anathematize
Arianism.282 At the end of this session ten delegates representing the majority party were
dispatched to Nike (in Thrace) to carry the council’s decisions to Constantius, though ten
delegates from Valens’ party also accompanied them. The emperor, however, was off on
campaign, and in his absence, it seems that the minority delegates badgered the other delegates
to make some concessions, most importantly a slight modification of the creed, replacing the
Nicene creed entirely.283 The latter development would initally be viewed as catastrophic by the
bishops in Ariminum.
At the return of the delegates, which marks the second session of the council, the bishops
were initially appalled at what had occurred in Nike. This second session is better documented
than the first,284 though good explanations for what happened in this session are lacking.
Somehow the sentiment among the bishops shifted and within a few months the majority agreed
to the modified decisions of Nike. All evidence indicates that this was done without any explicit

Ὅμοιον δὲ λέγομεν τὸν υἱὸν τῷ πατρὶ κατὰ πάντα. For a detailed discussion of this creed, see R. P. C Hanson,
The Search, 360–80.
280
Socrates, Ecclesiastical History, 2.37. Socrates lists the creed in its entirety.
281
This is preserved by Hilary of Poitiers. See CSEL 65, 95.
282
Sozomen, Ecclesiastical History, 4.17.
283
Williams, Ambrose, 25f.
284
Jerome’s Altercatio, in fact, is a significant source for this part of the council.
279

88

coercion, thereby supporting the conclusion that the members of the council thought that these
alterations were orthodox.285 Jerome famously describes this moment almost three decades later
in his Altercatio, and because of its great influence on this less known council, it deserves
quotation in full:
After that, the council was concluded. All returned joyfully to their
provinces, for this was the desire of the emperor and all good people, that
both the West and the East unite themselves with a bond of communion.
Crimes, however, do not lie hidden very long; a wound poorly bandaged
soon splits open with oozing pus. Afterwards, Valens and Ursacius, in
addition to their partners in crime, notable priests of Christ, threw up their
hands, claiming that they did not deny that Christ was a creature, only that
he was a creature similar to other creatures. Next the word ousia was
abolished followed by a condemnation of the Nicene faith. The whole
world groaned, amazed that it was Arian.
His ita gestis, concilium soluitur. Laeti omnes ad prouincias reuertuntur.
Id enim regi et bonis omnibus curae fuerat ut Oriens atque Occidens
communionis sibi uinculo necterentur. Sed diu scelera non latent et
cicatrix male obducta, incocto pure, dirumpitur. Coeperunt postea Ualens
et Ursacius, ceterique nequitiae eorum socii, egregii uidelicet Christi
sacerdotes, palmas suas iactitare, dicentes se non creaturam negasse
Christum, sed similem ceteris creaturis. Tunc usiae nomen abolitum, tunc
Nicaenae fidei damnatio conclamata est. Ingemuit totus orbis, et Arianum
se esse miratus est.286
As Jerome notes, the initial departure from Ariminum was cheerful, but soon thoughts of
doubt were to creep into the minds of many as news of the council’s decisions spread. Recalling
the synod at Alexandria discussed above, the Council of Ariminum and its counterpart in the
East were treated with suspicion almost immediately, so much so that a synod had to be called to
determine how to treat the lapsi. In the following section, the loudest voice of dissent against the
mercy shown in Alexandria will be discussed, that of the Luciferians. So great was their
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opposition to the reintegration of the lapsi back into the fold of the church that members of this
sect persisted until the late 380s.
The Luciferian Schism
Whether Lucifer himself actually founded the group known as the Luciferians, or
whether they constitute a group of like-minded thinkers on the issue of lapsed bishops cannot be
determined with certainty, though some commentators assume that the former is true.287
Regrettably not much can be said about the Luciferians because not much is known. The two
best sources are Faustinus (the Luciferian’s) De Trinitate288 and especially Jerome’s Altercatio
Luciferiani et Orthodoxi. One must of course proceed with caution in making assumption about
the beliefs of a heretical other289 depicted in a controversial dialogue, but at the same time, the
rhetorical stipulation that one’s opponent must be characterized accurately (cf. Quintilian’s
claim: qui tamen ita demum a fide non abhorreant, si ea locutos finxerimus, quae cogitasse eos
non sit absurdum)290 gives some credibility to how they are portrayed by Jerome. This portrait is
mostly an intellectual one, but it is primarily the beliefs of the Luciferians that matter to this
chapter.
The Luciferians’ positions on the lapsed bishops and those baptized by the these bishops,
as given by Jerome, can be summarized as follows. First, the bishops who have lapsed are like
the salt described by Christ in Matthew 5:13; they are salt that has lost its flavor, only good for
being thrown to the ground and trampled underfoot. This is not to say that Luciferians held that
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these bishops were doomed to Gehenna. They did not hold this view. Instead, the lapsed bishops
had lost any claim on their episcopal authority, descrating the sacred duty to which they were
entrusted.291 Arian bishops, therefore, could be reconciled with the church, as they must laicize
first.292 The second tenet of the Luciferians concerns the laity. The laity, unlike its episcopal
shepherds, could be reaccepted into the church, though only after (partial) rebaptism, that is,
orthodox bishops must only lay hands upon them.293 Various arguments are given for this
position, but this is not the place to dwell on them because there is a good possibility that Jerome
frames them in order to make a philosophical point. The Luciferian interlocutor claims, for
example, that the layperson can be received because he or she is baptized out of ignorance and
therefore should not be faulted. Such a statement allows the Orthodox interlocutor (or rather
Jerome himself) to retort that the same excuse can be given the bishops who signed at Ariminum,
unaware of the grave mistake that they had made.294
This brief historical background suffices for understanding Jerome’s dialogue. In the
following sections, I shall attempt to show how Jerome used the dialogic form in order to
counteract the disagreement and discord caused by Lucifer and his followers.

The Content of the Altercatio
The Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi is clearly divided into two parts. Unlike the
Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, whose two books contain arguments arranged by chronological
period, this is not true for this dialogue. Instead, the two parts of the Altercatio contain
arguments about the same issues. What differentiates them is how the two interlocutors interact
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and therefore explicate their arguments. In the first half of the dialogue, the tone is caustic and
hostile. Filled with battle and hunting imagery, the combatants attack each other agressively,
conforming closely to the antagonistic subtype of dialogue discussed by Diogenes Laertius
above.295 In the second half of the dialogue, the tone shifts dramatically. The Luciferian submits
to the Orthodox’s authority, asking for clarification and evidence for his positions. For this half
of the dialogue, Diogenes’ “pedagogical” subtype is relevant.296
Because the very process of the dialogue is of interest for the discovery of how Jerome
uses the form of the dialogue in light of the historical context of the Luciferian Schism, the
following treatment will read the dialogue sequentially, dwelling especially on key moments that
shed light on Jerome’s choices as author. This dialogue is usually read for the historical
information it can provide about third-century doctrinal contrversy. I do not disagree. I would
only add that a close reading of its literary elements can make the light shine a little brighter.
The First half of the Altercatio (ἀνταγωνιστικός)
Like the majority of the controversial dialogues, the text of the Altercatio begins with an
Aristotelian prologue and presents the fiction that the text is a faithful record of an actual
debate.297 On the previous day, the prologue states, a follower of the Luciferian sect and an
orthodox Christian had met in a contentious debate. The dispositions of these two combatants are
starkly contrasted. The former is portrayed as having argued violently and eristically like a
savage dog (odiosa loquacitate contendens, caninam facundiam exercuit), while the latter, on the

See Chapter 1 above, under “What is a Dialogue? Diogenes’ Definition of (Plato’s) Dialogue.”
Ibid.
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The prologue of the Altercatio is terse, and this brevity can be contrasted with that of the later Dialogus contra
Pelagianos, where Jerome is much more explicitly forthcoming with his reasoning for composing this dialogue. He
states that he has chosen the form of the dialogue because the Socratic method (ex utraque parte) is the best way to
discover the truth, and his reasons for using generic names for his interlocutors.
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other hand, calmly and rationally responded to his adversary (rationabiliter). However, because
the location (in the streets) and the time of the debate were unfit for bringing the contest to a
satisfactory conclusion, the disputants, after nearly spitting in each other’s faces (consputata
paene inuicem facie), agreed to meet the following day. From the very beginning, then, Jerome
situates the Luciferian within the context that Lucifer and his followers were understood in the
fourth century—they were intractible and adversarial. Just as important is how Jerome describes
the Orthodox interlocutor. He is calm and rational, the opposite of his opponent. The importance
of this dichotomy is signposted throughout the dialogue, and it is related to the call for
reconciliation made throughout—the Orthodox always takes the initiative in fostering
reconciliation. One compelling way to read this dialogue is as an argument for reconciliation
through harmonious debate.
The beginning of this debate, however, is cacophonous. The first order of business for the
disputants is to come to terms and find common ground of agreement so that they have a
foundation from which to begin their argument.298 Most notably, they agree that all heretics have
the same status as pagans.299 All subsequent argument in the first half of the dialogue proceeds
from this simple point, creating the following general pattern: the Luciferian makes an objection
or attack upon his opponent’s position, and the Orthodox reveals how such an attack undermines
itself through self-contradiction.300 This pattern demonstrates par excellence the ancient
characterization of heresy where the “heretic” is portrayed as concerned more with winning the

A common theme and obvious prerequisite in dialogues. Cf. Nestorianus: Relinquentes, si placet, ista, ea
proferamus discutienda in medium, quae unusquisque nostrum simplici mente catholicis iudicat conuenire
dogmatibus, ne in his, quae ad rem non pertinent, tempus uideamur expendere. Dialogus contra Nestorianos,
1.Introduction.19–22.
299
Orthodoxus dixit: Igitur fixum inter nos habemus de haeretico sic loquendum quasi de gentili. Altercatio
Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 2.28–9.
300
Cf. Ecce impleta est prophetia: parauit mihi foueam et ipse in eam incidit! ibid. 3.43–4.
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argument than finding the truth, hence his willingness to modify his position in an attempt to
gain the upper hand against his opponent.301 What follows is an exposition of the Luciferians’
positions.
First, the Luciferian condemns the Orthodox for receiving bishops because they are
heretics (the most basic criticism of the Luciferian party), but the Orthodox retorts that the
Luciferian receives the laity, who are also heretics, which is self-contradictory. If all heretics are
equal, he argues, the Luciferian acts incorrectly in accepting some heretics (the laity) and
refusing others (the bishops). Angered by the rebuttal, the Luciferian pivots, emphasizing the
difference between the two classes (the laity and the clergy) to justify his position of accepting
one and not the other, and he then enters into outright invective, which the Orthodox calmly
deflects.302
Because the Luciferian is unwilling to concede the point that clergy and laity are on equal
grounds here, the Orthodox agrees to indulge this line of argumentation.303 This is an important
point and is another signpost pointing to the critical shift in the dialogue that is to come. The
Luciferian may be unwilling to abandon arguments that do not hold water, but rather than end
the dialogue before it can even begin, the Orthodox acquiesces in accepting this untenable (in his
view) position to continue the discussion. This willingness to enter into dialogue or even
“condescend,”especially by the figure of the dialogue associated with being the teacher, is a
virtue commonly praised and seen as a necessary enterprise in dialogue, especially for

John Maxentius lucidly articulates this in Contra Nestorianos. See Appendix B, Book I, Introduction.
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 2–3.
303
Orthodoxus dixit: Quoniam obstinate tenes aliam rationem esse episcopi, aliam laici, ad compendium
concertationis, tribuo quod postulas, nec me pigebit, loco tecum faciente, manum conserere. (cf. Matthew 5:13) ibid.
4.81–84.
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pedagogical purposes.304 With this strategy, there is hope that the Luciferian will eventually
abandon his self-serving positions.
But in the meantime, the Luciferian continues by shifting his argument to make a
utilitarian point against the Orthodox: the Luciferian sect receives the heretical laity because too
many souls would be lost were they to turn them away and reject them.305 The Catholic turns this
new claim on its head, by making a utilitarian argument of his own (since he has agreed to meet
his interlocutor on his own terms). He claims that many more souls would be saved were the
Luciferians to adopt the Orthodox position (receiving bishops), since each bishop received would
also include every member of his congregation, though he also reminds his opponent in the same
breath of the logical soundness of this position. For the Catholic, his own position is superior
both in terms of its utilitarian net-gain and because of its truth—the Catholic position is sound
(they accept both the laity and the bishops), while the Luciferian is self-contradictory (only one
of the two).306
Undeterred, the Luciferian then makes an argument whose origin can be traced to
Cyprian, that the bishops are like salt that has lost its seasoning and have, therefore, forfeited
their episcopal office.307 A medley of other biblical quotations add spice to the Luciferian’s

Gregory the Great makes this very point to his interlocutor Peter the Deacon as discussed in Chapter 1. Cf. Cur
condescendentem te infirmitati proximorum aequanimiter non feram, cum Paulus dicat: omnibus omnia factus sum,
ut omnes facerem saluos? IV.4.89–91. Here Gregory praises his friend for “condescending” to meet his students on
their own terms. This trope can also be found in homilies and is even applied to the actions of biblical characters and
most notably God himself. Συγκατάβασις (literally, “a coming down to”) is John Chryosostom’s favorite word for
articulating this concept in his homilies, for example.
305
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 4.
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Ibid.
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Cyprian begins his work De Ecclesiae Catholicae Unitate with a reference to salt: Cum moneat Dominus et dicat:
‘Uos estis sal terrae.’ M. Bévenot, Sancti Cypriani Opera. CCSL 3 Turnhout: Brepols, 1977, p. 249. Cyprian’s
thought and writings played a complicated role in the subsequent history of the Church, often cited as supporting
patristic authority on both sides of any given issue. See Allen Brent, Cyprian and Roman Carthage. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 328–9, for his thoughts on rebaptism 17–8. In general, the theme of
childishness is pervasively used to describe inappropriate behavior in dialogues.
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biting diatribe, which is his longest speech in the dialogue,308 but again the Orthodox brings the
boiling pot back down to a simmer.
Luciferian: I ask you, have you not read what is said about bishops? “You
are the salt of the earth; but if salt has lost its taste, how can its flavor be
restored? It is no longer good for anything, but is thrown out and
trampled under foot” [Matt 5:13]. And also, “If someone sins against
another, a priest can intercede with the Lord; but if a priest sins, there is
no one else to make intercession for him” [1 Sam 2:25]? These two
passages from scripture are in agreement. For just as salt seasons all food
and there is nothing so intrinsically flavorable that improves taste without
it, so also is the bishop the condiment of the whole world and his own
church in particular.
Luciferianus dixit: Oro te, non legisti de episcopis dictum: Uos estis sal
terrae. Si autem sal infatuatum fuerit, in quo salietur? Ad nihil ualet, nisi
ut proiciatur foras et ab hominibus conculcetur. Sed et illud quod, pro
populo peccatore, sacerdos Dominum exoret, pro sacerdote uero nullus sit
alius qui deprecetur. Quae quidem duo Scripturarum capitula in unam
sententiam concurrunt. Nam, ut sal omnem cibum condit nec est aliquid
per se tam suaue quod absque eo gustum demulceat, ita mundi totius et
propriae Ecclesiae condimentum episcopus est.309
With the introduction of the argument about the salt—that the bishop has lost his power to
function as a bishop—baptism finally comes to the fore, the issue in which the Orthodox will
ultimately succeed in catching his opponent in an inescapable contradiction. Here he stands his
ground and again repeats that this position is incompatible with what was originally agreed upon
(heretics are no different from pagans). Those baptized by Arian bishops should not be received,
argues the Catholic, if that bishop has lost his episcopal powers, but this is precisely the
Luciferian’s practice.310

For the whole speech, see Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 5.121–192.
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 121–130; I have modified the NRSV translation of 1 Samuel significantly.
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Neque enim fieri potest ut qui in baptisterio sanctus est sit apud altare peccator. Altercatio Luciferiani et
Orthodoxi, 6.205–6.
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It is with untangling this problem that the rest of the first half of the dialogue is
concerned. The Luciferian commences by quoting Acts 19:1–6,311 attempting to separate baptism
into two distinct parts—the act of pouring water and the laying on of hands—citing Church
custom as authority here for the first time,312 the point being that the Luciferians “complete” the
baptism through the laying on of hands. The Orthodox again counters with his usual answer, that
this line of argumentation is inconsistent with what they have already agreed upon. Again, the
Luciferian replies by resorting to the stereotypical eristic mode of debate; he changes his original
position, claiming that his sect should then accept neither the lay nor the bishops and thereby
claiming victory for himself. The Orthodox censures him for his sophistic tactics,313
condemning, in general, every Christian writer who, like Aristotle, prefers delighting the ears of
his listeners over drinking the sweet draughts of Scripture.314 “Christians,” he says, echoing
imagery from Minucius Felix’ Octavius, “who participate in this sort of dialogue are like small
children who mimic their opponents when they fight, repeating every word that they say.315
There is yet one final argument to be made before the Luciferian experiences his
epiphany, and surrender is conceded, an argument about intentionality. The lay person who
receives baptism from the Arian, the Luciferian argues, believes that the baptism received is

In this passage a number of persons previously baptized by John the Baptist are rebaptized “in the name of the
Lord Jesus,” and Paul lays hands upon them.
312
Nam multa et alia quae per traditionem in Ecclesiis obseruantur, auctoritatem sibi scriptae legis usurpauerunt.
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 8.335–37.
313
Sed dum amorem contradicendi sequeris, a quaestionum lineis excidisti, more quorumdam loquacium potius
quam facundorum, qui cum disputare nesciant, tamen litigare non desinunt. ibid. 11.411–15.
314
Cf. [Orthodoxus dixit:] Accedit ad hoc quod Ariana haeresis magis cum saeculi sapientia facit et
argumentationum riuos de Aristotelicis fontibus mutuatur. ibid. 11.429–431.
315
Igitur, paruulorum inter se certantium ritu, quicquid dixeris, dicam: affirmabis, affirmabo, negabis, negabo! ibid.
431–33. This statement might be a subtle allusion to the frame of Minucius Felix’ Octavius, where Caecilius,
Octavius, and Minucius witness a number of young boys on the beach skipping stones into the sea as a competitive
game (cf. Octavius, 3.5–6). This game serves as a symbol of the debate between Octavius and Caecilius that will
also take place next to the sea later in the text. Jerome clearly alludes to the Octavius at the conclusion of the
Altercatio (cf. Altercatio, 28.1010–11, and Octavius, 40.1).
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correct and therefore can be forgiven for his fault.316 He or she is the unwilling victim of the
nefarious state that the Arian bishops occupy. This critical move in the Luciferian’s
argumentation is the catalyst that causes the superstructure of the dialogue to transform, and its
connection to the historical background of the Luciferian Schism, particularly the Council of
Ariminum, is certainly intentional.
The Second half of the Altercatio (γυμναστικός)
The irony (or hypocrisy as Jerome would have it) in the Luciferian’s statement that the
unwitting ignorance of the laity is sufficient for treating them mercifully is great. As the
Orthodox points out, or perhaps Jerome points out, in his criticism of this position, the erroneous
arguments contained in this statement have both historical and rhetorical implications. First, the
Luciferian’s claim that the lay should be forgiven because of their ignorance should also be
applied to the bishops at Ariminum who ignorantly support a creed that they believed was
orthodox. In fact, Jerome will emphasize the bishops’ignorance and their repentance at their
mistake later in the dialogue.317 Second, the logical error in believing that even an ignorant
layperson can receive baptism from a pagan bishop (since a heretic is none other than a pagan)
betrays the Luciferian’s inability to converse with the Orthodox as an equal. The manifestation
of this inequality is then represented rhetorically in the dialogue coinciding with the shift from
the antagonistic form of the dialogue to the pedagogical, the Orthodox becoming the magister,
the Luciferian the discipulus.318 Because of the profound importance of this moment for the
dialogue as a whole, it merits quotation in full.

Luciferianus dixit: Sed laico ideo ignoscendum est, quia Ecclesiam Dei putans, simpliciter accessit et iuxta fidem
suam credens baptizatus est. ibid. 12.437–39.
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Uerum hoc penitus absurdum est, ut discipulus ad magistrum uadens ante sit artifex quam doceatur, ut modo ab
idolorum ueneratione conuersus, melius nouerit Christum quam ille qui doceat...Ridicula penitus assertio, ante
316

98

Luciferian: Just before I asked you not to speak cleverly
(philosophically) but simply (Christianly) with me.
Orthodox: Do you want to learn, or are you disputing with me?
Luciferian: Certainly I am disputing with you because I am asking you
for the reason for your action.
Orthodox: If you dispute, then I have already given you my response,
“I accept bishops from the Arians for the same reason that you accept the
baptized.” If you want to learn, join my ranks! An opponent is defeated; a
student is instructed!
Luciferian: I cannot become a student before I hear what the teacher
teaches!
Orthodox: Because you turn your back in retreat, and you want to be
“taught” by me so as to have a fresh opponent, I shall “teach” you in the
same spirit. We agree in our faith; we agree that heretics should be
received. Might we also agree in agreement?
Luciferian: This isn’t teaching; this is making an argument!
Orthodox: Because you seek peace with a shield, I hide my sword in a
branch of olive.
Luciferian: I give up. I raise my hands in defeat. I yield. You’ve won.
But because I have surrendered, I ask the reason for the oath you
compelled me to swear.
Luciferian: Iam et superius rogaui ut non philosophice mecum sed
Christiane loquaris.
Orthodox: Discere uis an contendis?
Luciferian: Utique contendo, qui facti tui a te quaero rationem!
Orthodox: Si contendis, iam tibi responsum est. Eadem enim ratione
ab Arianis recipio episcopum qua tu recipis baptizatum. Si discere cupis,
in meam aciem transgredere! Aduersarius enim uincitur, discipulus
docetur!
Luciferian: Non possum ante esse discipulus quam magistrum audiam
praedicantem!
Orthodox: Quoniam tergiuersaris, et sic a me uis doceri ut aduersarium
in integro habeas, tuo animo te docebo. Consentimus in fide, consentimus
in haereticis recipiendis, consentiamus et in conuentu!
Luciferian: Hoc non est docere, sed argumentari!
Orthodox: Quia tu pacem cum scuto petis, et nos oliuae ramum gladio
inserimus.
Luciferian: En tollo manus, cedo, uicisti. Uerum cum arma deponam,
sacramenti, in quo me iurare compellis, quaero rationem.319

quemquam de fide disputare quam credere, ante mysterium scire quam initiatus sit, aliter de Deo sentire baptizantem
et aliter baptizatum! bid. 445–48, 461–464.
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Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 14.501–521.
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This remarkable exchange, perhaps responding directly to the writings of Lucifer
himself,320 immediately begs the question of the plausibility that the intractible Luciferian would
willingly submit and accept defeat. This is a useful question for thinking about the controversial
dialogue as a whole, the Altercatio included. The simple answer is that it is implausible, but this
departure from the reality of debate shows what the literary form of the dialogue can accomplish
(and what real debate sometimes cannot).321 On the other hand, the adoption of a pedagogical
mode of dialogue is not unusual. In fact, the movement made by the two interlocutors in this
passage to adopt the roles of master and disciple and abandon those of combative adversaries is a
trope found in other extant dialogues, rhetorical treatises, and even transcripts of recorded
debates. As mentioned in Chapter 1, these two modes are subdivisions of Plato’s dialogues found
in Diogenes Laertius.322 Similar subdivisions can also be found in Aristotle’s On Sophistical
Refutations, which was translated by Boethius. In this treatise, Boethius claims, via Aristotle,
that there are four types of disputations, the didactic (doctrinales), the dialectical (dialecticae),
the experimental (temptatiuae), and the eristic (litigiosae).323 Of greatest interest is how Boethius
describes the didactic arguments, especially the student’s state of mind, “Didactic arguments are
those that reason from the principles appropriate to each branch of learning and not from the
opinions of the respondent—for the learner must believe (oportet enim credere eum qui
discit).”324 This is precisely what the Orthodox interlocutor presses his opponent to do: to throw

Language such as “Consentimus in fide, consentimus in haereticis recipiendis, consentiamus et in conuentu!” of
Lucifer of Cagliari’s extant works, especially De non conueniendo cum haereticis. See also below.
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This will be explored further below in the context of Augustine’s Collatio cum Maximino.
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Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, 3.48–51.
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Sunt ergo disputationum genera quatuor, doctrinales, dialecticae, temptativuae, litigiosae. De Sophisticis
Elenchis, 165a38–165b1. Ἔστι δὴ τῶν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι λόγων τέτταρα γένη, διδασκαλικοὶ καὶ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ
πειραστικοὶ καὶ ἐριστικοί. On Sophistical Refutations, 165a39–165b1.
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Doctrinales quidam quae ex propriis principiis cuiusque disciplinae et non ex his quae respondenti uidentur
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up his hands and surrender so that true learning might take place. Opponents are conquered, but
disciples are instructed (Aduersarius enim uincitur, discipulus docetur). Just as it was absurd to
believe that the uninitiated layperson was more knowledgeable than the bishop baptizing him or
her, the same is true for the student to claim superiority over his teacher. The Luciferian’s
argument, “non possum ante esse discipulus quam magistrum audiam praedicantem,” is
therefore nonsensical. He must submit and put his faith, as Aristotle and Boethius claim, in his
teacher before he can begin to understand. This is not to say, of course, that Jerome was aware
of Boethius’ translation, which postdated his own death, but only that he is positioning himself
within a long-established rhetorical mode, namely didactic discourse where there are clearly
defined “teachers” and students,” which is succinctly expressed in Aristotle’s On Sophistical
Refutations.
Furthermore, other contemporary controversial dialogues and even actual recorded
debates also laud the value of the pedagogical method of discouse (if only sarcastically in the
recorded debates), and what is more, they find evidence for this strategy in scripture itself, Nisi
credideritis, non intellegetis (Isaiah 7:9; cf. Boethius’ oportet enim credere eum qui discit). In
fact, this verse becomes almost a motto in the dialogues. When explaining the reasoning behind
Christ’s incarnation to the philosopher Apollonius, Zacchaeus exhorts him,
[Zacchaeus the Christian said:] “If you do not believe, neither will you
understand” [Is 7:9]. Only then, if you raise your mind, which is
wandering in the shadows, to the light of higher understanding so that you
believe that whatever God wills is also possible, you will the discover that
He is not forced through necessity—insofar as there is necessity in Him—
of coming to earth, or rather because He is omnipresent, of appearing
visibly in a man; instead you will understand with your reason that [the
incarnation] was His will.”
[Zaccheus Christianus:] Nisi credideritis, nec intellegetis. Proinde, si
animum in tenebris oberrantem ad superni intellectus lumen erexeris, ut
Deum quaecumque uelit credas et posse, ueniendi eidem ad terras, immo
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quia ubique semper est, in homine ut uisibiliter appareret, necessitatem
quidem, quantum in ipso est, non deprehendes, sed cum ratione fuisse
intelleges uoluntatem.325
Evagrius makes the same claim, when Theophilus begins his debate with Simon, his Jewish
interlocutor; otherwise, he says, their dialogue will never achieve anything.
Theophilus: Christ’s saying is sacrosanct, and if you desire to understand
it, you should first believe and only then can you understand. Isaiah, in
fact, refutes you when he says, “If you do not believe, neither will you
understand” [Is 7:9]. Beyond any doubt, the God whom we know and
worship is omnipotent, invisible, immeasurable, and incomprehensible.
And knowing this, we profess Christ God, the Son of God.
Theophilus: Sacratissima Christi uox est, quam si tu uolueris cognoscere,
oportet te primum credere et tunc demum poteris intellegere. Esaias enim
redarguit te dicens: Nisi credideritis, non intellegetis. Indubitanter igitur
Deum omnipotentem, inuisibilem, immensum, inconprehensibilem
nouimus et scimus et colimus, deinceps Christum Deum et Dei Filium
profitemur.326
Adamantius also states that it is fides upon which every honest discussion should be based,327
and Augustine often makes this point in his dialogues, both in the Cassiciacum dialogues and in
the later dialogues.328 This reasoning even persists into the Latin dialogue of the Middle Ages.
Anselm of Canterbury frames the methodology of his dialogue and magnum opus, Cur Deus
Homo, in similar terms in the dedication of this work to Pope Urban II.329
Such statements are also found within the transcripts of actual debates recorded by
notaries. One example comes from the public debate between the aged Augustine and the wily

Consultationes Zacchei christiani et Apollonii philosophi, 1.7.
Evagrius, Altercatio Simonis Iudaei et Theophili Christiani, 1.25.
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Adamantius dixit: Quicunque amatores sunt ueritatis et honestati morum student omneque aeuum, quo in huius
mundi luce uersantur, emendatioris uitae firmare cupiunt institutis, non aliter poterunt, quae proba et perfecta,
obtinere, nisi firma et stabili fide in deum semper intenti sint, seque ab eo indesinenter non ambigant intueri.
Dialogus Adamantii, 1.1.
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Cf. Contra Academicos, 3.20.43; De Magistro, 11; and De Libero Arbitrio, 1.2.11.
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Et ut alia taceam quibus sacra pagina nos ad investigandam rationem invitat: ubi dicit: "nisi credideritis, non
intelligetis," aperte nos monet intentionem ad intellectum extendere, cum docet qualiter ad illum debeamus
proficere. Cur Deus Homo, commendatio.
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adherent to Homoian Arianism, Maximinus, which took place in Hippo in 427 or 428.330 As we
are told by Possidius, Augustine’s biographer, a certain Maximinus of Carthage arrived in Hippo
with a number of Gauls, and because of public demand and the presence of a number of
important persons, Maximinus and Augustine debated publicly while a notary recorded what
each party said (quid singulae adseruerint partes scriptum est).331 This lengthy debate is unusual
because of the overall negative performance by Augustine. When the North African bishop was
bested by Maximinus, Possidius reports that news (or the “rumor” as he would have it) of this
victory quickly spread around Carthage upon Maximinus’ return there.332 Partially responsible
for this “defeat” was the filibuster-like tactic of Maximinus (de sua multa in conlatione
loquacitate). About halfway through the debate, which probably lasted for about two hours,
Maximinus embarked on a nearly hour-long rhetorical answer to Augustine’s previous question,
only finishing speaking when daylight began to wane and therefore preventing Augustine from
making any response.
Augustine’s frustration at this can be seen in the subscription of the text, where the notary
includes a dictation given to him by Augustine at the debate’s conclusion, “Your (i.e.
Maximinus’) extreme prolixity exhausted the time during which I could give a response, and
now so little daylight remains that what you said cannot be reread to me.”333 This text certainly
deserves much more attention than the scanty discussion it has received in scholarship at
present,334 but only the inclusion, albeit sarcastic and caustic, of the didactic method of
Roland Teske, Arianism and Other Heresies, 175.
Vita Augustini, 17.7.
332
Cf. Sed quoniam ille haereticus, de Hippone rediens ad Carthaginem, de sua multa in conlatione loquacitate
victorem se de ipsa conlatione recessisse iactavit. ibid.
333
Scis autem sermonem tuum prolixissimum occupasse nobis tempora quibus respondere possemus, et tantum diei
remanisse, quantum omnino non sufficeret, ut ea quae dixisti, saltem nobis relegerentur.
334
It has recently come to my attention that Roland J. Teske, S.J. has provided a short introduction as well as a
translation of this text in The Works of Saint Augustine: Arianism and Other Heresies. Hyde Park, NY: New City
Press, 1995, pp. 175–227.
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argumentation is relevant here. Over the course of the debate, Maximinus taunts Augustine to
explain the logic of his Trinitarian theology:
[Maximinus:] Go on, I beg you, have me as your student. Profess about
the Son, that the Son is unborn, that he is without origin. If he is equal [to
the Father], he is certainly just [as the Father is]. If this is so, he is
certainly unborn. If unborn, certainly no human even saw him. Give
testimony; go on. Teach me; I shall be your student.”
[Maximinus dixit:] Dic, rogo, habe me discipulum. prosequere de filio,
quod filius sit innatus, quod sit sine origine. si aequalis, utique talis: si
talis, utique innatus: si innatus, utique nec uidit eum quisquam hominum.
da testimonia, et instrue, et doce, et habebis me discipulum.335
In response to his suggestion, Augustine criticizes Maximinus’ prolixity, which, he says, is
inconsistent with his desire to be a student (sed si uis discipulus, noli esse multiloquens).336 That
Augustine and his opponents are disingenuous in adopting the personae of master and disciple is
of little importance. This fact simply highlights the differences between the reality of actual
debates, which were often hostile in nature,337 and the idealistic cordiality found in many of the
dialogues. This disparity also highlights one of the benefits that the literary dialogue has over the
public debate: literary dialogue, because it is composed by a single author, facilitates the
uninterrupted exposition of the teachings or doctrine of a given position. Augustine himself
lucidly makes this point in the Soliloquia. Literary dialogues (or in this case, literary
monologues), he claims, fortuitously combine two usually contradictory realities: question and
answer, which is the best way to arrive at the truth (cum enim neque melius quaeri ueritas possit,
quam interrogando et respondendo), and the freedom from shame and anger, which almost
always occurs when someone is refuted (quem non pudeat conuinci disputantem).338 The

Scis autem sermonem tuum prolixissimum occupasse nobis tempora quibus respondere possemus, et tantum diei
remansisse, quantum omnino non sufficeret, ut ea quae dixisti, saltem nobis relegerentur.PL 42:719.13.
336
Puto me tibi ad omnia respondisse. Sed si uis discipulus, noli esse multiloquens. PL 42:724.6–8.
337
Cf. Tertullian’s description of a public debate between himself and a Jew, Aduersus Iudaeos, 1.1.
338
Cf. Soliloquia, 2.14.
335
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controversial dialogues, according to Augustine, can have their cake and eat it too, since they
simulate the “best way of discourse” and avoid the major pitfall of this mode of discourse
simultaneously.
The shift in argumentation, therefore, halfway through the Altercatio Luciferiani et
Orthodoxi fits well within the context of fourth century literature, rhetorical theory, and extant
records of actual public debates, and the rest of the dialogue proceeds according to the rules
delineated by Boethius above: “didactic arguments are those that reason from the principles
appropriate of each branch of learning and not from the opinions of the respondent—for the
learner must believe.”339 Rather than being coerced to respond to the Luciferian’s eristic attacks
as before, the Orthodox interlocutor can expound his own position, while the Luciferian asks
relevant questions to clarify it. Reason and concord, it seems, enter the stage as the contentious
language of hunting, athletics, and warfare makes its exit. “I request,” says the Luciferian, “that
you explain to me—not as an opponent (aduersario) but as a student (discipulo)—why the
Church receives those coming from the Arians.”340 He only seeks the reason (quaero
rationem).341 The rhetorical and literary background concerning this mode of discourse is useful
for understanding why Jerome composed the Altercatio as a dialogue and chose to structure it in
this way. As I shall suggest, it was to promote reconciliation, understanding, and inclusion. This
will become clearer after a brief discussion of the dialogue’s conclusion.
The lion’s share of the dialogue’s second half considers the circumstances of the Council
of Ariminum (359). Constantius’ role in calling this council is highlighted. As discussed above,
Constantius was viewed mostly negatively in his efforts to guide the theological debates of his
See quotation above for the Latin.
Sed quaeso te ut mihi omnem causam quare ab Arianis uenientes Ecclesia recipiat, non quasi aduersario, sed
quasi discipulo explices. Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 16.599–601.
341
Ibid., 14.504–5.
339
340
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times because he was understood to be an Arian-sympathizer. This perspective is particularly
true for Lucifer himself, who composed a number of caustic works against Constantius.342 Such
an attitude must be true for Jerome as well, so it is significant that Jerome explicitly downplays
Constantius’ heretical leanings, emphasizing instead his desire for reconciliation among all
Christians (cf. unitatem and totius mundi communione below). The most explicit example of this
generous characterization of the emperor is the following:
For at that time, nothing seemed to God’s servant to be so pious and
correct as to pursue unity and not to be separated from communion with
the whole world. This was especially the case because the exposition [of
the creed] ostensibly did not offer anything blasphemous.
Nam, illo tempore, nihil tam pium, nihil tam conueniens343 seruo Dei
uidebatur, quam unitatem sequi et a totius mundi communione non scindi,
praesertim cum superficies expositionis nihil sacrilegum praeferret.344
After this brief reference to Constantius, the emperor is removed from the scene (probably for
reasons just decribed). The Orthodox’s attentions are then drawn to making two points: first, he
argues for the reacceptance of the bishops through patristic writings, using the acta of the
Council of Nicea, and a description of the events of the Council of Ariminum as examples; and
second, he lays the blame of the Luciferian view on only a few individuals, namely Lucifer of
Cagliari and Hilary the Deacon (not to be confused with Hilary of Poitiers), both of whom were
dead by the time the Altercatio was composed.345 This accomplishes two goals at once. He opens
the door to his living opponents for rejoining the church through his focus on the two deceased

This will be discussed more below, but cf. Superatum te, imperator, a dei seruis ex omni cum conspexisses parte,
dixisti passum te ac pati a nobis contra monita sacrarum scripturarum contumeliam; dicis nos insolentes extitisse
circa te quem honorari decuerit. De non parcendo in deum delinquentibus, incipit.
343
The frequency with which Jerome uses forms of conuenio (which can mean both “to gather/meet with” and “to
be proper/correct”) should probably be read as a response to the title of one of Lucifer’s most caustic works, De non
conueniendo cum haereticis.
344
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 605–609.
345
For Lucifer, see Krüger, Lucifer, 55–7. For Hilary, see Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 21.793–801.
342
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persons, and he provides rational arguments that emphasize the mistake made at Ariminum and
the church’s tradition of showing mercy on the lapsed.
Using the Luciferian’s (or rather, the “former Luciferian’s”)346 questions as a guide, the
Orthodox first relates the proceedings of the Councils of Nicea and Ariminum. First, he claims
that the insertion of the homoian formula, “Si quis dixerit creaturam Filium Dei ut sunt ceterae
creaturae, anathema sit,347 was generally misunderstood by the majority at the council and was
the nefarious uenenum, he claims, injected by only a few.348 Moreover, after this problem was
realized, many of those at this aforementioned council publicly repented and reaffirmed their
belief in the Catholic faith, which is what they thought the Ariminum formula represented.349
Because of this misunderstanding, those who signed at Ariminum, the Orthodox claims, were not
“really” Arians, and the Luciferians are not justified in shunning them, destroying the union
(concordia) of the church unnecessarily.350 To bolster the adoption of such a policy of
reacceptance, the Orthodox turns to the proceedings of the Council of Nicea, where eight bishops
were reaccepted into the church under similar circumstanes.351 Jerome therefore mitigates the
culpability of the lapsed and emphasizes the church’s history of treating them leniently for the
sake of concord. The Orthodox finally turns to the authority of the patristic fathers, particularly
the works of Cyprian. As mentioned above, Cyprian’s position was complicated, but the

Cf. Luciferianus dixit: Et fere omnes nostri, immo iam non mei, hoc quasi ariete in disceptationibus utuntur.
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 16.596–7. The language “of my former sect” is common post-conversion
language in the Controversial dialogues.
347
See above , under “the Council of Ariminum (359).”
348
Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi, 17–8.
349
ibid. 19.
350
Cf. Cur [Luciferiani] damnarent eos qui Ariani non erant? Cur Ecclesiam scinderent in concordia fidei? Cur
denique bene credentes obstinatione sua facerent Arianos? ibid. 19.723–5.
351
Nam, cum in synodo Nicaena, quae propter Arii perfidiam congregata est, octo episcopos Arianos susceptos
sciamus. ibid. 726–7.
346
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Orthodox argues that a close reading of Cyprian’s works, specifically Epistles 72 and 73, reveals
that his position on the lapsed was consistent with his own.352
After this, the Orthodox concludes the dialogue with a powerful image, an image that is
both effective for underscoring Hilary the Deacon’s personal hypocrisy but for fostering for
forgiveness and reconciliation. Hilary, Jerome relates, was guilty of the very crimes for which he
censured the church, namely accepting those who had been baptized by Manichaeans and by
Ebionites. What is more, Hilary himself was ordained by those whom he then rejected, meaning
that he should ostracize and condemn himself. In order to articulate this hypocrisy in a powerful
way, the Orthodox uses prosopopoeia, assuming the voice of the church herself. Responding to
the Luciferian’s claim at the beginning of the dialogue that the church has become a brothel
(lupanar),353 she says:
But if you, who were born from my womb, if you, who were nourished
from the milk of my breasts, now raise your sword against me, then return
to me what I gave you and be, if you can, a Christian in some other way. I
may be a courtesan, but I am still your mother. Do I not preserve the
chastity of a single bed? Such was I when you were conceived. Do I now
commit adultery with Arius? Did I before with Praxias, with Ebio, and
with Novatus? Now that you are an adult you embrace them and receive
them into your mother’s house. I don’t know why only one adulterer
offends you.
Si uero in sinu meo natus, si uberum meorum lacte nutritus, aduersum me
gladium leuas, redde quod dedi et esto, si potes, aliter Christianus.
Meretrix sum, sed tamen mater tua sum. Non seruo unius tori castitatem?
Talis eram quando conceptus es. Cum Ario adulterium committo? Feci et
ante cum Praxea, cum Ebione, cum Nouato! Hos amplexaris, hos in matris
tuae domum iam adultus recipis. Nescio quid te unus adulter offendit!354
Cicero is correct in his judgment about prosopopoeia—it does add excitement and diversity to
oratory. The speech is also successful in articulating the hypocrisy of the deceased Luciferian
ibid., 23–27.
ibid., 1.
354
Ibid. 26.968–975.
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Hilary and his ilk more generally, but it is more than that. By personifying the church as a
woman, a mother, and a courtesan, Jerome is able to inscribe his argument within the context of
the gospels, namely the “Woman Caught in Adultery” (John 7:53–8:11). By using this rhetorical
device, Jerome is able to criticize the Luciferians with the same words that Christ criticized the
scribes and the Pharisees, “Let anyone among you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone
at her” [John 8:7]. The conclusion of the dialogue, therefore, contains a message of censure but
also a call for reconciliation. Instead of the hardline attitudes exhibited by the Luciferians,
Jerome (surprisingly) is the voice of compromise and reason.
To conclude, it is useful to summarize what has been discussed in this chapter and how it
advances our understanding of the question, “Why Dialogue?” I observed at the conclusion of
the previous chapter that close readings of Jerome’s Altercatio and Maxentius’ Contra
Nestorianos would be useful for showing how the elements of the literary dialogue discussed in
Chapter 1 can be mobilized by individual authors of controversial dialogues to make specific
doctrinal claims. This is certainly true, but more interesting is the contextualization of these
arguments within the historical discourse of the heresy itself. In the case of the Luciferian
Schism, the semi-heretical other was an opponent of dialogue, infamous for his intractible
intolerance and unwillingness to forgive. In response to this situation, I argue that we can read
Jerome’s Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi as a conscious response to solve the problems
posed by this vocal group of schismatics. In addition to the philosophical content contained
within the dialogue, the very form of the dialogue makes an essential contribution towards its
argument. Jerome combines two well established modes of dialogue in a historically significant
way, emphasizing in his Orthodox’s pedagogical demeanor not only what arguments Orthodox
Christians should use against their Luciferian opponents, but also how they should make their
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arguments. This is not an insignificant point. The literary form of the dialogue successfully
makes Jerome’s argument in a way that other literary forms cannot.
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Chapter 4: John Maxentius, Dialogus
Contra Nestorianos
Omnes, qui Catholicam sectamur fidem, optamus et cupimus damnari
haeresim, homines emendari, aut certe, si in errore uoluerint permanere,
non nostram culpam esse qui scripsimus, sed eorum qui mendacium
praetulerint ueritati.
Jerome, Dialogi Contra Pelagianos, Prologue, 22–7
τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐδέποτε ἐλέγχεται.

Plato, Gorgias, 473b10

The next dialogue to which I shall turn is the Dialogus contra Nestorianos355 composed
by the Scythian monk named John Maxentius, who is also sometimes known as John of Tomis
(Tomis is the seat of the episcopal see of Scythia Minor). Like Jerome’s Altercatio discussed in
the previous chapter, this dialogue also contains a fictional discussion that negotiates and defends
an orthodox position against a heretical position.356 In this case, John Maxentius ostensibly
defends the Chalcedonian position, along with the theologies expressed in Pope Leo I’s Tome
and the infamous Twelve Anathemas of Cyril of Alexandria, against Nestorius, who was
anathematized at the Council of Ephesus (431), and against the groups in the East associated
with Nestorianism such as the so-called Monophysites.
This is the position defended, as John Maxentius and his Scythian companions
understand it, but it is far from how this theological position was received among their
contemporaries. In fact, neither of the two sides of the ongoing Christological debate—the proLeo I and pro-Chalcedonian West, and the anti-Chalcedonian and pro-Cyrillian East—accepted

Throughout this chapter, I shall refer to this text as Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, Dialogus, and Contra
Nestorianos interchangeably.
356
Again, I avoid Orthodox with a capital O. As will be seen, the orthodoxy of the Contra Nestorianos fluctuated.
355
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the arguments found in the Dialogus as orthodox. For example, Emperor Justin I (reigned 518–
27) even warns Pope Hormisdas (reigned 514–523) about these unruly Scythian monks (inquieti
homines) as they were departing from Constantinople to Rome seek support for their theological
doctrine.357 Such reception of the Scythian monks is mostly representative, though there are
exceptions, notably with the North African bishop Fulgentius of Ruspe who was then in exile in
Sardinia.358 In retrospect, this was not unexpected, as the paradoxical concept of divine suffering
was perhaps the thorniest theological issue of the fifth and early sixth centuries, and the
unapologetic Theopaschite Theology (as it is now called) of the Scythians was deeply unsettling
to many. Although in their own time John Maxentius and his companions were mostly
unsuccessful in their bold endeavors to lobby for this position before the Constantinopolitan
court and the Pope in Rome, their position was ultimately adopted in modified form at the
Second Council of Constantinople (553) a few decades later.359
The pivotal role that John Maxentius and his cohort played in this debate has only
recently been the focus of study,360 as most previous scholarship has seen the Scythian monks as
not more than a curiosity of the early sixth century. Pereira’s dissertation is notable for its
discussion of the fairly large literary output of John Maxentius, though absent from his thesis is a

Cf. Sunt autem nomina eorum [sc. Scythian monks] Achilles, Iohannes, Leontius et Mauritius. haec nostra est
maxima sollicitudinis causa, ne unitas, quam uester labor oratioque perfecit, per inquietos homines dissipetur,
sperantes in deo, quia, si quid est quod adhuc a totius orbis pace dissentiat, hoc quoque orationibus uestris
apostolicae sedis comunioni societur. Epistula 187.3–4, CSEL 35.2: 644–5.
358
For reasons still unknown, Justin I composed another letter shortly after the aforementioned one in which he
reverses his position on the Scythian monks, advising Pope Hormisdas to accept the Scythians warmly. Cf. unde
petimus ut, si est possibile, celerrimo dato responso et satisfactis religiosis monachis Iohannem et Leontium ad nos
remittatis. nisi enim precibus et diligentia uestra ista quaestio soluta fuerit, ueremur, ne non possit pax sanctarum
ecclesiarum prouenire. Epistula 191.3, CSEL 35.2:648. The Scythian monks, however, were placed under house
arrest in Rome until the matter could be further discussed.
359
See the discussion of this below.
360
Two dissertations have been written about the Scythian monks and their Theopaschite theology. Matthew Joseph
Pereira, “Reception, Interpretation, and Docrtine in the Sixth Century: John Maxentius and the Scythian Monks.”
Dissertation, Columbia University, 2015; and David R. Maxwell, “Christology and Grace in the Sixth-Century Latin
West: The Theopaschite Controversy.” PhD Dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 2003.
357

112

detailed analysis of the longest and, as I would contend, most interesting text from this corpus,
the Dialogus contra Nestorianos. Dialogues, in fact, represent a significant portion of his literary
output,361 and the Dialogus contra Nestorianos is of great interest for two reasons. First, it is the
longest and most complete discussion of the complex theological positions of the Scythian
monks. It is, therefore, a unique and historically significant philosophical document that
demands attention, which it has not yet received. Second, and almost completely overlooked in
previous scholarship, it adopts a method of argumentation markedly different from the rest of the
Scythians’ rhetoric. It almost completely eschews citations from the Church Fathers—Augustine,
Cyril of Alexandria, Leo I, and Proclus of Constantinople are of greatest importance to the
Scythians—and the authority of previous Church Councils. Instead, its focus rests on syllogistic,
logical argument, and like Jerome’s Altercatio, what few references to authority that it contains
are reserved for the end of the dialogue.
The circumstances and location of the composition of the dialogue are still unclear (a
good argument can be made for both Constantinople and Rome),362 but as I shall suggest, the
purpose of the dialogue within the Christological controversy of the early sixth century is clear.
In a controversy that was as much philosophical as political, that is, both what was said and who
said it mattered, the dialogic form and the mode of argumentation associated with it served the
Scythian program well. The dialogue deftly dodges partisan politics by simply avoiding them. Its
focus is reserved for logical argument and interpretation of important biblical passages
associated with the status of Christ. Furthermore, the insertion of the voice of the opposition,
which is one of the greatest benefits of the dialogic form, is significant. Not only does it provide

For a brief discussion of each, see my catalogue in the previous chapter.
The reason for this is that it is unclear whether John Maxentius remained in Constantinople while his companions
travelled to Rome or remained behind in Constantinople.
361
362
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the opportunity for conversation and clarification between the interlocutors, but it also includes,
surprisingly, a show of respect (though qualified) to the viewpoint of the so-called Nestorian.
Like Jerome’s Altercatio and Minucius Felix’ Octavius, reconciliation, truth, and mutual respect
are idealized if not consistently practiced throughout the dialogue.
In order to give a full reading of this text, the theological and political background of the
dialogue must first be briefly sketched. I shall focus on the theological decisions of two councils,
namely the Council of Ephesus (431) and the Council of Chalcedon (451), giving a slightly
extended treatment for the former council because it includes the person of Nestorius himself—
the namesake of the dialogue in question. Finally, I will briefly discuss two later theological
problems that were both significant to the Scythians’ philosophical program but also had a
detrimental political impact on their reception by the imperial and papal authorities. These
comprise the Acacian Schism and the controversy surrounding an addition to the Trisagion
hymn.

The Historical Background for Contra Nestorianos
The Council of Ephesus (431)
As with all Church controversy, the Christological debates that occurred across the
Mediterranean world (and even into the Sassanian Empire) of the fifth and sixth centuries cannot
be attributed to any single isolated factor. Real and imagined philosophical discrepancies, largescale political partisanship, individual friendships and enmities, linguistic barriers, and plain
ignorance all had a role to play. For the Theopaschite theological controversy and its authors, the
first relevant historical event is the Council of Ephesus (431). This story begins with the
Patriarchs of Alexandria and Constantinople, Cyril of Alexandria and Nestorius of Antioch, the
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latter of whom is ostensibly the unfortunate namesake of John Maxentius’ dialogue.363 Cyril,
who was vetted for the patriarchate (or papacy as the patriarchate of Alexandria was often called)
from early in his career by his infamous uncle Theophilus, was named patriarch in 412,364 and
Nestorius was consecrated as patriarch of Constantinople in 428.
Following in the footsteps of some of his predecessors, notably John Chrysostom,365 the
transition from Antioch to Constantinople proved to be difficult for Nestorius, particularly with
regard to the complexity of political sensitivities in the capital city. His destruction of the only
remaining Arian church early in his episcopate is indicative of his inability or unwillingness to
compromise theology with politics—the destruction of this building had significant
ramifications, angering the “barbarians” campaigning in the western empire, and souring
Constantinople’s relations with German mercenaries.366 Most notably, Nestorius created a
powerful enemy in the greatly influential Augusta Pulcheria, who was partially responsible for
his eventual downfall at Ephesus. Their disagreement originated from Nestorius’ practice of the
liturgy. The Augusta Imperatrix had been in the practice of receiving the sacrament in the
sanctuary from the patriarch himself, a privilege usually granted only to the emperor. Whether
from ignorance or by design, Nestorius refused to administer the sacrament to Pulcheria, and
when confronted about this, he further roused her ire by publicly questioning her professed
virginity. He accused her of having numerous lovers and even removed her robe, which had been

This problem with the appellation “Nestorian” is well-known from antiquity onwards and will be discussed in
more detail below. For a succinct and helpful discussion of this problem, see Sebastian Brock, “The ‘Nestorian’
Church: A Lamentable Misnomer,” in The Church of the East: Life and Thought. J. F. Coakley and K. Parry
(=Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library of Manchester 78:3): 23–35.
364
For a thorough discussion of Cyril’s early career and his literary output, see John Anthony McGuckin, St. Cyril of
Alexandria: The Christological Controversy. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1–125.
365
Cyril and his uncle Theophilus were both present at the Synod of the Oak (403), where Chrysostom was deposed
as patriarch of Constantinople. Cyril’s position on Chrysostom’s exile and his subsequent reputation, which was
positive, was a complicated issue.
366
ibid., 24.
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used as an altar covering, from the sanctuary.367 His implication was clear—the Virgin Mary
should not be honored with the robe of a promiscuous empress. Pulcheria, as will become clear,
would not forget the slanders of Nestorius.
Given this political background, a theological problem arose among the monastic factions
in Constantinople: what was the orthodox position for the epithets “Theotokos” (God-bearer) and
“Anthropotokos” (human-bearer) for the Virgin Mary? The arena was set for what would
ultimately become the major struggle between Cyril and Nestorius, which would only be settled
at the Council of Ephesus. Nestorius, indicative of his Antiochene theology and his connection
with Theodore of Mopsuestia, supported the term “Anthropotokos” and condemned the usage of
“Theotokos.” This was, of course, met with strong resistance. Bishop Proclus, some of whose
writings are preserved only via quotation in the corpus of the later writings of the Scythian
monks, boldly repudiated Nestorius’ position during a homily just before Christmas in December
428, Nestorius himself being present. Proclus’ homily received great acclaim and embarrassed
the patriarch. In response, Nestorius gave a series of homilies in support of his own position.368
What began as a local disagreement had now become a public issue across the entire
Roman world. Marius Mercator, it seems, translated five of Nestorius’ sermons into Latin and
sent them to the Archdeacon Leo, who would become Pope Leo the Great and whose Tome
would become one of the most important Christological documents for the Council of Chalcedon
and later for the Scythian monks. As the matter progressed, Pope Celestine, informed by the
theological opinions of Leo and John Cassian, called a synod in Rome in 430 and anathematized
Nestorius.

See Vasiliki Limberis, Divine Heiress: The Virgin Mary and the Creation of Christian Constantinople. London:
Routledge, 1994, pp. 53–61, and McGuckin, Cyril of Alexandria, 24–27.
368
McGuckin, Cyril, 25–33.
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Turning to Egypt, Cyril’s agents in Constantinople informed him of the proceedings of
this synod, and the Alexandrian patriarch immediately began to publish and disseminate a
number of writings against Nestorius and his teachings. The topic of contention was mostly the
term “Theotokos,” but in one of his three letters, Cyril introduced the infamous Twelve Chapters,
which contained twelve anathemas, and to which he demanded Nestorius’ assent. The most
historically important and contentious was the twelfth and final anathema, which explicitly stated
a novel position on divine suffering. What it meant for God to suffer had been a thorny
theological issue that had been mostly bypassed in previous theological debates, but Cyril’s
public discussion of it brought it to the fore. It would not be wholly settled until the Second
Council of Constantinople (553).369
Whoever does not confess that God the Word suffered according to the
flesh, was crucified according to the flesh, tasted death according to the
flesh, and became the first-born from the dead according to the fact that
He is Life and the Giver of Life since He is God, let him be anathema.
Si quis non confitetur Deum Uerbum carne passum esse et carne
crucifixum et mortem carne gustasse factumque primogenitum ex mortuis,
secundum quod est et uita et uiuificator ut Deus, a[nathema] s[it].
Εἴ τις οὐχ ὁμολογεῖ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγον παθόντα σαρκὶ καὶ ἐσταυρωμένον
σαρκὶ καὶ θανάτου γευσάμενον σαρκί, γεγονότα τε πρωτότοκον ἐκ τῶν
νεκρῶν, καθὸ ζωή τέ ἐστι καὶ ζωοποιὸς ὡς θεός, ἀνάθεμα ἔστω.370
The negative reactions to this document encouraged Nestorius to think that he would be
successful in any council called to discuss his reinstatement, shifting the negative attention of the
hearing to Cyril’s own orthodoxy. A council was called, but against Nestorius’ wishes, the
location of the council was changed from Constantinople to Ephesus. This ostensibly minor

ibid. 45–50.
Epistula tertia Cyrilli ad Nestorium, Anathema 12. This letter is preserved in the Acts of the Council of Ephesus.
Giuseppe Alberigo et al., eds., Conciliorum oecumenicorum Decreta. Bologna: Instituto per le scienze religiose,
1973, third edition, pp. 59–61.
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detail became a huge disadvantage to Nestorius. The change of venue was attributed to practical
necessity: the abundance of grain in the hinterland of Ephesus would more easily feed the
visitors than the already crowded city of Constantinople. But Pulcheria, it seems, finally found
the opportunity for her revenge. Her influence seems to have been a significant factor in moving
the council to Ephesus. For one, this city contained the most important Marian shrine in the
empire at the time, which served to highlight the importance of “the Mother of God” in a debate
about the terms “Theotokos” and “Anthropotokos.” Furthermore, this location neutralized
Nestorius’ “home field advantage” in the capital city. From the beginning of the council,
Nestorius was poorly received by the attendees, and Cyril was treated like a king. Nestorius was
condemned, living the rest of his life in unhappy exile in monasteries in the east. The term
“Theotokos” was upheld, which is recounted in the first half of Book I of the Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos.371
The Council of Chalcedon
The Council of Chalcedon was the humpty-dumpty moment for Christian theology in the
Roman Empire: a fairly unified theological concordia was broken into pieces that could not be
reassembled despite the efforts of many philosophers, bishops, and emperors.372 John Maxentius’
Contra Nestorianos can be seen as one of these efforts, even one of the most successful of
them.373 Because the significance of this council was monumental and has merited many booklength treatments, I shall restrict my focus here to two key points: the impact that the previous

Cf. the reference to this in the Contra Nestorianos. Catholicus: Sed deum natum ex uirgine, etiam ille [sc.
Nestorius] dixit, qui apud Ephesum condemnatus est, non quo uere et proprie natum confiteretur deum ex femina,
sed propter unitionem dei uerbi ad hominem factum, quem uirgo enixa est.
372
I take this observation from Jack Tannous.
373
The Emperor Justinian, who corresponded with the Scythian monks before becoming emperor, successfully
adopted their formula in the 530s to appease many of the anti-Chalcedonians. See Gray, Defense of Chalcedon, 57f.
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condemnation of Eutyches and Theodoret had on the Council of Chalcedon and the content of
this statement of faith as promulgated by the council.374
After the Council of Ephesus in 431 where Nestorius was anathematized and ultimately
sent into exile, there are two other important (and controversial) figures and two corresponding
events of importance for the proceedings at Chalcedon: the trial of Eutyches at a synod in
Constantinople in 448 and the so-called Latrocinium Council of 449. Eutyches was a priest from
Constantinople who first distinguished himself at the First Council of Ephesus as a fervent
opponent of Nestorius and his doctrinal position. However, over time Eutyches, as he was
perceived both by his contemporaries and modern historians,375 overcompensated for his
opponent’s position of two natures by postulating the equally schismatic position that Christ had
a single, fused nature after the incarnation, often called monophytism.376 Eutyches was called to
a synod in Constantinople to defend his position, and when his answers were not satisfactory, he
was deposed and removed from the priesthood.
One year later, Theodosius II convened the Second Council of Ephesus, better known as
the Latrocinium or Robber Council, over which Dioscurus of Alexandria presided. Two
decisions that occurred at this meeting shaped the thinking at Chalcedon. First, Eutyches was
surprisingly reinstated and absolved of wrongdoing while some of his opponents were
condemned instead. Furthermore, Theodoret, who was dissuaded from attending the council, was

For a translation and commentary of the documents associated with the council, see Richard Price and Michael
Gaddis, trans. and eds. The Acts of the Council of Chalcedon. Liverpool : Liverpool University Press, 2005–7. The
bibliography on Chalcedon is vast. The classic is Aloys Gillmeier, S. J., Christ in Christian Tradition: Volume Two,
From the Apostolic Age to Chalcedon (451). Pauline Allen & John Cawte, trans. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1973.
See also R. V. Sellers, The Council of Chalcedon: A Historical and Doctrinal Survey. London:SPCK, 1953.
375
A good example of this conceptualization of Nestorius and Eutyches found in Latin literature is Boethius’
theological tractate, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium. E. K. Rand, Der dem Boethius zugeschriebene Traktat de
fide catholica. Jahrb. f. klass. Philol., Suppl. xxvi (1901): 405–461.
376
See note above for Brock’s article on “The Nestorian Church,” for a discussion of terminology for monophytism.
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condemned in absentia by Dioscurus because of Theodoret’s connections with Theodore of
Mopsuestia (Nestorius’ mentor) and Diodorus of Tarsus (Theodore’s mentor).
Therefore, when the emperor Marcian convened the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the
events of previous years were still fresh in mind, especially the alarming reversal that constituted
the reinstatement of Eutyches, and the wording of the statement of faith can be read as most
directly responding to the Eutychean position.377 Furthermore, despite Theodoret’s presence at
the Council of Chalcedon, the general attitude towards him was negative. The result of this
apprehension about Theodoret meant a weakening of the importance of Antiochene theology
(Theodoret was from Antioch) and an emphasis on Alexandrian (that is, Cyrillian) and Roman
theology when forming the statement of faith.378 The portion of the statement pertaining to
Christological concerns is the following:
All of us agree that we confess . . . one and the same Christ, the Son, Lord,
only begotten, in two natures but understood to be unmingled, unchanged,
indivisible, and inseparable—the respective differences of the natures are
never absent because of the union but rather their individual properties
remain intact, coexisting in one person and substance. We do not confess
one who is partitioned and divided into two persons, but one and the same
Son, unbegotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ just as the prophets
taught about Him before, and Jesus Christ taught us, handing down to us
the teaching of the Fathers.
. . . confiteri consonanter omnes docemus . . . unum eundemque Christum
Filium Dominum unigenitum, in duabus naturis inconfuse, immutabiliter,
indivise, inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sublata differentia
naturarum propter unitionem magisque salva proprietate utriusque naturae
et in unam personam atque subsistentiam concurrente, non in duas
personas partitum sive divisum, sed unum et eundem Filium unigenitum
Deum Uerbum Dominum Iesum Christum, sicut ante prophetae de eo et
ipse nos Iesus Christus erudiuit et patrum nobis symbolum tradidit.379

Gray has an excellent summary of this, 7–16.
H. M. Diepen, Les Trois Chapitres au Concile de Chalcédoine. Une étude de la christologie de l’Anatolie
ancienne. Oosterhout: Éditions de Saint-Michael, 1953, pp. 84–7.
379
Giuseppe Alberigo, Concilia oecumenica et generalia Ecclesiae catholicae - Concilium Chalcedonense.
Bologna: Istituto per le scienze religiose, 1973. Editio tertia. It is worth noting that the Latin translation of the
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This portion of the definition of faith, specifically the words in duabus naturis (ἐν δύο
φύσεσιν), was the source of much disagreement to follow. The explicit claim about Christ’s two
natures was essential to refute the Eutychean claim of a single, mixed nature, but this claim was
also un-Cyrillian in form. Cyril’s famous Christological statement even spoke of “one nature of
God the Word incarnate” (μία φύσις τοῦ Θεοῦ Λόγου σεσαρκωμένη).380 The members of the
council, however, agreed that “in two natures” was Cyrillian in meaning, though this was not the
case for many of the recipients of the statement, who interpreted it as Nestorian. For them, the
claim that Christ was “in two natures” contradicted Cyrillian orthodoxy and promoted the
Nestorian duplicity of Christ as separate from God the Word.381 Below the two most important
examples of this interpretation of the Council of Chalcedon will be discussed briefly: the
Acacian Schism, during which Pope Felix excommunicated the Patriarchs of Constantinople and
Alexandria, and the Trisagion controversy, when the Patriarch of Antioch composed an antiChalcedonian addition to the Trisagion hymn. Both of these events had recently concluded
shortly before the composition of the Contra Nestorianos and directly contributed to the hostility
with which the Theopaschite position of the Scythian monks contained in the dialogue was
received in the early sixth century. This is recounted in the second half of Book I of Contra
Nestorianos.

Definitio fidei comes from Rusticus, a deacon who also wrote a dialogue similar to Contra Nestorianos later in the
sixth century, but the phrasing of this translation is consistent with Chalcedonian doctrine as expressed in the fifth
and early sixth centuries. Cf. . . . ὁμολογεῖν . . . συμφώνως ἅπαντες ἐκδιδάσκομεν . . . ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν Χριστόν,
υἱόν, κύριον, μονογενῆ, ἐν δύο φύσεσιν ἀσυγχύτως, ἀτρέπτως, ἀδιαιρέτως, ἀχωρίστως γνωριζόμενον· οὐδαμοῦ τῆς
τῶν φύσεων διαφορᾶς ἀνῃρημένης διὰ τὴν ἕνωσιν, σωζομένης δὲ μᾶλλον τῆς ἰδιότητος ἑκατέρας φύσεως καὶ εἰς ἓν
πρόσωπον καὶ μίαν ὑπὸστασιν συντρεχούσης, οὐκ εἰς δύο πρόσωπα μεριζόμενον ἢ διαιρούμενον, ἀλλ᾽ ἕνα καὶ τὸν
αὐτὸν υἱὸν καὶ μονογενῆ, θεὸν λόγον, κύριον Ἰησοῦν Χριστόν· καθάπερ ἄνωθεν οἱ προφῆται περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς
ἡμᾶς ὁ κύριος Ιησοῦς Χριστὸς ἐξεπαίδευσε καὶ τὸ τῶν πατέρων ἡμῖν παραδέδωκε σύμβολον.
380
ACO, 10, 372.3.
381
The first book of the Contra Nestorianos contains many examples of this argument. See Appendix B.
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The Acacian Schism
In 484 the Emperor Zeno attempted to heal the theological controversies that had plagued
the empire after the Council of Chalcedon. He commissioned Acacius, the patriarch of
Constantinople, to compose and publish a statement of faith that became known as the
Henoticon. With this effort, Zeno attempted to reconcile the anti-Chalcedonians in the East with
the Chalcedonians in Constantinople by creating a document that completely avoided mention of
this controversial council, the logic being to ignore the source of contention rather than attempt
to come to a compromise. To achieve this, the authority of the precedents of Chalcedon was
emphasized. The creed of Nicaea was to be adopted. The Twelve Chapters of Cyril were upheld.
Nestorius and Eutyches were, of course, still understood to be condemned as they had been at
Ephesus. In short, every doctrinal decision of the fifth century was reaffirmed, and it was
pretended that the Council of Chalcedon never occurred. This attempt was initially successful in
the East, but one problem remained, Rome.382
As Devreesse pointed out in the middle of the last century, “Zénon et Acace pensèrent
que le temps était venu de donner quelque satisfaction aux Égyptiens et à leurs amis d’Antioche,
de grouper l’église d’Orient autour d’un Credo commun, sans se préoccuper de Rome.”383 This
oversight, or rather necessary choice—because to placate Rome would only mean alienating the
East in turn—would mark the chief reason for the failure of the Henoticon. While downplaying
the overall importance of Chalcedon is not obviously a slight to Rome and the Italian theological
politics, the result of this action was perceived as such because Pope Leo’s Tome, a document
explaining the papacy’s position on Christology was read at the council. For Rome then, the

Gillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 247–252; and Gray, Defense of Chalcedon, 28f.
Robert Devreesse, Le patriarcat d'Antioche: Depuis la paix de l'église jusqu'à la conquête arabe. Paris: J.
Gabalda, 1945, 66, cited in Gray, 28.
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Council of Chalcedon and Leo’s Tome had to be proclaimed orthodox, as to do otherwise was
seen as a diminishment of its ecclesiastical power.
When Pope Felix finally learned of the contents of the patriarch’s Henoticon, he
excommunicated Acacius and Peter Mongus (the patriarch/pope of Alexandria), and in response
Acacius retaliated by striking Felix’ name from the diptychs in Constantinople and imprisoning
the head of the so-called Acoimetae monks, who remained the only knot of steadfast supporters
for Rome in Constantinople. Moreover, despite the initially positive reception of the Henoticon
in the East, it quickly became clear that there were severe problems. For many in the East,
Acacius had not gone far enough. Passing over Chalcedon was not sufficient; only outright,
explicit condemnation of the Council of Chalcedon and specifically Leo’s Tome would appease
them. Although Zeno intended to achieve a sincere reconciliation throughout the empire, the
Henoticon failed because it was still viewed to be too Chalcedonian to many in the East and too
anti-Chalcedonian to Rome and the West, and this schism would persist until March of 519 when
Justin I formally made peace between Rome and Constantinople.384
Trisagion Controversy
Overlapping with much of the empire-wide Acacian Schism was a related, but more
localized controversy, the infamous “Nestorian” addition to the Trisagion hymn. This
controversy begins with Peter the Fuller, an ambitious monk favored by the emperor Zeno
(reigned 474–475, 476–491). He became patriarch of Antioch in 471 and was a staunch antiChalcedonian. Eager to promote his theological position and gain popular support for it, Peter

Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 322–25, and cf. the conclusion of Justin’s letter to Pope Hormisdas two
months later, “Oret igitur uestrae religionis sancitas, ut quod pervigili studio pro concordia ecclesiarum catholicae
fidei procuratur, diuini muneris opitulatio iugi perpetuitate seruari annuat. Dat. X. Kal. Maias Constantinopoli,
AVO, 160.
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made an infamous addition to the Trisagion hymn,385 by adding the phrase “crucified for us” (ὁ
σταυρωθεὶς δι’ ἡμᾶς)386 to this hymn. How this created such a controversy stems from the
traditional understanding of the addressee of the Trisagion, that is, to the entire Trinity. This
inclusion, therefore, insinuates that the entire Trinity was crucified, which was one of the
common objections to the theological doctrine promulgated by Chalcedon.387 The significance of
this event can be seen in the violent riots that ensued in Antioch when Peter insisted that this
formula be followed in the liturgy. It is even recounted that a sympathizer to Peter’s position
taught a parrot to recite the Trisagion with the addition and kept it on the street to antagonize
passersby. The contemporary Syrian poet, Isaac of Antioch, even wrote a two thousand line
Syriac poem on the topic of this infamous bird.388
The most important facet of this controversy for the discussion at hand is what comes
forty years later. This modified Trisagion persisted in the Empire and was notably introduced
into the liturgy in parts of Constantinople in 511, much to the chagrin of the Emperor Anastasius.
As in Antioch, this formula was intended to be anti-Chalcedonian in tenor and provoke the
Chacedonian city of Constantinople. Therefore, when John Maxentius and the Scythian monks
arrived in the capital city seven years later, using the formula remarkably similar to the Trisagion

The hymn is as follows: Ἅγιος ὁ Θεός, Ἅγιος ἰσχυρός, Ἅγιος ἀθάνατος, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς. (3x) Δόξα Πατρί καὶ Υἱῷ
καὶ Ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι. Καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ καὶ εἰς τοὺς αἰῶνας τῶν αἰώνων, Ἀμήν. See J. Mateos, La Célébration de la
Parole dans la Liturgie Byzantine, Étude historique. Rome: Pont. Institum Studiorum Orientalium, 1971, 98f.
386
A punning joke was created, calling it “ὁ σταυρωθεὶς Δημᾶς.” Demas was one of the legendary names attributed
to the good thief. See Gray, Defense of Chalcedon, 23.
387
Glanville Downey, A History of Antioch in Syria: from Seleucus to the Arab Conquest. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1961, 484–488; Gray, Defense of Chalcedon, 23. For an example, Contra Nestorianos II.4ff in
Appendix B.
388
“Memra about the Bird that Sang the ‘Hagios Ho Theos’ in the City of Antioch” ( ܡܐܡܪܐ ܥܠ ܿܗܝ ܦܪܚܬܐ ܕܩܠܝܐ ܗܘܬ
)ܐܓܝܘܤ ܐܬܐܤ ܒܐܢܛܝܘܟܝܐ ܡܕܝܢܬܐ, Isaac of Antioch, Carmen 7. G. Bickell, S. Isaaci Antiocheni, Doctoris Syrorum
opera omnia: ex omnibus, quotquot exstant, codicibus manuscriptis cum varia lectione Syriace Arabiceque primus
edidit, Latine vertit, prolegomenis et glossario auxit. Gissae: Sumptibus J. Ricker, 1873–1877, pp. 84–174.
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addition, unus de Trinitate crucifixus (one from the Trinity crucified), and what is more, using it
to make a pro-Chalcedonian argument, the reaction was strongly negative from both sides. 389

Background to Contra Nestorianos
Composition of Contra Nestorianos
The location of the composition of the Dialogus contra Nestorianos and its contemporary
reception and impact are issues that are currently unclear. As mentioned above in the catalogue
of controversial dialogues, 520 or the years that immediately follow is the most likely period for
the date of composition. In 520, most of the Scythian monks departed from Constantinople in
order to plead their case before Pope Hormisdas in Rome. It is known from a letter from the
Avella Collectio that a certain John was numbered among the Scythian monks who traveled to
Italy,390 but it is unclear whether this John is identical with John Maxentius, whose appellation is
not always consistent in the references to the members of the circle of Scythian monks in the
literature.391
Recently, Donald Fairbairn has argued that John Maxentius remained behind in
Constantinople at this time, and Matthew Pereira, whose recent dissertation analyzes the
theological position of the Scythian monks, seems to agree with him.392 In the early twentieth

Gray, Defense of Chalcedon, 49; and Volker L. Menze, Justinian and the Making of the Syrian Orthodox Church.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, 165–175; Volker discusses the importance of Unus de Trinitate crucifixus in
the East, but does not mention its importance in the West.
390
Sunt autem nomina eorum [sc. Scythian monks] Achilles, Iohannes, Leontius et Mauritius. See note 1 above.
391
See Glorie, (CCSL 85A) xl–xli, and Bark, “John Maxentius,” 93–107. A letter dated to 519 and composed by the
Scythian monks to Fulgentius of Ruspe and other North African and Italian bishops complicates matters further, as
the letter refers to “another John.” Cf. Dominis sanctissimis, et cum omni ueneratione nominandis, Datiano,
Fortunato, Ianuario, Albano, Orontio, Boetho, Fulgentio et ceteris episcopis et in Christi confessione decoratis,
exigui Petrus diaconus, Iohannes, Leontius, alius Iohannes, et ceteri fratres in causa fidei Roman directi. Epistula
Scytharum Monachorum ad episcopos.
392
Rob Boy McGregor & Donald Fairbairn, trans. with Introduction and Notes by Donald Fairbairn. Fulgentius of
Ruspe and The Scythian Monks: Correspondence on Christology and Grace. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 2013, pp. 18–9.
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century, during which there was the last spike in interest in the Scythians, the two German
scholars V. Schurr and Eduard Schwarz disagreed on this issue. The former, like Fairbairn and
Pereira, understands Maxentius to have remained behind in Constantinople, but Schwarz, who
edited the first critical edition of the Contra Nestorianos, finds it implausible that the leader of
the Scythian monks, John Maxentius, would not accompany his comrades before the pope, which
was presumed, and probably rightly, to be more important than their failing embassy to
Constantinople.393 That their business in Rome was more important than their failed effort in
Constantinople, however, does not necessarily prove John’s location one way or the other. This
issue needs to be pursued further in the future in order to understand more fully the immediate
reception of this dialogue.
I shall only add that most scholars take for granted that John Maxentius is the author of
the Dialogus contra Nestorianos. There is no doubt that this dialogue originates from the
Scythian monks, but the attribution of Maxentius as its author comes from the only manuscript
that preserves the text, a ninth century codex currently housed at Oxford. Migne, Schwartz, and
Glorie, all of whom edited this text, simply continue this attribution. Further work still needs to
be done to establish more fully, if possible, the details of each individual Scythian monk. For the
Dialogus Contra Nestorianos in particular, the most important and recent study of the texts
associated with John Maxentius and the Scythian monks spends regrettably little time discussing
this dialogue. In fact, it receives the least treatment of the entire corpus, despite its being the
longest and arguably the most important of them. Instead, Pereira simply states that the lack of a
translation of the text “remains” a lacuna in the scholarship on the Scythian monks.

393

See Pereira, 203–4.
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Structure of the Dialogue
The structure and format of the Dialogus contra Nestorianos first deserve comment,
since form is intricately related to meaning, especially in dialogues. As has been discussed in
Chapter 1,394 this dialogue begins with the typical prologue written by the author. Included
within it is a dedication to the probably generic Theophilus. The opening words of the dialogue
immediately disclose the anti-heretical project of the work, specifically by providing a
methodology for refuting heresy that serves as the underlying structure of the argument of the
dialogue.
If it were possible for there to be an end of deceit in this age, Christ’s
church would rest easily everywhere. But because an inexplicable evil
somehow never ceases from attacking human hearts and from disturbing
the Catholic faith with unforeseen arguments, followers of the Truth must
first diagnose their sophistical arguments with care, then expose [their
flaws] correctly, and when the issue is raised publicly, destroy them with
the hammer of Truth, fighting for the Truth against them, even to the point
of bloodshed.
Si in hoc saeculo posset finis esse mendacii, maneret utique quieta Christi
ecclesia. Sed quia inextricabile quodammodo malum numquam desinit
humana corda pulsare, atque inopinatis argumentis fidem inquietare
catholicam: necesse est sectatoribus ueritatis, prudenter captiosas eius
sententias praeuidere, sapienterque detegere, prolatasque in medium
malleo ueritatis conterere, et usque ad effusionem sanguinis contra eas pro
ueritate certare.395
As will be discussed in further detail below, this is exactly how the dialogue proceeds—
the philosophical or theological stumblings of the “Nestorian” are diagnosed, and their faulty
logic is exposed over the course of the conversation of which the dialogue consists. For
See the discussion of the Aristotelian and Ciceronian style of prologues in Chapter 1, under “The Importance of
Plato.”
395
Dialogus contra Nestorianos, Praefatio, 1.2–8. All translations of this text within this chapter are from my
complete translation found in Appendix B. The rally to fight “even to the point of bloodshed” is more than mere
melodrama. The controversy stemming from the Council of Chalcedon was not without events of extreme violence
among various factions. On Good Friday, 457, Proterius, who was named Patriarch of Alexandria by the
aforementioned council, was murdered before the baptistery of his church by an anti-Chalcedonian mob. Cf.
Evagrius Scholasticus, Ecclesiastical History, 2.8.
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Maxentius,396 one of his greatest concerns is maintaining a precision and clarity in the language
that is used in the Christological debate post-Chalcedon. According to him, the heretics abuse
(abuti) language associated with orthodoxy, by nefariously injecting the poison of deceit within
it. This is what is most dangerous in the minds of the Scythian monks, that the antiChalcedonians seem to be Catholic but actually are heretical. This illusion of truth is what makes
their argument so compelling to the “more simple-minded” because of their inherent
disingenuousness.397 The presence of the two interlocutors, then, allows for a prolonged
exchange where clarification is often called for and given. Difficult theological terms are
carefully defined and supported by examples.398 This phenomenon is not isolated to single,
topical issues but is construed as an ongoing process that progresses throughout the two books of
the dialogue. The dialogic exchange, therefore, with its constant back-and-forth, allows the two
interlocutors to discover that they actually agree on matters about which they previously believed
that they had disagreed.399 At the conclusion of the preface, the author highlights the importance
of the dialogue for achieving this aim. The very form of the dialogue, he claims, allows for a
more efficient (quo facilius) refutation of the heretic’s objections (obiectionum absolutio) in a

For the sake of convenience, I refer to the author of this text as John Maxentius, as the current status quaestionis
makes this the most likely.
397
Cf. Catholicus: quamuis callide, ad decipiendos simplices, unum eos esse argumenteris. Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos, II.17.812–13. The theme of insincerity or εἰρωνεία, as it is famously known, is pervasive in the
dialogue, as the Introduction of this dialogue contains a scene where the Catholicus questions the Nestorian’s
sincerity in believing in his own views. Dissimulation, though, is not automatically understood to be a broach of the
etiquette of dialogue. It is always a matter of context and the rules adopted for any given conversation. In the De
Magistro, Adeodatus suggests that his father is feigning ignorance for pedagogical reasons: Ad. Miror te [sc.
Augustinum] nescire uel potius simulare nescientem. De Magistro, III.5.1–2. Such pedagogical examples are
usually viewed favorably.
398
E.g., Catholicus: Proprietas multis intellegitur modis. . . . quapropter: quomodo deum corporis sui proprias
fecisse asseris passiones, exemplis te planum facere conuenit. Contra Nestorianos, II.13.589, 596–8.
399
Cf. Catholicus: Deus uerbum, qui incarnatus est, ipse et passus est? an alius incarnatus, alius uero passus est?
Nestorianus: Incarnatus quidem deus est; passus autem deus non est, sed caro dei.
Catholicus: Magnam nobis spem de teipso dedisti. Nam qui hactenus carnem non dei, sed assumpti hominis
asserebas, nunc dei eam confessus es.
Reconciliation and agreement, not refutation, are always in the foreground in this dialogue.
396
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format that will be clear to his readers (legentibus elucescat).400 Of course, none of these claims
about the dialogue is novel. Augustine remarks that dialogue is the most efficient form for the
discovery of the truth.401 Jerome likewise decides to compose a dialogue against the Pelagians in
order to give a fuller account than his responses from an earlier letter about this heresy.402 The
author of the Dialogi attributed to Gregory the Great also points out the ability of dialogue to
subdivide and clarify complex positions.403 Similar claims are found in the Greek dialogues of
late antiquity as well.404
More remarkable about the structure of the dialogue is what precedes both of the books
of the dialogue, namely extensive tables of contents (capitula) summarizing the topic of the
debate and often the scriptural verses discussed in each individual section. As far as I am aware,
this is the earliest example of a table of contents being included in a Latin controversial dialogue.
Within the corpus that is the subject of this thesis only the Dialogi attributed to Gregory the
Great contain this feature, but this text may have been composed as late as the end of the seventh
century.405 The only other Latin dialogue that exhibits a similar organization is also associated

Cf. Placuit igitur, sub persona interrogantis haeretici et catholici respondentis, explicare huius nostrae
disputationis opusculum, quo facilius obiectionum absolutio legentibus elucescat. Dialogus contra Nestorianos,
Praefatio, 4.39–42.
401
Cf. Soliloquia, 2.14.
402
Cf. Dialogus Aduersus Pelagianos, Prologue, 1.
403
I have argued recently that an understanding of Gregory’s use of prosopopoeia in Book IV of his Dialogues is
essential to understanding his literary and philosophical program. For a discussion of prosopopoeia in dialogues, see
Chapter 1, and see, Charles N. Kuper, (unpublished) “Book IV of Gregory the Great’s Dialogues as a Commentary
on Ecclesiastes,” paper delivered at the One Hundred Forty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the Society for Classical
Studies, January 5–8, Toronto, Canada.
404
See the discussion of Theodoret’s Eranistes below.
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The date and authenticity of the Dialogues has garnered much attention. Francis Clark energetically argued that
the Dialogues were composed at the end of the seventh century by a clever imitator who had access to Gregory’s
writings among other documents, but there has been strong resistence to his thesis. See Francis Clark, The PseudoGregorian Dialogues. Leiden: Brill, and The ‘Gregorian’ Dialogues and the Origins of Benedictine Monasticism.
Leiden: Brill, 2003; and Paul Meyvaert, “The Enigma of Gregory the Great’s Dialogues: a response to Francis
Clark.” Journal of Ecclesiastical History (1988): 335–81, and “The Authentic Dialogues of Gregory the Great.”
Sacris Erudiri 43 (2004): 55–130. See also, Adalbert de Vogüé, “Les Dialogues, oeuvre authentique et publiée par
Grégoire lui-même,” in Gregorio Magno et il suo tempo, vol. 2 (Rome, 1991): 27–40.
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with the Scythian monks, the Disputatio XII Capitulorum.406 As the title suggests, this text is a
rereading of Cyril of Alexandria’s infamous “Twelve Anathemas,”407 whose content and impact
was discussed at length above. The similarities between these two dialogues, however, are
merely superficial and only serve to highlight the uniqueness of the Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos. In a sense, the table of contents found here looks forward to the much later
dialogues of Anselm of Canterbury such as the Cur Deus Homo, in which he directs later
copyists to include his table of contents so that readers may peruse what parts of the dialogue
“are not useless.”408 Beneath the surface of Anselm’s authorial humility is a very simple point:
the chapters allow the reader to find what is most important before reading, or even more likely,
to locate a particular passage for rereading or consultation for a particular theological issue. By
doing this, Anselm has created not only a cogent, unified argument for discussing the Christian
mystery of the Incarnation, but has also effectively made the Cur Deus Homo a reference text
that a curious reader may consult to clarify a specific theological point such as, “Why was the
number of fallen angels necessarily made up by humans?”409
Regrettably, Maxentius does not include an explicit discussion of his own table of
contents as Anselm does, but his intentions must be similar. How the chapters might be related to
the reception and reading of the dialogue in its own controversial climate will be further

Or more fully, Disputatio XII Capitulorum Cyrilli Alexandrini et sic Dictorum Nestorii Anti
Anathematismatorum.
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Contained within Cyril’s third letter to Nestorius, which was read during the Council of Ephesus (431), the
interpretation of the “Twelve Anathemas” was a major point of contention in the post-Chalcedonian debates. For the
Latin and Greek texts of this work, see Giuseppe Alberigo et al., eds., Conciliorum oecumenicorum Decreta.
Bologna: Instituto per le scienze religiose, 1973, third edition, pp. 59–61.
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toto corpore sit quod non despiciat. Cur Deus Homo, Praefatio, II (Schmitt, II.43).
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Capitulum XVI. Ratio quod numerus angelorum qui ceciderunt restituendus sit de hominibus. Cur Deus Homo,
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N. Kuper, “An Angelic Digression: The Significance of 1.16 –18 in the Cur Deus Homo.” MA Thesis, Bryn Mawr
College (2012): 1–49.
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discussed below. But another point of interest arises when the content of the chapters is
compared to the main text of the dialogue—one quickly notices that the tone of the chapters is
significantly harsher and more contentious than the tone of the dialogue itself. For example, in a
passage noted above, the Catholicus exclaims that he has great hope for his interlocutor’s
progress when the Nestorianus concedes a point that he had previously denied.410 The progress
of the Nestorianus is emphasized, and the very purpose of the dialogue plays out before the eyes
of the reader—their discussion has effected a change in the interlocutor’s thinking. This
description of this section of the dialogue, however, is much different in the table of contents:
“About the following sophistic claim: ‘God’s flesh suffered, but God did not suffer according to
the flesh.’”411 Progress and mutual respect are forgotten. Instead, the focus is doctrinal and
dismissive—“this is how to deal with this position.”
Such a simple dichotomy—polite main text and more caustic descriptive headings—is
not without exception, most notably with the occasional presence of sarcasm in the main text, but
the general distinction is certainly meaningful. Maxentius the author, through the personae of the
two interlocutors, constantly brings the issue of mutual respect and tolerance to the foreground of
the debate, and not, as one might expect, only in the voice of the Catholicus. At the very
beginning of the dialogue, Nestorius asks the Catholicus to be more charitable, “Please do not
attack me with misunderstood accusations before you consider my words carefully” (Noli,
quaeso, te, antequam meorum dictorum rationem diligenter discutias, calumniosis me impetere
uocibus).412 As I shall contend, John Maxentius uses the form of the dialogue, not only to

Catholicus: Magnam nobis spem de teipso dedisti. Nam qui hactenus carnem non dei, sed assumpti hominis –
asserebas, nunc dei eam confessus es. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.12.570–2.
411
XII. De eo, quod callide dicitur ab eis: caro dei passa est, deus autem carne passus non est. Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos, eiusdem Capitula Libri Secundi.
412
Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, I.1.45–6.
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instruct his readers in what to say or what arguments to make for his position, but also how to
debate with their opponents, namely by giving them the benefit of the doubt and treating them as
charitably as possible. This will become apparent in the discussion of the dialogue below.
Literary Precedents to Contra Nestorianos
There do not seem to be any clear Latin parallels in structure or content to Contra
Nestorianos, though, of course, the earlier Latin controversial dialogues such as Jerome’s two
dialogues and the Octavius are important predecessors of this type of dialogue. In the case of this
dialogue, however, it is not Latin literature alone to which readers should look. The body of
Greek literature is especially important here. In this section, I want to make two suggestions for
thinking about the literary background for the Dialogus Contra Nestorianos: first, that the
structure and explicit methodology of Maxentius’ dialogue is closely parallel to two Greek
dialogues composed by important figures associated with the Nestorian controversy, Cyril of
Alexandria’s Dialogus De Trinitate and Theodoret of Cyr’s Eranistes, and second, that John
Maxentius might be responding directly to the text of the Eranistes.
The first obstacle to making such a claim is establishing how the Scythian monks might
have had access to Greek literature. The level of comfort, for example, with reading and
understanding Greek possessed by the Scythian monks and John Maxentius in particular is
debated in the scholarly literature. The majority of scholars conclude that they could not read
Greek well enough to work significantly with the text.413 However, despite their apparent
ignorance of the Greek language, the following can be said, almost in the same breath, about
their cultural and linguistic sensitivities, “The Scythian monks, more so than those Christian

Fairbairn, Fulgentius & the Scythian Monks, 16–7; Pereira, John Maxentius and the Scythian Monks, 130–132.
Rarely is evidence given to support this position; Pereira, for example, cites no source.
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theologians steeped exclusively in either the Greek or Latin theological worldview, were open to
gaining insights from a range of sources and thereafter coalescing them together into a singular
framework.”414 How this complex process occurred is usually ignored, but one fact is generally
agreed upon. Dionysius Exiguus, who is most famous for the invention of Anno Domini and
other innovations related to the calendar, is known to have translated some of the works of Cyril
into Latin for his friends the Scythian monks. This can be seen most clearly in the explicit Latin
quotations of Cyril found in the writings of the monks.415
The Scythians’ competency in Greek needs to be investigated further, and caution should
prevail until the foundations are more firmly established. At the same time, the close reading of
the texts is a good place to start for bringing obscure matters to light. The similarities, in my
view, both in form and content between the Dialogus Contra Nestorianos and the two earlier
Greek dialogues demand attention. The very fact that both Cyril and Theodoret composed
dialogues is worthy of note. Cyril was, obviously, the greatest opponent of Nestorius and one of
the interlocutors of the first dialogue of the Scythian monks. Theodoret, on the other hand, was
viewed as a Nestorian sympathizer, which is seen most publicly at the Council of Chalcedon
where he was forced to condemn Nestorius. It is too significant a coincidence that two of the
most important figures in the theological controversies of the fifth century, to which the
Scythians monks are responding, wrote dialogues. What is more, Theodoret composed his
Eranistes in order to defend himself against accusations of teaching “Nestorian” doctrines,416

Pereira, John Maxentius and the Scythian Monks, 131.
ibid. 132. For the Latin texts of these translations, see PL 67.9–454.
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which was also a motivating factor for Maxentius’ composition of his own dialogue.417 In a way,
then, the Eranistes is Theodoret’s own Contra Nestorianos.
Similarities in Structure
Contra Nestorianos shares three structural similarities with De Trinitate and Eranistes:
first, a programmatic statement that the mimetic form of the dialogue was used to make the
arguments clear to the reader; second, the identities of the interlocutors in the dialogue are
generically named; and third, some version of summary chapters is included in the dialogues for
the reader to review the contents of the work.
To turn to the programmatic statements first, Cyril and Theodoret both make similar
statements about the dialogue’s ability to make their complex arguments clear to the reader. The
former writes:
The text is so arranged that it progresses in question and answer through
two interlocutors. Before the first interlocutor the letter Alpha has been
written, and the letter Beta before the second. For because there is a
certain great complexity to the matters under discussion, the introduction
of two interlocutors was necessary in order that the issue under scrutiny
might be constantly constructed and deconstructed through questions and
answers. Great care must be taken with the letters [written] in the margins.
Καὶ ἔστι μὲν ἀνειμένος ὁ λόγος, ὡς πρὸς πεῦσιν δὲ καὶ ἀπόκρισιν διὰ
δυοῖν προσώποιν ἔρχεται· καὶ τοῦ μὲν πρώτου τὸ A προτέτακται
στοιχεῖον, τοῦ δὲ δευτέρου τὸ B. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ πολλή τις ἄγαν ἐν τοῖς
ζητουμένοις ἐστὶν ἡ λεπτότης, ἵνα ταῖς ἐρωτήσεσι καὶ ταῖς ἀποκρίσεσιν
ἀεὶ τὸ βασανιζόμενον κατασκευάζηταί τε καὶ ἀνασκευάζηται πικρῶς,
ἀναγκαία γέγονεν ἡ τῶν προσώπων εἰσκομιδή. Παραφυλακτέον οὖν
ἀκριβῶς τὰ προτεταγμένα αὐτῶν στοιχεῖα.418
And the corresponding passage in the prologue of Theodoret’s Eranistes:
The text will proceed in the manner of dialogue, having questions and
answers, refutations and counter-positions, and everything else associated
with the dialogic form. I shall not insert the names of the interlocutors into
417
418
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the body of the text as the wise men from Greece did of old; instead I shall
write them in the margins. They composed their writings for those who
received a thorough education and for whom literature was their life. I
want the reading [of this dialogue] and the discovery of its benefit to be
clear, even to the uninitiated in literature. This [clarity] will be achieved
because the conversing interlocutors are marked by their names, which
have been written in the margin. The name “Orthodoxus” is given to the
proponent of apostolic teaching. The other is called “Eranistes.”
Διαλογικῶς μέντοι ὁ λόγος προβήσεται, ἐρωτήσεις ἔχων καὶ ἀποκρίσεις
καὶ προτάσεις καὶ λύσεις καὶ ἀντιθέσεις, καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα τοῦ διαλογικοῦ
ἴδια χαρακτῆρος. Τὰ δέ γε τῶν ἐρωτώντων καὶ ἀποκρινομένων ὀνόματα
οὐ τῷ σώματι τοῦ λόγου συντάξω, καθάπερ οἱ πάλαι τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφοί,
ἀλλ’ ἔξωθεν παραγράψω ταῖς τῶν στίχων ἀρχαῖς. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν γὰρ τοῖς διὰ
παντοδαπῆς ἠγμένοις παιδείας καὶ οἷς βίος ὁ λόγος προσέφερον τὰ
συγγράμματα· ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τοῖς λόγων ἀμυήτοις εὐσύνοπτον εἶναι
βούλομαι τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν καὶ τῆς ὠφελείας τὴν εὕρεσιν. Ἔσται δὲ τοῦτο,
δήλων γινομένων τῶν διαλεγομένων προσώπων ἐκ τῶν παραγεγραμμένων
ἔξωθεν ὀνομάτων. Καὶ τῷ μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀποστολικῶν ἀγωνιζομένῳ
δογμάτων Ὀρθόδοξος ὄνομα, ὁ δὲ ἕτερος Ἐρανιστὴς ὀνομάζεται.419
Finally, Maxentius’ statement is shorter but makes the same point:
I decided to compose this work of our disputation through the characters
of a heretic, who asks the questions, and an orthodox believer, who
responds to them, in order that the refutation of the heretic’s objections
might be clearer to my readers.
Placuit igitur, sub persona interrogantis haeretici et catholici respondentis,
explicare huius nostrae disputationis opusculum, quo facilius obiectionum
absolutio legentibus elucescat.420
Like Maxentius then, Cyril and Theodoret both claim to use the mimetic form of the
dialogue in order to facilitate the reading and understanding of their doctrine. This is, no doubt, a
benefit of the mimetic form of the dialogue as readers of Plato’s Symposium or Augustine’s
Cassiciacum dialogues know well; such texts can be difficult reading because it is sometimes
difficult to ascertain the identity of the speaker. But this observation is so ubiquitous in ancient
dialogues that it is almost banal to remark upon it. More interesting is how this decision in favor
419
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of the mimetic form benefits not only the reader but the author as well. These two bishops
understood the high stakes of theological partisanship in the fifth century and the peril of being
misunderstood in one’s own position, Theodoret especially. The disambiguation, therefore,
between the orthodox and heterodox perspectives provided by the mimetic dialogue acts as a
shield against misinterpretation. Nothing marks the boundary between us and them like the
physical separation of the speakers on the page—“we” the orthodox say this; “they” the heretics
blaspheme that. And the continuous discussion between the two interlocutors brings the finer
points into focus, leaving nothing to doubt or speculation.421 Cyril’s command, then, to future
copyists that they practice extreme caution (παραφυλακτέον ἀκριβῶς) in retaining the alphas and
the betas of the two interlocutors in their correct positions is more than a reminder to practice
scribal diligence. It is defense against the misattribution of a heretical theological position that
could be disastrous for the author. In the volatile environment of fifth century theological
politics, even the reputation of the eminent Cyril of Alexandria and his ecclesiastical rank as
patriarch are possibly at risk. In fact, it was only at the Council of Chalcedon, after Cyril’s death,
that his orthodoxy was enshrined, and he became a second Athanasius or Hilary. Some of
Theodoret’s writings were posthumously condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople,
where, in contrast, the general positions of the Scythian monks were upheld.422
Also apparent in the above quotations is the decision by the three authors to mark the
identities of the interlocutors with generic or thematic names rather than with the names of living
or deceased individuals. For the author of a controversial dialogue, it is almost a rhetorical
necessity to exclude oneself from the text, since anonymity qua absence of personal opinion is

John Maxentius often makes this point throughout the Contra Nestorianos. Cf. [Catholicus]: Quomodo Deum
corporis sui proprias fecisse asseris passiones, exemplis te planum facere conuenit. II.13.596–598
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the required philosophical high ground in combatting heresy. According to Cyril, Theodoret, and
John Maxentius, their respective dialogues merely transmit and clarify the Truth, never their own
opinions.423 To have one’s name associated with a position is the token of heresy. They are
Nestorians, Apollinarians, Pelagians, and Arians, not orthodox. Hence there is the “Nestorianus”
for Maxentius and the “Eranistes” for Theodoret—ἐρανιστής means “beggar,” with the
implication that he stitches together scraps of false teaching to fashion his ragged cloak of
heresy.424 Cyril’s unique decision in using letters to denote the interlocutors and his overall lack
of naming his antagonists throughout the dialogue have puzzled readers,425 and I know of no
clear parallel to this method of marking interlocutors.
The presence of chapter headings or summaries is the third and final structural similarity
between the Contra Nestorianos and the two Greek dialogues. In Cyril’s De Trinitate, he
includes a brief summary of the argument of each of the seven books at the beginning of the
dialogue. More interesting is what follows the three books of the Eranistes. Theodoret adds short
syllogistic statements to summarize the points made in each of three books of the dialogue,426
and though this epilogue is not of exactly the same type as the descriptive chapters found in the

Another way to achieve this is claiming that one is merely repeating the words of a biblical author. Cf.
[Catholicus:] Uerum, quia crucifixus est et mortuus is, qui est uita, non me, sed beatum Paulum ad Iudaeos audi
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Contra Nestorianos discussed above, the content is much the same. Of the three similarities in
structure, the presence of summaries is the most significant connection between the three
dialogues because there are no parallels for this phenomenon found in earlier Latin literature.
That said, it can certainly be argued that these similarities between the Latin dialogue of
John Maxentius and the earlier Greek dialogues of Cyril and Theodoret discussed here are
accidental and generic. In fact, the assessment of the mimetic form of the dialogue and need for
anonymity found in the prologues of the three authors were described as ubiquitous in
controversial dialogues, though the presence of the summaries is certainly a unique exception. I
shall address this objection more fully at the conclusion of this section, but first I shall turn to the
possible intertextual relationship between Contra Nestorianos and Eranistes.
Eranistes as model for Contra Nestorianos?
The more closely one reads the Eranistes alongside Contra Nestorianos the more the
similarities between them become apparent. Many of the arguments are similar between the two
dialogues, as the theological positions of Theodoret and John Maxentius are similar. Even the
trajectory of the argument and the biblical citations utilized are parallel. Most remarkable,
though, are the places where the texts differ, and it is on one of these examples that I want to
focus. Examples of theological difference are interesting in dialogues composed about the same
issue because of the polyvocal nature of the texts. What this means is that the two competing
positions are not respectively present and omitted between the two dialogues; instead, both
positions are present in each text, though the attributions are reversed. The result, then, is a
surprising and powerful contrast between what is “orthodox” in the two dialogues. In the
following example, the position that the “heretic” Eranistes “blasphemes” and Orthodoxus
condemns in Eranistes is what Catholicus champions and the “heretic” Nestorianus denies in
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Contra Nestorianos. What Cyril fears might happen to the text of his dialogue, that the letters A
and B become confused and their corresponding positions become misattributed, surprisingly
happens by design in Maxentius’ Contra Nestorianos when articulating his novel position on
divine suffering.
Eranistes: How do you deny that God the Word suffered according to
the flesh?
Orthodox: Because this statement is not found in sacred scripture.
ΕΡΑΝ. Πῶς τοίνυν οὔ φατε τὸν θεὸν λόγον πεπονθέναι σαρκί;
ΟΡΘ. Ὅτι παρὰ τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ ταύτην οὐχ εὑρήκαμεν τὴν φωνήν.427
Catholic: In no way do I proclaim that the Divinity is passible;
however, I strongly confess that God suffered according to the flesh,
because I recognize that Jesus Christ is truly God.
Nestorian: I completely deny that God suffered according to the flesh
because this is never read in the holy scriptures, but I profess, following
Peter the apostle, that Christ suffered according to the flesh.
Catholicus: Diuinitatem quidem passibilem nullatenus praedico, Deum
autem carne passum omnino confiteor, quia Iesum Christum Deum uerum
agnosco.
Nestorianus: Nullo modo ego Deum passum carne profiteor, quod in
scripturis sanctis nullatenus legitur, sed Christum passum carne, sequens
Petrum apostolum, fateor.428
These two passages are not true opposites,429 but they suffice as representatives of a
fundamental difference in argumentation about divine suffering between the two texts.430 Despite
this negligible difference, these two passages constitute a remarkable example of two dialogic
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texts whose theological theme is nearly identical but which have come to opposite conclusions
concerning a single issue, in this case the prospect of divine suffering. Not only is the theological
position reversed between the orthodox and heretical interlocutors but the justification for
denying this position is also reversed. Theodoret’s Orthodoxus does not accept his opponent’s
heretical position because it has no precedent in scripture, while Maxentius’ Nestorianus, in
contrast, will not accept the orthodox position for the very same reason.431 This very fact is of
interest on its own, as it is very rare to find such examples in extant Christian literature because
of the tendency to suppress the heretical viewpoint. But how much further can this be developed?
A question ought to be raised at this point. Is there a direct intertextual relationship
between Theodoret’s Eranistes and Maxentius’ Contra Nestorianos? In my view, it is still too
early to claim a direct connection between these two dialogues as the matter currently stands.
Furthermore, if a true connection is shown to exist, it remains to be seen how significant it is. A
number of other factors, for example, can account for the similarities between the texts, not least
Cyril’s Twelve Chapters and Leo’s Tome to which both Theodoret and Maxentius are
responding. Any two texts grappling with Chalcedonian theology will of course contain
arguments framed in the formulaic idiom that is associated with the Council. That said, I think
that there is a strong possibility of a significant connection between Contra Nestorianos and
Eranistes. The choice of using dialogue by the Scythians, the rhetorical and structural
connections between the two texts, and the historical relationship between these figures makes
the likelihood of a profound exchange in thought between the two texts compelling, or at least

The significance of this important reversal in Contra Nestorianos will be discussed at length in the section “The
Conclusion of the Dialogue” below.
431

140

suspiciously coincidental. A study of the possible Greek influences on the corpus of the Scythian
monks remains a desideratum.
Even though this issue is unsettled, the reader of this Latin dialogue gains insight about
the content and arguments found in Contra Nestorianos by reading the Greek Eranistes
alongside. The structure of the arguments is similar. The same scriptural battlegrounds for
important positions are the same. Also, as mentioned before, the differences between them might
be just as illuminating, perhaps more. Furthermore, the very fact that Greek and Latin authors are
making the same arguments, in the same way, in the same literary genre, about the same
theological controversy, and at roughly the same time demands attention; it also raises fears that
many other examples like this have been overlooked.432

The Content of Contra Nestorianos
The Dialogus Contra Nestorianos is divided into two books.433 The first book is
concerned with the two major theological problems associated with the Council of Ephesus (431)
and the Council of Chalcedon (451), namely the validity of the appellation Theotokos (Ephesus),
and the doctrine that Christ is one person from (or “in”) two natures (Chalcedon).434 The second
book, which is roughly twice as long as the first book, focuses on the human nature of Christ,

Rusticus the Deacon, who, as mentioned before, was responsible for translating some the Acta of the Ecumenical
Councils into Latin, should also be mentioned in the context. He composed a dialogue, Contra Acephalos, in Latin
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contributo nel dibattito teologico postcalcedonese. Rome: Libreria Ateneo Salesiano, 2007, and Sara Petri, La
Disputatio Contra Acephalos di Rustico. Studi Sulla Tardoantichit, 5. Pisa: Fabrizio Serra Editore, 2010.
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particularly the theological problems that arise from this. The relationship between Christ and his
flesh, whether the divinity suffered, and Christ’s place in the Trinity are all important questions.
These two subdivisions of Contra Nestorianos, then, fit well into the chronological progression
of theological thought over the course of the fifth century and into the early sixth century.
Viewed from the time of composition of the text, Book I is retrospective in its thought, as it
discusses the major positions upheld during the councils of the previous century, and Book II
contains a discussion of ongoing and contemporary theological problems of the early sixth
century.435 This is, of course, a generalization, but it is a useful way for understanding the
trajectory of the arguments found within the dialogue. This model also fits the Scythians’
understanding of their own theological program, a clarification of the doctrines approved by the
ecumenical councils of Ephesus and Chalcedon. Despite a modern, etic appreciation of the
“progress” and “novelty” of the Scythians’ theological speculation, these are never the terms
used by ancient authors to describe their own thought. “Innovation” and “novelty” are anathema.
Instead, it is always imperative to situate one’s own thought within orthodox doctrine,436 and it is
to this end that the Contra Nestorianos has been organized and divided.
Unlike the discussion of the Altercatio Luciferiani et Orthodoxi given above, the
Dialogus Contra Nestorianos is too long for a summary-like analysis. Extended Christological
argument also has a tendency to be less than engrossing for many readers. Therefore, my

At the conclusion of the dialogue, the two interlocutors discuss the validity of any statement if it has not been
approved by a synod. In so doing, they summarize the two parts of the dialogues, “Sed et duas naturas et theotocon
dicere synodus definiuit, hoc autem nulla synodus statuit” (Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.25.1144–45). The duae
naturae and theotokos, positions which were confirmed at Ephesus and Chalcedon, were the topic of Book I, while
hoc refers to the Theopaschite Theology position advanced in Book II.
436
Cf. the beginning of the Scythian monks’ Libellus Fidei, composed in 519, Quoniam nonnulli—uidentes nos
contra eos, qui inimico proposito uenerabilis Chalcedonensis concilii fidem nituntur euertere, patrum proferre
sententias, et nouis prauorum argumentationibus uerbis catholicis obuiare—augmentum aliquod nos in fide facere
iudicant aut certe contra statuta uenire concilii, necessario credidimus probabilibus documentis hanc inconuenientem
ab eorum animis expergare opinionem. Libellus Fidei, 1.1.5–12.
435

142

treatment will instead highlight the major themes, rhetorical strategies, and other passages of
interest such as how the dialogue concludes. If the reader is interested in a more exhaustive
understanding of the contents of the dialogue, there is a full translation of the text with its
summary-chapters available in Appendix B. As the current state of literature on the Contra
Nestorianos stands, there have been regrettably few attempts to read this dialogue closely and
comment upon it, and the following discussion is intended to begin to fill this lacuna for such an
interesting text.
Tone of the Dialogue
The first place to begin is with the tone and conduct between the two interlocutors, as it is
also the first topic that they discuss. This inclination toward explicit statement of method is
nothing new for dialogues—a discussion of how to converse is just as important as the subject
matter of the conversation—but the constant appeal to civility is surprising in this particular
dialogue.
Catholic: In my opinion, it is always best and most acceptable to
pursue the Truth without mockery and insults.
Nestorian: Whoever desires not Truth but the glory of personal victory
usually prefers mockery to rational judgment. But there is no place at all
for mockery among those whose sole intention is the joy of discovering
the Truth.
Catholic: Truth herself is accustomed, as scripture says,437 to appear
graciously before disputants on the path when she observes them sincerely
striving to find her. Our disputation, therefore, will doubtless reach a
fruitful conclusion, if belligerent contentiousness is absent from it.
Nestorian: I am completely of the same opinion, provided that you also
agree to respond to my questions with gentle spirit.
Catholic: Proceed as you wish, so that I can see what you want me to
know.
Cf. Wisdom 6:17. This observation is also remarkably similar to a famous biblical scene, the so-called “Walk to
Emmaus” (Lk 24:13–32). Found only in the Gospel of Luke, Christ appears, after the resurrection, on the road to
Cleopas and a nameless disciple as they are walking to the town of Emmaus. Over the course of their discussion he
reveals the truth of scripture to them. This is an important thematic antecedent to Christian dialogues. Minucius
Felix’ Octavius begins, for example, after a conversation that began during a walk.
437
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Catholicus: optimum quidem mihi et nimis gratum est, semotis
conuiciis, semper de ueritate conquirere.
Nestorianus: Solent iniuriae illis praestare suffragium, quibus studium
est non de ueritate, sed de propria gloriari uictoria; in his autem, qui tota
intentione cupiunt de comperta ueritate gaudere, locum haec penitus non
habent.
Catholicus: Facile solet in disputationum semitis, se—sicut scriptum
est—hilariter ipsa ueritas intimare, cum ad inuestigationem sui
disputantium mentes simplici uiderit intentione pertendere. Erit igitur,
procul dubio, nostrae disputationis fructuosus finis, si modo furiosa
contentio submoueatur e medio.
Nestorianus: Mea certe haec est omnino intentio, si tamen et tu placido
animo meis interrogationibus dignum duxeris respondere.
Catholicus: Moue quod uis, ut iam uideamus ea, quae a me scire
desideras.438
The commencement of this dialogue is radically different from that of Jerome’s
Altercatio. First, there is not the slightest attempt at creating even a fictitious mise-en-scène.
Second and more importantly, where the disputants were “nearly spitting in each other’s face”
(consputata paene inuicem facie) in Jerome’s dialogue, here the reverse is true for Maxentius.
Though this meeting does begin with some tension,439 it is agreed upon immediately by
Catholicus and Nestorianus that mutual respect and goodwill must be present for the dialogue to
be productive (nostrae disputationis fructuosus finis). Assuming an almost Stoic ethos, the
success of the argument, according to the interlocutors, will suffer to the degree that anger is
present in their conversation.440 Also in contrast to the Altercatio, the style of argumentation of
Contra Nestorianos is neither the caustic anger of the first half of Jerome’s dialogue nor the
Luciferian’s subservient obedience to the Orthodox authority like the second half of that

Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, I.Intro.23–39.
Before the passage quoted above, the Nestorian notes that he is happy to meet his opponent, who has been
slandering him, in a face-to-face discussion. The Catholic responds with a generalizing statement about
disagreement, with the implication that the Nestorian is consciously teaching false doctrine. This comment will
receive further comment during the discussion of the dialogue’s conclusion.
440
Cf. Quo quid est mitius, dum in recto animi habitus est? Quid autem ira crudelius est? Quid homine aliorum
amantius? Quid ira infestius? Homo in adiutorium mutuum genitus est, ira in exitium. Seneca, De Ira, I.5.2.
438
439
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dialogue. Instead, the entirety of the Contra Nestorianos maintains a middle ground, a civil but
frank communication of competing interpretations. There is a moment of rhetorical shift in
Maxentius’ dialogue, which will be discussed more fully below, but there is nothing that
constitutes the radical reversal of the Altercatio, where Luciferianus surrenders to his opponent
and agrees to be his student. The entirety of the dialogue is constant philosophical debate
initiated by both sides who are allegedly polite and civil.
Outbursts that break this agreement, however, are frequent, though efforts to quell them
are swift to follow. In fact, the first words that Catholicus speaks after the introduction are an
attack against Nestorianus, who, in return, asks him to consider his words closely before
attacking him with misunderstood accusations.441 Such encroachments on decorum are constant
and perpetrated by each side, though more often by Catholicus, which is surprising. Sometimes
such indiscretions are preemptively avoided. Nestorianus asks Catholicus to be patient in his
responses, and not to be provoked by what might seem to be contradictory before it is
understood.442 More often, the fire can be put out only after it has been kindled. After
Nestorianus’ appeal to patience, for example, the dialogue devolves into a series of mutual
accusations of the other’s syllogistic sophistry and defenses of their own sermo humilis inspired
by the truth.443 This continues for the rest of Book I until Nestorianus finally gives ground and
restores civility to the colloquy. He asks for clarification from Catholicus, asking him to teach
him (doce me) about the subtleties between person and nature and what the appropriate

Nestorianus: Noli, quaeso te, antequam meorum dictorum rationem diligenter discutias, calumniosis me impetere
uocibus. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, I.1.45–46.
442
[Nestorianus]: quaeso ut patienter de his, quae a te quaeruntur, respondeas; nec te moueant ea, quae tibi fortassis,
antequam intellagas, uidentur esse contraria. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, 1.5.133–35.
443
For example, “Catholicus: Uersuta quidem fraude argumentaris, sed nullatenus a duorum filiorum praedicatione
discedis.” Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, I.9.370–1
441
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terminology is for discussing them.444 Catholicus is then allowed to expound on his position, and
Nestorianus agrees with all of his points except for one, how nature can exist independent of
person. The first book concludes amicably under the agreement that further matters will be
discussed in the following book.
This nicety is quickly forgotten a few pages later when Catholicus claims that he could
not expound his position sufficiently in the previous discussion because Nestorius preferred
personal victory (uincere cupiens) rather than being cured (sanari) of his false beliefs,445 a
statement that is directly opposed to what Nestorianus said at the beginning of Book I.446 This
rhetorical jab is indicative of an underlying problem with Nestorianus’ argumentation that will
only become apparent at the very end of the dialogue, but despite this bumpy start, the dialogue
continues in much the same vein as the previous book. Tension percolates to the surface but
usually cools before it can boil over.447 One such episode is notable. Catholicus questions
Nestorianus’ sincerity in seeking the truth, but Nestorianus responds forcefully.
[Catholic]: ...even if I teach from the scriptures that He, who is “Life,”
died and was crucified, you will still turn to other matters because you do
not yield to the truth, as you never cease from asking pointless questions.

Nestorianus: Quia nos inualidos arguis ad discernendum, quid inter naturam sit et personam: doce tu naturam
esse sine persona, aut quae possint naturis proprie siue personae uocabula coaptari. Contra Nestorianos, I.13.495–6.
445
Catholicus: Multa quidem in superiore sermone disserentes, nullum apud te prouectum habere potuimus, quia
mens, non sanari sed uincere cupiens, auersa ab his, quae dicuntur, ad nihil aliud intenta est, nisi ut inueniat, quod
pro suis partibus eloquatur. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.1.10–14. Maxentius’ use of language of healing
(sanari) is of interest because Theodoret does the same in the Eranistes. Cf. “I shall attempt to speak briefly with
them [sc. heretics], both in order to heal them and to show concern for those who are still healthy. The name of the
text is Eransistes or Polymorphus, because the heretics have collected terrible doctrines from many sick men.” Ἐγὼ
δὲ αὐτοῖς βραχέα διαλεχθῆναι πειράσομαι, καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν χάριν θεραπείας καὶ τῆς τῶν ὑγιαινόντων ἕνεκα
προμηθείας. Ὄνομα δὲ τῷ συγγράμματι Ἐρανιστής ἢ Πολύμορφος. Ἐκ πολλῶν γὰρ ἀνοσίων ἀνθρώπων
ἐρανισάμενοι τὰ δύστηνα δόγματα. Eranistes, Prologue, 28.19–23. This connection should not be overemphasized,
however, as question and answer was often used in medical texts, making such a statement a pervasive rhetorical
trope. See Yannis Papadoyannakis, “Instruction by Question and Answer: The Case of Late Antique and Byzantine
Erotapokriseis,” in Greek Literature in Late Antiquity: Dynamism, Didacticism, Classicism. Scott Fitzgerald
Johnson, ed. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006, pp. 91–103, at 91–2.
446
More on this point below.
447
Cf. Nestorianus: Docuisti certe, quod multis hactenus uerborum ambagibus tegere uidebaris: compositionem
nullatenus naturarum seruare proprietatem. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.3.227–229
444
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Nestorian: If I refused to yield to the truth, I would have never brought
forth those matters that trouble me before us for discussion. But you,
because you cannot respond to my objections, accuse me of asking
pointless questions.
[Catholicus]: ...etsi eum, qui est uita, mortuum et crucifixum ex
scripturis docuero, rursus, ad alia te conuertens, dum non uis cedere
ueritati, superfluas quaestiones mouere non desinis.
Nestorianus: Si nollem cedere ueritati, numquam ea, quae me mouent,
in medium discutienda proferrem; tu uero, dum non uales respondere
obiectis, nobis quasi superflua quaerentibus insultas.
If there is a moment of transition in the second book of the dialogue, this is it. Catholicus
thereafter abandons his more overt criticism of his opponent’s questions and ostensibly assumes
that Nestorianus is in earnest in his desire for the truth. Nestorianus, on the other hand, becomes
more adversarial. This moment of role-reversal also coincides with the beginning of the most
important theological discussion within the entire dialogue—the introduction of Catholicus’
“novel” Theopaschitism—what it means for God the Word to suffer—the greatest theological
innovation, from a modern perspective, of the Scythian monks. The significance of this moment
is not lost on Nestorianus or on Maxentius, who created the literary persona of his opponent.
“This teaching of yours,” Nestorianus complains, “is novel and intolerable” (noua quaedam et
intolerabilis).448
This shift between the two interlocutors, therefore, does not happen by chance. John
Maxentius, it seems, sees the need for both the philosophical soundness and the respectful
civility of the proponent of his main position. That the fair and unbiased discussion of these
thorny issues was seen as important can be determined by the discourse that follows. Catholicus
coolly explicates his own position, while Nestorianus makes every possible attack against him. A
large portion of this debate concerns biblical interpretation, and many of the subsequent

448

Nestorianus: Noua quaedam et intolerabilis doctrina haec uestra est. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.9.360–61.
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exchanges take the following form: Nestorianus raises a biblical objection, and Catholicus
reinterprets or contextualizes Nestorianus’ citation.
Before some examples of this type of argumentation are discussed, especially insofar as
the form of the dialogue directly impacts it, it is appropriate to pause and consider the reasons for
the tone of the dialogue. Why is Catholicus initially cast as the villain and Nestorianus the one
who extends the olive branch? Why does Nestorianus persist in his theological resistance,
leveling powerful objections at Catholicus’ arguments? And, why is an atmosphere of civility
maintained, even if only barely? All of these questions, I think, can be answered by the political
and theological climate in which the Scythian monks found themselves. As discussed above, the
Scythians found themselves in a hostile environment in both Constantinople and Rome. After the
Acacian Schism, which began in 484 but concluded in 519 as the Scythian monks arrived in
Constantinople, and the controversy surrounding the Theopaschite addition to the Trisagion in
511, John Maxentius and his companions were viewed as disturbers of a peace that had only
recently been reinstated.449 In response to this, their views were intentionally misrepresented by
their adversaries,450 and, in fact, they initially found favor from no party at all. Even after they
were received more warmly by Justinian in Constantinople, Pope Hormisdas forcibly kept them
under house-arrest in Rome as punishment for their failed escape attempt.451

Cf. “Insidiator antiquus excitauit monachos de Scythia, qui de domo magistri militum Uitaliani sunt, omnium
Christianorum uotis aduersarios, quorum inquietudo non paruas moras generauit unitati ecclesiarum et magnopere
de praedictae ecclesiae Antiochenae ordinatione,” (AC.216.5), and “Harum tamen tribulationum prouisores et socii
et unitatis ecclesiarum impedimenta monachi de Scythia fuerunt, qui posteaquam hic [sc. Constantinople] defecerunt
adsignati ab omnibus nihil pacificum cogitare, ad beatitudinem uestram [sc. Pope Hormisdas] cucurrerunt sperantes
subripere et per litteras uestrae sedis suas intentiones confirmare. (AC.217.5) Both of these letters are dated to July
519, the first by Dioscurus the Deacon, and the second to Disocurus and some of his companions.
450
Maxwell, “Christology and Grace,” 80f.
451
A. A. Vasiliev, Justin the First: An Introduction to the Epoch of Justinian the Great. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1950, 194–5, Gray, Defense of Chalcedon, 48–50, & Maxwell, Latin West, 90.
449
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At best, the theological views of the Scythian monks were misunderstood. In a letter
written to Pope Hormisdas, Dioscurus the Deacon characterized their teaching as the following,
“May your blessedness know that these Scythians call everyone who accepts Chalcedon
‘Nestorians,’ claiming that ‘[the teaching of] the council is not strong enough against Nestorius,’
and claiming that we should understand the council as they explain it.”452 In sum, the Scythians
met resistance from all sides, much of it explicitly hostile and uncharitable. These circumstances,
then, bring the tone of Contra Nestorianos into sharper focus. From the evidence that can be
gathered, the dialogue represents a communicative space that was missing in reality. In contrast
to the minor disagreements found in the literary dialogue, the actual conversations held in
Constantinople and Rome seem to have been derailed before they could even begin. This fact can
account for the initial tone and characterization of the two interlocutors, especially the
unexpectedly negative portrayal of the protagonist, not the antagonist, of the dialogue. It is
impossible, of course, to know with certainty, but this aspect of the dialogue can be seen as
calculated self-deprecation intended as a gesture of respect.453 Although John Maxentius and his
companions received unfair treatment from their opponents, the tone of this dialogue can be read,
I suggest, as a conscious effort to provide a space of civility and level-headed argument to the
fracas. I shall develop this more fully below, but only after a discussion of the content and
conclusion of the dialogue. It is to the former that I shall turn next.

Isti tamen Scythae sciat beatitudo uestra quia omnes accipientes synodum Calcedonensem Nestorianos dicunt
dicentes ‘non sufficit synodus contra Nestorium’ et sic debere synodum suscipere, quomodo ipsi exposuerint. CA
224.7.
453
This sentiment is not related to the Latin rhetorical strategy of deprecatio, which is a strategy, criticized by
Cicero and Quintilian (De Inventione 1.15, and Institutio Oratoria 7.4.17), that acknowledges willful crime but
nonetheless requests pardon. For further discussion see, David Konstan, Before Forgiveness: The Origins of a Moral
Idea. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 38f.
452
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Method of Interpretation: quo facilius obiectionum absolutio legentibus elucescat
The argumentation found in the Contra Nestorianos is notable both for its interpretive
content (both what is discussed and what is absent from the discussion) and the style of the
argumentation. First of all, there is a notable omission of argumentation from authority,
specifically the explicit discussion of previous claims made by acknowledged patristic
authorities such as Augustine, Cyril of Alexandria, and the Emperor Zeno. Quotations from the
decrees of the Ecumenical Councils are eschewed as well.454 This stance is in direct contrast with
the rest of the Scythian corpus where this sort of argumentation is abundant. One of their works,
for example, is a florilegium of Augustine’s writings, and with regard to Theopaschite Theology,
Augustine is, in fact, Maxentius’ chief authority for using the phrase “unum de Trinitate,” as
stated in Libellus Fidei.455 However, in the discussion of this phrase in Contra Nestorianos,
which is an essential point for the conclusion of the argument in the dialogue,456 Maxentius
completely avoids this former argument from patristic authority, using reason and biblical
exegesis instead.457 Likewise, there is no discussion of Cyril’s Twelve Chapters in the Dialogus,
although the other dialogue composed by the Scythian monks, the aptly titled Disputatio XII
Capitulorum Cyrilli Alexandrini, includes the personae of Cyril and Nestorius as the only two
named interlocutors. In fact, the very structure of the dialogue is based upon a patristic text: the
text is subdivided into twelve parts, each corresponding to one of Cyril’s Twelve Chapters.
Furthermore, there is also no mention of Zeno’s Henotikon, another key document supporting the
The final section of Contra Nestorianos argues against the need for synodal authority for any given position.
Nec enim uerendi sunt hi, qui nos reprehendere tentant—dicentes: eo quod Trinitatem diuidere est, Christum
dicere 'unum de trinitate' —cum et ‘ex trinitate,’ et, quod amplius est, ‘unus trium’ a beato dictum sit Augustino.
Libellus Fidei, 9.188; cf. Augustine, De Trinitate, II.9.16 et passim.
456
See Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.19–21.
457
This is not just my observation, but it comes from Maxentius’ own words. Cf. [Catholicus]: Quapropter, tam
ratione quam his diuinis testimoniis, uana et inanis docetur illa tua, multis syllogismis collecta, conclusio, quae dicit
non conuenire ueritati, Christum unum ex trinitate dicere, quia unum numeri proprium est, numerus autem omnis in
diuisione est. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.19.943–47.
454
455
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Chalcedonian position, in the Contra Nestorianos. Instead, the argumentation of Contra
Nestorianos is consistently anonymous and biblical. Authority figures are referred to obscurely,
and only by Nestorianus.458 Synodal authority is raised only to be discounted,459 the sole
exception being a reference to Nestorius’ condemnation at the Council of Ephesus, though this is
mentioned in passing and his name is omitted (ille).460 The impact of structuring the Contra
Nestorianos in this way will become clearer below, after some of the arguments found within
this dialogue are discussed in more detail.
Perhaps the most illustrative example of the dialogue’s argumentation comes from one of
its longer sections, which investigates the relationship between the second person of the Trinity
and Christ. After a discussion about the nature of Christ’s suffering on the cross, Nestorianus
appears, or at least claims, to have gained the upper hand. Using a metaphor of pursuit, he boasts
that he has his opponent cornered with no avenue of escape. A verse from the Letter to the
Hebrews, he asserts, will be the final snare that will trap Catholicus: Decebat enim eum, propter
quem omnia et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum
per passiones consummare [Heb 2:10].461 For Nestorianus, this ambiguous verse provides clear
testimony that God the Word perfected Christ through his suffering. Interpretation, here, is
obviously a requirement. In order to arrive at this reading, the various pronouns in the verse are
parsed and their relationship to the Trinity illuminated. According to Nestorianus, “eum propter

Nestorianus: Haec de patrum possum scriptis ostendere. Catholicus: Sed et nos, quod unus ex trinitate Christus
sit, ex patrum scriptis ostendimus. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.25.1163–1165. Ostendimus is certainly perfect
tense, possibly referring directly to the passage from Libellus Fidei.
459
Cf. Contra Nestorianos, II.25.
460
Cf. Catholicus: Sed Deum natum ex uirgine, etiam ille dixit, qui apud Ephesum condemnatus est, non quo uere et
proprie natum confiteretur Deum ex femina, sed propter unitionem Dei uerbi ad hominem factum, quem uirgo enixa
est. Contra Nestorianos, II.22.1061–64.
461
The NRSV renders this verse as, “It was fitting that God, for whom and through whom all things exist, in bring
many children to glory, should make the pioneer of their salvation perfect through sufferings,” translating eum as
“God,” but it is the very ambiguity of eum (original Greek, αὐτῷ) that is the subject of discussion in this passage.
458
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quem . . . adduxerat” indicates God the Word, who perfected (consummare) “auctorem salutis
eorum,” who is Christ, through his sufferings (per passiones). Following this reading, therefore,
Nestorianus claims that Christ is different from God the Word, because the latter purified the
former through the passion of the crucifixion. Framed another way, the suffering in Christ is
completely absent from the Godhead, because Christ and the Godhead are different.462
Continuing the metaphor begun by Nestorianus, Catholicus retorts that his opponent has
left the door wide open for his escape because the quotation from Hebrews actually supports his
own position. The knife, it seems, cuts both ways. What follows is Catholicus’ counterinterpretation of the previous verse as well as other excerpts from Hebrews. It is important to
note that the truth of the verse from Hebrews is never in question nor is the validity of the Latin
translation an issue for the two interlocutors,463 as the Bible is one of the many things upon
which the two interlocutors agree.464 The source of disagreement is their interpretations, not the

[Nestorianus]: Quando ergo unius eiusdemque mirabilia et passiones credendae sunt, cum per passiones alter ab
altero consummetur? Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.11.511–513.
463
There is one exception to this, which merits further investigation elsewhere. Earlier in Book II, Nestorianus
contests not Catholicus’ interpretation but rather his translation of Malachi 3:8, “Si affigit homo Deum, quia uos
configitis me? gens tota.” He claims instead that the correct reading is the following, “Si supplantat homo Deum,
quia supplantatis me uos? gens tota.” Catholicus responds that Nestorius’ reading corresponds to what is known as
the Vetus Latina version of the Bible, but that his own reading is found in the Vulgate (in nouella [editione]). This
problem of translation is pursued no further here by the two interlocutors, but this discrepancy in competing
translations can be further explored because Jerome’s justification for his translation of this very verse is preserved
in his commentary on the prophet Malachi. Part of Jerome’s reasoning for his choice of “affiget” rests on how the
Syriac and “Chaldean” translators treat the original Hebrew, “The language of the Syrians and Chaldeans translate
the Hebrew word haiecba ( )הַ יִקְ בַ עas ‘affiget’” (Hoc quod diximus haiecba, lingua Syrorum et Chaldeorum
interpretatur, “si affiget”), In Malachiam, 3.269–285. Contrary to what Jerome claims, however, the reading of the
Old Testament Syriac Peshitta, which is generally understood to have been translated from the Hebrew in the second
century, reads telam (“ )ܜܜܜto defraud, cheat” for haiecba, supporting the reading against which Jerome is arguing,
namely “Si fraudat homo Deum, quia uos fraudatis me?” (ibid.) There are a number of factors that can account for
this discrepancy, some more interesting than others, but this passage from the Contra Nestorianos is a good
reminder that variant Latin translations of the Bible still had a significant impact on later theological discussion.
464
This is not always true for late antique Latin dialogues, especially those that include “pagan” or Jewish
interlocutors. Theophilus limits his arguments against Simon to the Hebrew Bible, and when he uses the New
Testament, it is almost apologetically. Cf. Et si uolueris plenitudinem euangeliorum cognoscere, inuenies apud
Iohannem nostrum euntem ad passionem Christum crucem in humeris sibi portasse, pro quo dicit Esaias: Cuius
imperium factum est super humeros eius. Altercatio legis inter Simonem Iudaeum et Theophilum Christianum,
6.241–43. Surrounding this quotation are two testimonies from the Psalms and one from Isaiah.
462
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validity of the interpreted object. Catholicus’ counterargument, then, is founded upon two
principles: the importance of the context of any individual verse’s meaning (hence his tendency
to use proximal passages in framing his reading),465 and the correct identification of each
individual speaking or being spoken about in the passage.
[Catholic]: Because you do not understand the apostle’s meaning, you
are convicted of proclaiming that one “Son of God” is passible and
another “Son of God” is impassible. For God the Word did not—as you
ignorantly claim—perfect the author of our salvation through his passion,
but God the Father perfected God the Son, Jesus Christ, “for whom and
through whom all things [exist], the author of His children’s salvation”
[cf. Heb 2:10], through His passion. Who, in fact, should understand “the
author of His children’s salvation, perfected through His passion” is
someone different from Him, “for whom and through whom all things
exist, in bringing many children to glory?” Especially since [the apostle]
before this passage said, “But we see Jesus, who for a little while was
made a little lower than the angels, now crowned with glory and honor
because of the suffering of death, so that by the grace of God He might
taste death for everyone” [Heb 2:9]. Then the apostle immediately follows
this by saying, “It was fitting that He”—that is, God the Father “for whom
and through whom all things [exist]”—“perfected ‘the author of the
salvation’ for ‘those’”—namely, ‘those children’ “whom He brought to
glory,” and, ‘He’ who, “although He was equal to the Father, was made a
little lower than the angels, so that by the grace of God”—that is God the
Father—“might taste death for everyone.” But we learn this much more
clearly and lucidly at the beginning of the letter. . .
[Catholicus]: Nam, cum apostoli sententiam non intellegas, alterum
passibilem, alterum impassibilem Dei filium praedicare conuinceris. Nec
enim—ut imperite asseris—Deus uerbum, salutis nostrae auctorem
consummat per passiones: sed Deus pater, Deum filium Iesum Christum,
propter quem omnia et per quem omnia, auctorem salutis filiorum,
consummat per passiones. Quis enim hic, auctorem salutis filiorum per
passiones consummatum, alium permittitur intellegere, nisi eum, qui
multos filios in gloriam adduxerat: propter quem omnia et per quem
omnia? nam, cum superius dixisset: eum qui modicum quam angeli
minoratus est, uidemus iesum propter passionem mortis gloria et honore
coronatum, ut gratia dei pro omnibus gustaret mortem, secutus mox
intulit, dicens: decebat enim eum—hoc est, Deum patrem, propter quem
omnia et per quem omnia—auctorem salutis eorum—uidelicet, quos in
Catholicus often criticizes Nestorianus for disregarding other passages from scripture. Cf. Catholicus: Dum nimis
intentus es in his scipturae diuinae uocibus, quas tuis putas competere partibus, ceteras penitus despicis. Dialogus
Contra Nestorianos, I.6.219–221. See also, ibid. II.4 and II.15.
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gloriam adduxerat filiorum; qui etiam, cum esset aequalis Deo, paulo
minus quam angeli minoratus: gratia Dei patris pro omnibus gustauit
mortem—per passiones consummare. Sed manifestius hoc et lucidius, in
ipsius epistulae principio, perdocemur. . .466
This tortuous, dense passage is a perfect example of the sort of biblical interpretation
described above. First, Catholicus pinpoints the crux of Nestorianus’ interpretative error and
demonstrates the unsavory implications of his reading—two “God the Word”-s are created.
Then, by using his opponent’s misreading as a foil, he can break the scriptural text into small
pieces, inserting explanatory comments at every moment of ambiguity. An almost staccato effect
is created between passages from the biblical text and notes of clarification such as in the
following: “He”—not God the Word, but God the Father—“perfected him, for whom and
through whom all things exist”—that is, God the Father to God the Word, not God the Word to
Christ. The result is a running commentary, wherein verses, clauses, and even individual words
are interrupted with glosses and clarification, creating almost a dialogue between biblical text
and interpreter.
This particular literary critical method of interpretation is nothing new. It has its origins
in Alexandrian commentaries on the epic poems attributed to Homer and later for Virgil’s
Aeneid. Called λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου (solution via persona), this method asks very simple
questions about the text—who is speaking or spoken about in any given passage—but it can play
a vital role in solving (λύσις) ostensible contradictions within a text. Most commonly, this takes
the form of “explaining” various contradictory statements found in the poems by attributing them
to the fallible personae contained within the Iliad or the Aeneid, thereby acquitting Homer and
Virgil of speaking falsely.467 It is not Virgil who lies, according to this logic, only the characters
Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.11.518–537.
Narratology is far from a modern method of reading literature. Aristarchus and his contemporaries believed that
many of the inconsistencies found within Homer could be understood by the fact that different people give different,
466
467
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in his poems. This method is also found in dialogues. An early example found in a Latin
dialogue comes from Cicero’s De Amicitia. Within this text, an amusing problem arises when it
is realized that Terence, with whom both Laelius and the late Scipio were friends, includes
statements in his plays that are inconsistent with those explicated by Laelius. Furthermore,
because friendship is “nothing other than the agreement of all matters, both human and divine,
combined with goodwill and love” (nihil aliud nisi omnium diuinarum humanarumque rerum
cum beniuolentia et caritate consensio),468 it follows that Terence cannot be the friend of either
of these famous Romans. Laelius (or Cicero through the persona of Laelius) playfully solves the
problem (sed nescio quo modo uerum est, quod in Andria familiaris meus [sc. Terentius] dicit)
by λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου. Like the case of earlier interpreters of Homer, the discrepancy in
“Terence’s” account of friendship is allayed when the views are attributed properly—they are the
opinions of the characters of his play, not necessarily his own (ut ait idem Terentius, sed ille in
Gnathonis persona).469
In Christian literature, especially Christian literature concerned with the language of
persona and πρόσωπον found in Trinitarian theology, this tool can have significant implications
for reading and interpreting the biblical text. The most common example of this reading strategy
is found in the exegesis of the Psalms. The question of persona, for example, is ubiquitous in
Augustine’s Enarrationes in Psalmos where the poem-hymns of David must be attributed to the

sometimes deceitful, accounts about the same event. The “discrepancies,” therefore, are not Homer’s, but of the
characters within his poems. Augustine himself uses a version of this method is his discussion of the sack of Rome
in 410 in light of the prophecy found in the first book of Virgil’s epic, “His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono /
imperium sine fine dedi,” Aeneid 1.278–9. Imagining the poet’s response to the sack, Augustine suggests that Virgil
could give the following defense, “Non ex persona mea dixi rem falsam, sed Ioui imposui falsitatis personam. Sicut
deus falsus erat, ita mendax uates erat,” Serm. 105.7.10. For an excellent and succinct discussion of this, in which
this quotation from Augustine is also cited, see James J. O’Hara, Death and the Optimistic Prophecy in Vergil’s
Aeneid. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 123–27.
468
De Amicitia, XX.53.23.
469
Cf. De Amicitia, XXIV.89 and XXV.93.
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correct persona.470 Oftentimes, as in the psalms, the concern is who is speaking, but just as often
the question is about whom the text speaks. Such was the case in the controversy, as mentioned
above, surrounding the Trisagion hymn in the early sixth century—is the phrase, “ἅγιος ὁ θεός,
ἅγιος ἰσχυρός, ἅγιος ἀθάνατος, ἐλέησον ἡμᾶς,” addressed to the Trinity or only to Christ?471 As
might be expected, then, this method becomes a vital tool for defending one’s position against
heresies concerning the Trinity and Christology, and it is especially effective in the dialogic
form.
Like Cicero’s dialogue, where Cicero discusses amicitia with his friend Atticus through
the personae of the dialogue, who in turn use this method of reading to interpret the personae
contained in other texts, namely Terence’s plays, the controversial dialogues also create a
Russian doll-like structure, each subordinate layer nested within that which precedes it. The
author constitutes the primary uox, which is first subdivided into the two interlocutors, who in
turn create another layer by their interaction with the authors of the biblical text and, even
further, the personae created by these authors. In the following passage, Catholicus and
Nestorianus participate in an exchange that, mutatis mutandis, could be found in a discussion of
ancient poetry such as that found in Macrobius’ Saturnalia or that described in Cicero’s De
Amicitia above.
Nestorian: Then does the Lord lie when he says, “No one has ever
seen God” [Jn 1:18, 1 Jn 4:12]? The apostle [Paul] also says the following
about God, “Whom no one has ever seen or can see” [1 Tim 6:16], and
God says to Moses, “No one shall see my face and live” [Ex 33:20].

Cf. “Ego autem constitutus sum rex ab eo super Sion, montem sanctum eius, praedicans praeceptum Domini” [Ps
2:6]. Ex persona ipsius Domini nostri Iesu Christi ista manifesta sunt. Enarrationes in Psalmos, 2.5.1. Forms of
persona occur 189 times in this text, more than one occurrence per psalm on average.
471
See Grillmeier, Christ in Christian Tradition, 254–6; Maxwell, Latin West, 71–2; and Gray, Chalcedon in the
East, 49.
470
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Catholic: If it is not God who was seen, how does He say, “Behold, I
who am speaking am present” [Is 52:6], and the prophet [says], “Our God
comes and does not keep silence” [Ps 49:3]?472
Nestorian: Must it be believed, therefore, that Divine Scripture
contradicts itself?
Catholic: Divine Scripture does not contradict itself in the eyes of
those who understand it piously. But it seems contradictory to those who
are deceived by the spirit of heresy and cannot grasp what its truths are.
For the following is said, “No one has ever seen God,” and “No one shall
see my face and live,” because no one can see, with their earthly eyes, the
nature of the divinity, which is obviously not matter but spirit.
Furthermore, the prefiguring that happened to Jacob teaches that God was
to be seen by humans in His assumed flesh—when in fact this very
patriarch wrestles with someone ostensibly human and when blessed by
“this man,” he says, “I have seen God face to face, and yet my life is
preserved” [Gen 32:30]. Thomas also, after the resurrection of the Lord,
felt and touched the Lord’s pierced side, exclaiming, “My Lord and my
God” [Jn 20:28].
Nestorianus: Mentitur ergo ipse Dominus, dicens: Deum nemo uidit
umquam? et apostolus, loquens de Deo: quem nemo, inquit, hominum
uidit, sed nec uidere potest; et ad Moysen dicit Deus: nemo potest faciem
meam uidere et uiuere.
Catholicus: Si non est Deus, qui uisus est: quomodo ipse dicit: ecce,
qui loquebar, adsum, et propheta: Deus manifeste ueniet, Deus noster et
non silebit?
Nestorianus: Contraria ergo sibimetipsi loqui credenda est scriptura
diuina?
Catholicus: Non est scriptura diuina sibimetipsi contraria apud eos,
qui eam pie intellegunt; sed illis uidetur contraria, qui, haeretico decepti
spiritu, non possunt, quae uera sunt, sapere. Nam, quia nemo corporeis
oculis potest uidere naturam diuinitatis, quae utique non est corpus, sed
spiritus, dictum est: Deum nemo uidit umquam, et: nemo uidet faciem
meam et uiuet. Rursus, quia uidendus est ab hominibus Deus in assumpta
carne, docet praefiguratio illa, facta ad Iacob; denique cum homine
colluctatur in uisione idem beatissimus patriarcha, et, benedictus ab eo,
dicit: uidi deum facie ad faciem, et salua facta est anima mea. Hinc et
Thomas, post resurrectionem Domini, palpans et contrectans perfossum
dominicum latus, exclamat: Dominus meus, et Deus meus!473
This phenomenon, which is frequent in Contra Nestorianos, especially in this reading of
Hebrews, is not limited to one interlocutor’s conversation with and interpretation of the biblical
472
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Maxentius seems to have reversed the attributions of these two scriptural passages.
Dialogus Contra Nestorianus, II.15.
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text. A similar phenomenon occurs in the dialogic back-and-forth between Catholicus and
Nestorianus themselves. As the dialogue progresses, the two speakers often resort to interpreting
or rephrasing their opponent’s position, often marked by the phrase iuxta uos/te.474 But in order
to see the impact of this style of argumentation, it is necessary to understand how the dialogue
concludes.
The Conclusion of the Contra Nestorianos
The conclusion of the Dialogus Contra Nestorianos is remarkable because, unlike nearly
all of its Latin dialogue predecessors, it pointedly ends with Nestorianus’ stubborn refusal to
reconcile with Catholicus despite the fact that they have come to an agreement on every issue.
Real progress toward agreement has certainly been made over the course of the dialogue, and
this is what makes the conclusion even more jarring. In fact, after all of Nestorianus’ objections
have been answered, Catholicus finally exclaims in a moment of joyful triumph, “What is this!
You agree that it is Catholic and consistent with the Truth to say that Christ is ‘one from the
Trinity?’”475 All seems to have come to a happy conclusion. Just as the Luciferian in Jerome’s
Altercatio and Caecilius in Minucius Felix’ Octavius are convinced by their respective
interlocutors, so also is Nestorianus by Catholicus. But Nestorianus’ reaction is far different from
those from these two earlier dialogues. Rather than accepting his “victorious defeat” at the hands
of his interlocutor, which is the usual trope,476 his response is to excuse himself, to quit the
discussion. “I do not want to pursue this matter with you any further,”477 Nestorianus lamely
replies. From this climactic moment, the final two sections of the dialogue radically shift gears in

Cf. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, I.2, I.3, I.5, I.6, I.8, I.10, II.1, II.2, II.9, II.13, II.16, II.19.
Catholicus: Quid ergo? Catholicum esse dicis, et ueritati congruum, unum dicere Christum ex trinitate? Dialogus
Contra Nestorianos, II.23.1092f.
476
That is, the fact that one’s personal defeat in a dialogue gains the victory of learning the truth.
477
Nestorianus: Nihil uolo de hac re ulterius tecum conquirere. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.23.1094.
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tone and contain an indictment of Nestorianus’ character, epitomized by his very refusal to
acquiesce to positions he has himself endorsed. For rhetorical and philosophical effect, this
(self)-indictment is spoken by Nestorianus himself.
He first presses Catholicus, demanding why he deserves to be labeled a heretic if he only
refuses to use Catholicus’ words (tuis sermonibus uti), though agreeing with Catholicus in
substance. Catholicus retorts by asking him how he would react to someone confessing that
“Christ is one nature of God the Word, namely incarnate and animate, but of rational and
intellectual quality” (incarnatam et animatam rationali et intellectuali).478 Nestorianus responds
to this query with the strong assertion that this sort of person deserves nothing short of
anathematization (tales . . . anathematizo) because this position has been clearly defined at a
synod, namely Chalcedon—Christ is one person in two natures, one human and incarnate, the
other divine and incorporeal. To say otherwise, he states, is heresy.
Second and finally, Catholicus again presses Nestorianus about certain ubiquitous
Christian concepts such as the “Trinity,” which were never explicitly defined by a synod (quod
in uerbis non continetur conciliorum) but are unanimously understood to be orthodox. To the
reader well-versed in the writing of Maxentius and the Scythian monks, the following response
given by Nestorianus is full of irony. He claims that he would use the writings of the church
fathers to defend his position (haec de patrum scriptis doceri facile). Catholicus, who for the first
time in the text, can be clearly identified with John Maxentius himself, responds that he has
already argued for his position from the church fathers, “But we have also proved that Christ is

This labored Latin is an obvious stab at Nestorianus’ previous linguistic gymnastics. “Incarnatam et animatam
rationali et intellectuali” suggests a Chalcedonian position—two natures, one divine and one human—but is
expressed in strange, un-Chalcedonian language. The label Monophysite, though, is also applicable to “incarnatam
et animatam rationali et intellectuali.”
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‘one from the Trinity’ by the Fathers’ writings.”479 As mentioned above, the persona of
Catholicus does not use explicit argument from patristic authority in the dialogue, which makes
the connection of this statement with John Maxentius himself certain, because he had, in fact,
previously argued for this position in the Libellus Fidei from patristic authority, specifically from
Augustine’s De Trinitate.480
This is not the only connection between the conclusion of the dialogue and the historical
reality of the Scythian theological project of the early sixth century. The final episode in the
dialogue is clearly reminiscent of actual events and arguments used previously against the
Scythian monks in their attempts to find allies in Constantinople and Rome. For example, in a
letter dated to July 519 and sent by the papal legates in Constantinople to Rome, the legates warn
Hormisdas about the Scythian monks (praedicti monachi) who were setting out for Italy in order
to disseminate their theses (aliquanta capitula) among which was the doctrine that Christ is the
“one from the Trinity who was crucified” (inter quae et “unum de trinitate crucifixum”
continetur). As justification for their condemnation of the Scythians’ position, the legates
reiterate that they will not accept any doctrine that is not contained within the four ecumenical
councils or the writings of Leo (extra synodos quattuor, extra epistolas papae Leonis nec
dicimus nec admittimus).481 Because this doctrine is not found in either of these sources, it is
rejected by the legates. The distinction between literature and reality, therefore, is destabilized at
the conclusion of the dialogue, as the arguments proffered by Nestorianus against Catholicus in

Catholicus: Sed et nos, quod unus ex trinitate Christus sit, ex patrum scriptis ostendimus.
Cf. Libellus Fidei, 9.188; and Augustine, De Trinitate, II.9.16 et passim.
481
Cf. Magnopere praedicti monachi [sc. monachi de Scythia] ad Italiam uenientes aliquanta capitula proponere
habent, inter quae et ‘unum de trinitate crucifixum’ continetur, sperantes ita confirmari ex auctoritate beatitudinis
uestrae. Sicut et in aliis litteris significauiumus, et modo hoc dicimus, ut nulla nouitas a sede apostolica scribatur,
quia et nos ante imperatorem et ante senatum hoc indicauimus dicentes: ‘extra synodos quattuor, extra epistolas
papae Leonis nec dicimus nec admittimus.’ AC 217.8–9.
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the dialogue have nearly verbatim analogues in the extant records of the arguments leveled
against Maxentius and his followers. At the end of the dialogue, Catholicus coalesces with John,
and Nestorianus represents the myriad of actors who opposed the Scythians.
The conclusion of the dialogue, then, is not subtle in its argument—hypocrite is
ultimately no different from heretic.482 In the final paragraphs of the text, Nestorianus (read:
Maxentius’ adversaries) condemns, in the strongest terms, his own hypocritical behavior. He
upholds the following system: doctrinal points agreed upon in the ecumenical councils must be
embraced as orthodox truth, both in substance and in the approved terminology, and when there
is no precedent in these councils, the authority of the church fathers is a reliable foundation upon
which to set one’s argument. The hypocrisy arises when he refuses to follow his own advice on
the Theopaschite position explicated by the Scythians. The sick patient Nestorianus refuses to
take his medicine, to use the medical analogy often used in Late Antiquity,483 and what is worse,
it is medicine that he has prescribed to others and himself. Instead, with his final words in the
dialogue, Nestorianus refuses to accept his and Catholicus’ arguments and breaks the
conversation.
Nestorian: Although I believe that even this [sc. that “Christ is one
from the Trinity”] is easily taught from the writings of the Fathers, I still
refuse to say this, and I shall not continue the discussion further with you,
clinging steadfast to my position instead.
Catholic: I was truly amazed that you could conquer human glory484 so
that you suffer no misunderstanding, insofar as you accept, through the
censure of divine scripture, the position against which you have just
A version of a criticism made by Galen, who cleverly puns on the words “Ἱπποκράτης” and “ὑποκριτής” in his
treatise, That the Best Doctor is also a Philosopher. According to Galen, the so-called doctors claim to follow
Hippocrates but are hypocrites because they actively practice the opposite of what Hippocrates taught. Cf. That the
Best Doctor is also a Philosopher, I.7.
483
Which is also found in this very dialogue: Catholicus: Multa quidem in superiore sermone disserentes, nullum
apud te prouectum habere potuimus, quia mens, non sanari sed uincere cupiens, auersa ab his, quae dicuntur, ad
nihil aliud intenta est, nisi ut inueniat, quod pro suis partibus eloquatur. Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.1.10–14.
484
The Latin words “uincere te posse humanam gloriam” are probably meant to be pointedly ambiguous. I have
translated them so as to make the meaning of the sentence clear, but the implication, as the following sentence
shows, is that human glory has, in fact, conquered Nestorianus.
482
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recently fought as consistent with the Truth. Yet because you are
determined to enclose yourself within your own position rather than
endorse a true confession with a love of eternal blessedness, I can never
consider you anything but a heretic, since you deny that God the Word,
our Lord Jesus Christ, who suffered in the flesh for our salvation, is one
from the holy and indivisible Trinity, to whom is honor and glory forever
and ever. Amen.
Nestorianus: Quamquam et hoc ex patrum scriptis doceri facile credo,
sed ego dicere nullatenus acquiesco, nec tecum ulterius sermonem
conseram, sed meam tenaciter fouebo sententiam.
Catholicus: Mirabar equidem uincere te posse humanam gloriam, ut
nulla te confusio superaret, quatenus congruam ueritati sententiam, quam
hactenus impugnaueras, diuina correptus auctoritate, reciperes. Uerum,
quia apud te definitum est, in tua te continere sententia,485 quam ueram
confessionem, amore aeternae beatitudinis, approbare: nec ego te umquam
aliud aliquid, quam haereticum, iudicabo, qui, Deum Uerbum Dominum
nostrum Iesum Christum, qui pro nostra salute passus est carne, unum esse
ex sancta et indiuidua trinitate, non approbas; cui est honor et gloria in
saecula saeculorum. Amen.486
It is clear that the conclusion of the dialogue is a condemnation of the hypocritical
attitudes of those with whom John Maxentius and his comrades had debated, but this is far from
the primary motive of the dialogue. By no means did Maxentius compose this dialogue to taunt
his opponents, or at least, primarily to taunt his opponents. Rather, I contend that this unusual
closure to the dialogue, when read in light of the historical context, the tone, and method of
argumentation of the dialogue described above, points to a calculated evolution of the Scythian
strategy of self-promotion that adeptly utilizes the dialogic form. In order to describe this shift in
strategy, it is useful to summarize briefly here the problems and rhetoric that the monks had
previously faced.

A superb example of what is variously known as “Metaphorical Word Order,” “Mimetic Syntax,” and
“Logotactic Iconicity.” “Te continere” is syntactically “contained” within “in tua . . . sententia,” the order of the
words imitating their own meaning. Some scholarship has discussed this phenomenon in Augustan poetry, but its
presence in prose, especially in Late Antiquity, has been all but completely neglected. See Luca D’Anselmi
(forthcoming), “Metaphorical Word Order in Latin.” D’Anselmi discusses prose examples from Livy, Tacitus, and
Jerome.
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Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.25.1166–1179.
485

162

First, the post-Chalcedonian theological controversies that constitute the political
landscape of the late-fifth and early-sixth centuries are rife with partisan politics. What this
means is that patristic authority has become an ineffective platform for compromise because of
partisan leanings for various figures and councils. Pope Leo, for example, and his thinking are
essential to the West, but problematic or even heretical to some in the East. Quoted authority,
therefore, often appeases one side, but angers and alienates the other. Second, the Scythians’
position was purposely misconstrued by many in the Constantinopolitan court, who forwarded
this skewed interpretation to Rome through epistles.487 The political deck was stacked, in a
sense, against the Scythian position, and one can infer that moments of sincere debate about their
position were rarer than the monks might have wished. Third and related to this, the evidence
also suggests that there was a real atmosphere of hostility directed at these monks. Regrettably,
our knowledge of this is limited mostly to the letters found in the Avella Collectio, but the
evidence is consistently negative.488
Given these difficulties faced by the Scythian monks, the purpose and force of the
dialogue becomes clear—it was composed to counteract them. Most importantly, the
argumentation of the dialogue marks a shift in how the Scythian monks justified their
Theopaschite theology. That the dialogue’s conclusion includes complaints against Nestorianus
about his inability to utilize the ecumenical councils and especially patristic authority only
highlights the difference between the dialogue and the previous works of the Scythian monks.
Because his opponents disavow the legitimacy of arguments from authority, John Maxentius
abandons such an argument and turns to a higher authority, scripture and logic (tam ratione
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David R. Maxwell, “Christology and Grace in the Sixth-Century Latin West,” 80f.
See above passim.
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quam his diuinis testimoniis).489 Such a move is clever and powerful because it avoids a number
of pitfalls that troubled the Scythian monks’ earlier efforts. By passing over writings associated
with controversial figures, the dialogue does not automatically alienate certain factions. By
eschewing mention of Chalcedon, the dialogue avoids, as far as possible, the circular argument
of validating Chalcedon with Chalcedonian teachings. By leaning almost entirely on scriptural
exegesis, the text forces its contemporary readers to take its content seriously. Like the rhetorical
strategy of many earlier Latin dialogues, Contra Nestorianos seeks to prove its validity by
making its argument from uncontested common ground, in this case the Bible.
Furthermore, the dialogic form itself includes elements that are advantageous, or even
essential, to this program. Most obviously, the back-and-forth, polyvocal discourse of the
dialogue allows for the careful juxtaposition of the views of each side. This view—that dialogue
was the most effective method for comparing philosophical views and arriving at the truth—was
ubiquitous in antiquity.490 By progressing through the problems and objections of Nestorianus in
order, the reader is able to see and judge the merits of the argument for him- or herself. Without
this thoughtful expression of the views from each side, the argument of Contra Nestorianos
would only be half-baked polemic. Furthermore, the dialogue also adds a level of politeness to
the content, the importance of which should not be discounted. Politeness and respect matter in
public discourse, and as has been noted above, the ancient texts consistently make this point
explicitly. Therefore, by distancing himself and his opponents from the work through the usage
of generically-named interlocutors,491 coupled with the overall positive tone of the dialogue

Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, II.19.943f.
Cf. “Cum enim neque melius quaeri ueritas possit, quam interrogando et respondendo.” Augustine, Soliloquia,
2.14 and passim throughout this thesis.
491
For the importance of generic interlocutors for avoiding ad hominem attacks on specific individuals, compare the
following passage from Jerome’s second dialogue against the Pelagians . Cf. Unde ut omnibus approbarem me non
odisse homines, sed errores, nec aliquorum infamiam quaerere, magisque dolere uicem eorum qui falsi nominis
489
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described above, John Maxentius is able fashion both a convincing and powerful argument from
biblical authority that acts as a polite but firm anatreptic for his readers—“do not be like this
fictional Nestorianus who foolishly contradicts himself.”

scientia supplantantur, Attici et Critobuli nomina posui, per quos et nostra pars et aduersariorum quid sentiret,
expromerem. quin potius omnes, qui Catholicam sectamur fidem, optamus et cupimus damnari haeresim, homines
emendari, aut certe, si in errore uoluerint permanere, non nostram culpam esse qui scripsimus, sed eorum qui
mendacium praetulerint ueritati. Jerome, Dialogi Contra Pelagianos, Prologue, 22–7.
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Conclusions
Why did Latin authors from Late Antiquity write dialogues? It would be foolish to
suggest that this study provides a definitive or an exhaustive answer to this question. There is
much more work to do and many texts that still need attention before a more complete picture
can be drawn. At the same, there is intrinsic value in even asking this question about the
dialogues from Late Antiquity. As discussed in Chapter 1, recent work on the dialogue has
questioned whether dialogues even existed among the people of Late Antiquity, especially
Christians, and much of the backlash to this provocative suggestion has focused on negating it:
there are many dialogues from Late Antiquity! This thesis certainly falls within this category to
some extent (see Chapter 2), but it was my aim to attempt to take this a step further. Yes there
are many diverse dialogues from this period, now what do we do with them?
My answer was to read them carefully, believing that the historical circumstances might
be especially useful in beginning to answer the question why. In Chapters 3 and 4, I suggested
that both Jerome and John Maxentius decided to compose dialogues as a vehicle for their
philosophical arguments because they realized that the mode of transmission can be just as
important as the content itself. Jerome, for example, counters the alienating rhetoric of the
Luciferians with a dialogue that both refutes their position but also instructs his readers how to
debate with the Luciferians, using strategies unique to dialogue to make this point. John
Maxentius also responds to his inability to find dialogue in Constantinople and Rome, by shifting
his strategy and using his dialogue to foster a mutual debate that could not happen in reality.
There is much still to be done, and the first priority, in my view, should be those Latin
dialogues that also have well defined historical contexts. Jerome’s Dialogus Contra Pelagianos
and Rusticus the Deacon’s Disputatio Contra Acephalos are notable examples. By culling more
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comparanda, a more defined picture might develop and more significant patterns might emerge.
The greatest obstacle to this endeavor, however, is the fact that many dialogues do not appear to
have significant contexts, historical or even geographical. This might ultimately turn out to be
true, but it has been my experience that this cannot be determined until the text has been closely
read (John Maxentius’ Contra Nestorianos, for example). On a related and final note, it is also
my view that classicists and historians who focus on Late Antiquity should be quicker to read
dialogues composed in the various languages spoken in this period. In order for a clearer picture
to emerge, the Latin, Greek, Syriac, and Coptic (among others) need to be read and read in
conjunction. It is of course very difficult for a single person to possess the linguistic and
historical competencies required to address all of these texts. Collaboration, therefore, is a sine
qua non for this endeavor. Sincere dialogue fosters more dialogue, and it is with this in mind that
we should move forward.
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Appendix A: Latin Dialogues of Late
Antiquity
Author

Title

Latin edition(s)

Translation

1

Augustine

Contra Academicos

Green, CCSL 29:89–137

WSA I.3

2

—

De Beata Vita

Green, CCSL 29:65–85

WSA I.3

3

—

De Ordine

Green, CCSL, 29: 89–137

WSA I.3

4

—

Soliloquia

Hörmann, CSEL 89:3–98

WSA I.3

5

—

De Magistro

Green, CCSL 29:157–203

WSA I.3

6

—

De Libero Arbitrio

Hörmann, CSEL 89:211–
321

WSA I.3

7

—

De Animae Quantitate

Hörmann, CSEL 89:131–
231

WSA I.4

8

—

De Musica

PL 42:709–42

WSA I.3

9

—

Contra Faustum
Manichaeum

Zycha, CSEL 25.1:249–797

WSA I.20

10 —

Contra Felicem
Manichaeum*

Zycha CSEL 25.2:801–852

WSA I.20

11 —

Collatio cum Maximino
Arianorum Episcopo*

PL 42:709–742

WSA I.18

12 —

De Grammatica†

Bonnet, Budé (2013)

(FR) Bonnet, Budé (2013)

13 —

De Dialectica†

Pinborg, Reidel (1975)

Jackson, Reidel (1975)

14 Arnobius Iunior

Conflictus Arnobii
Catholi cum Serapione

Daur, CCSL 25A:43–173

(ITL) F. Gori, Società Editrice
Internazionale (1992)

15 Boethius

In Porphyrii Isagogen
commentorum editio
prima

Brandt, CSEL 48:3–132

n/a
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16 —

Consolatio Philosophiae

Bieler CCSL 94

Stewart et al. LCL 74

17 Eusebius of
Vercelli

De Trinitate

Bulhart et al. CCSL 9:3–99

n/a

18 Evagrius

Altercatio legis inter
Simonem Iudaeum et
Theophilum Christianum

Demeulenare CCSL 64:
255–302

Varner, E. Mellen Press (2004)

19 Faustinus

De Trinitate

Simonetti, CCSL 69:295–
353

(FR) Mardoyan & Mattei, University of
Lyon (2005)

20 Fulgentius the
Mythographer

Expositio Vergilianae
Continentiae

Helm, Teubner (1898)

Whitbread, Ohio State University Press
(1971)

21 Gregory the
Great

Dialogi

Vogüé, SC 251, 260, 265

Zimmerman, FCNT 39

22 Isidore of
Seville

Synonyma

Elfassi, CCSL 111B:5–147

Throop, MedievalMS (2012)

23 Jerome

Altercatio Luciferiani et
Orthodoxi

Canellis, CCSL 79B:5–61.

Fremantle & Martley, NPNF(2nd) 6

24 —

Dialogus Contra
Pelagianos

Moreschini, CCSL 80:3–124

Hritzu, FCNT 53

25 John Cassian

Collationes

Petschenig CSEL 13

Luibheid, Paulist Press (1985)

26 John Maxentius

Disputatio XII
Capitulorum Cyrilli
Alexandrini et sic
Dictorum Nestorii Anti
Anathematismatorum

Glorie, CCSL 85A: 195–213

Pereira (2015)

27 —

Dialogus Contra
Nestorianos

Glorie, CCSL 85A: 51–110

Kuper (2017)

28 Macrobius

Saturnalia

Kaster, OCT (2011)

Kaster, LCL 510, 511, 512

29 Minucuius
Felix

Octavius

Kytzler, Teubner 1981

Freese, Macmillan (?)
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30 Rusticus the
Deacon

Disputatio Contra
Acephalos

Petri, CCSL 100

n/a

31 Sulpicius
Severus

Dialogi

Halm, CSEL 1:152–216

NPNF, 11.

32 Vigil of
Thapsus

Dialogus Athanasio,
Ario, Sabellio, Photino,
et Probo iudice,
interlocutoribus

PL 62:179–238

n/a

33 Anonymous

Altercatio Ecclesiae et
Synagogae

CCSL, 69A: 25–47

n/a

34 —

Contra Philosophos

CCSL 89A:1-352

n/a

35 —

Contra Iudaeos

CCSL 58B:3-271

n/a

36 —

Consultationes Zacchei
christiani et Apollonii
philosophi

Feiertag, SC 401–2, Feiertag

(FR) Feiertag, SC 401–2 (1994)

37 —

Life of Saint Helia

Burrus & Conti, Oxford
University Press (2013)

Burrus & Conti, Oxford University Press
(2013)

38 PseudoAugustine

Collatio cum Pascentio
Ariano

PL 33:1153–62

n/a

40 PseudoAugustine

Contra Felicianum
Arianum

PL 42:1152–72

n/a

41 PseudoAugustine

De Unitate S. Trinitatis
Dialogus

PL 42:1207–1212

n/a

42 PseudoHegemonius

Acta Archelai

Beeson, De Gruyter (1906)

Vermes, Brepols (2004)

43 Pseudo-Origen

Adamantii Dialogus

Buchheit, Wilhelm Fink
Verlag Munchen (1966)

Pretty, Peeters (1997)
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Appendix B: John Maxentius, Dialogue
against the Nestorians in Two Books
Translator’s note
The task of a translator is a difficult one and has been recognized as such since the time
of Cicero if not earlier. Each language has its own unique character, as does every individual
user of that language. Necessarily then something is lost or at least a difference is created when a
text is translated into another language. Recognizing this distance or difference, translators both
ancient and modern have noted two competing interests in translation, usually understood to be
proportionally exclusive of the other, that attempt to mitigate this problem. These two interests
are that the translation accurately capture the true meaning of the original though not necessarily
representing the individual words and constructions found in the original language, often called
sensus de sensu in Latin, and that the translation accurately represent the words, constructions,
and syntax of the original language, though not necessarily expressing its meaning in the idiom
of the target language, often called uerbum e uerbo in Latin.492 Every translator must position his
or her work somewhere on this continuum, usually somewhere in the middle. Influencing this
decision will be a number of factors such as what sort of text is being translated, who will be
reading it, for what reason, and so forth.
For this translation of John Maxentius’ Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, the first, of which I
am aware, into any modern language, I have chosen to follow the Latin closely in rendering it
into English, though I have of course allowed myself some freedoms. My reasoning for this is

For a good discussion of ancient thinking on translation and these two competing goals, see Sebastian Brock,
“Aspects of Translation Technique in Antiquity.” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies. 20.1 (1979): 69–87.
492
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twofold. First, the nature of the dialogue and the theological issues at stake demand an accurate
portrayal of the language because part of John Maxentius’ program for composing this text was
to articulate his position clearly in standard theological terminology against learned, scrupulous
objectors. For Maxentius, words mattered. Second, many modern readers of this dialogue, I
suspect, would also be interested (if not primarily interested) in the construction of theological
positions as they are expressed over the course of the dialogue, an interest which also places
great value in an accurate representation of the original Latin. It was with these two reasons in
mind that this translation was created. It is my personal view that if and when this translation is
published elsewhere, it should be printed with the original Latin on the facing page in order that
the reader, whatever his or her facility with the original language, can quickly compare the
translation with the Latin. Because this format is not possible here, I have inserted the original
Latin in parentheses in some cases where I found it useful, though these judgments are
subjective. The sparse explanatory notes are far from exhaustive and should also be expanded
significantly in subsequent iterations.
A few miscellaneous notes. I have used the NRSV (or a slightly modified version) for
biblical quotations and close allusions to it. I have opted to capitalize the masculine pronoun
when referring to God (e.g., “His,” “Him) because it often adds clarity to passages and prevents
inserting words that are not present in the Latin. All and any errors in this preliminary version of
the English text are mine and mine alone.
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Dialogus Contra Nestorianos, John Maxentius
Preface
1. If it were possible for there to be an end of deceit in this age, Christ’s church would rest easily
everywhere.493 But because an inexplicable evil somehow never ceases from attacking human
hearts and from disturbing the Catholic faith with unforeseen arguments, followers of the Truth
must first diagnose their sophistical arguments with care, then expose [their flaws] correctly, and
when the issue is raised publicly, destroy them with the hammer of Truth, fighting for the Truth
against them, even to the point of bloodshed—since this is what holy scripture commands when
it says, “Fight to the death for the Truth” [cf. Sirach 4:24], and “certain in the Truth even unto
death” [cf. ibid. 4:33]. Similarly Paul, when he censures the fearfulness of some, saying, “In
your struggle against sin not yet have you resisted to the point of shedding blood” [Hebrews
12:4].
2. Therefore, we must resist and hold nothing back against the heretics, confident that there will
hardly be a lack of discussion in a matter such as this. For if “the Lord opened the mouth of a
donkey” [Numbers 22:28] to refute the foolishness of a prophet, how much more will he open
the heart of the faithful to refute the insanity of the wicked. Moreover, although the Nestorian
depravity was already condemned to its roots, it somehow arises again more strongly, attacking
the very foundations of the Catholic faith with clever, syllogistic arguments, allegedly under the
proclamation of religion but actually trying to desecrate religion. I expect that I, aided by your
prayers, my dear Theophilus, must bring to light their impious beliefs, which are secretly hidden
in their Catholic language, so that when they are exposed and denounced they might be apparent
to all. At the same time, I shall do this to those who, although they admit that Christ is God,
driven by what perversity I not know, refuse to confess that [Christ is] “one from the holy and
indivisible Trinity” (unum ex sancta et indiuidua trinitate).
3. Because they refuse to affirm this belief, who would not understand that they deny, in
different words, the very thing that they affirm, and believe that Christ is separate from the
Trinity and—like the Arians—impiously believe that Christ is a creature? For if Christ is true
God—which He is—he is either the Trinity or one from the Trinity. But because it is sacrilege to
believe that Christ is the entire Trinity, it follows that Christ God is one from the Trinity, unless
they contend perhaps that he is some other god apart from the Trinity. But this argument is not
Catholic but Manichaean, as they fabricate two gods that are opposed to each other.
4. I decided to compose this work of our disputation under the personae of a heretic questioning
an orthodox believer who responds to his questions, in order that his refutation of the heretic’s
objections might be clearer to my readers.

493

CCSL 85A (1978): 51–110.
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Chapters of Book I
1. On the usage of the term Theotokos, that is, Genetrix of God.
2. That the heretics claim that the blessed virgin is Theotokos, not because she gave birth to
God according to the flesh, but a man united to God.
3. That they do not call the blessed virgin “Theotokos” correctly or appropriately.
4. That they falsely accuse those who correctly and appropriately confess that God was born
according to the flesh from a woman of [confessing] that a beginning was given to God the
Word from the woman.
5. That they sophistically and perversely claim that she was the mother of [His] humanity.
6. That from those words from the Gospel that we read were addressed to Joseph, the holy
virgin’s husband (namely, “Take the child and his mother, and flee to Egypt, for Herod is
about to search for the child, to destroy him” [cf. Matt 2:13], and “For those who were
seeking the child’s soul are dead” [Matt 2:20]) not [containing] the words “Mighty God” as
the prophet says [cf. Is 9:6], but only the word “child,” they attempt to claim that Christ is
called “Mighty God” on account of Him to whom he will be joined because he was born
from a woman.
7. About this scripture passage, “That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is
born of the Spirit is spirit” [Jn 3:6].
8. About the fact that they sophistically claim not that God was made Christ, but that Christ
was made God.
9. That they foolishly claim that Christ is not God by nature, but by merit and union—and
this because of that passage from Acts of the Apostles where Peter says to Cornelius, “For
God was with him” [Acts 10:38].
10. That they impiously claim that Christ is only different from the prophets because he was
born without the seed of a man, and, although they do not use the terms “after the makeup”
(post conformationem) but “in the very makeup” (in ipsa conformatione) they contend that
God the Word was joined to Christ.494
11. That they claim that just as there are two natures (naturae) in Christ, so also are there
two substances (subsistentiae) or persons (personae) in him.
12. That they perversely assert that man was assumed by God, not that God was made man,
and that they define nature and person as the same thing.
13. That there are some terms appropriate to either natures or persons, which are not
ambiguous, but other words common to both, which are ambiguous.
14. That there is a difference between nature and person, and that not every nature is a
person.
15. That heretics refuse to believe that God was made man, and that [this happened]
according to the birth of God the Word in the flesh.

494

For the decision to translate conformatio as “makeup,” see the note ad loc.
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Book I
Introduction
Nestorian: When I heard that you defamed my spoken claims, my soul was often stirred
to investigate the holy matter of divine dispensation with you. But now that we have the
opportunity of time and place—God has granted me your presence—I greatly desire that you
debate with me present before you, since you never ceased from disparaging me when I was
absent.
Catholic: Whoever shows himself to adhere, not to deceit, but to the Truth, is never
bothered by querulous whispers. As to the one who is self-aware of his own falsity, no one
should complain about him, though he certainly is distressed with stabs of suspicion. But the
slanders of the malicious subtract nothing from the sensible; on the contrary it improves them.
For if they are in any way censured truly, they will be corrected so that they are censured no
more, but if they are falsely accused, [their attackers] must be condemned and suffer penalty.
Therefore, if—as you believe—I have slandered your assertions, come as you like and show
yourself to be an adherent of the Truth and me to be your false accuser.
Nestorian: Setting aside this matter, if you please, let us discuss openly what both of us
judge, with simple mind, to be catholic teaching, so that we might not seem to waste time in
what does not pertain to the matter at hand.
Catholic: In my opinion, it is always best and most acceptable to pursue the Truth without
mockery and insults.
Nestorian: Whoever desires not Truth but the glory of personal victory usually prefers
mockery to rational judgment. But there is no place at all for mockery among those whose sole
intention is the joy of discovering the Truth.
Catholic: Truth herself is accustomed, as scripture says,495 to appear graciously before
disputants on the path when she observes them sincerely striving to find her. Our disputation,
therefore, will doubtless reach a fruitful conclusion, if belligerent contentiousness is absent from
it.
Nestorian: I am completely of the same opinion, provided that you also agree to respond
to my questions with gentle spirit.
Catholic: Proceed as you wish, so that I can see what you want me to know.
1.

Nestorian: I would like you to explain to me how you call the blessed virgin Theotokos,
that is, Genetrix of God, who, we agree, gave birth to Emmanuel.
Catholic: The very beginning of your questioning reveals that you believe that there are
two sons!
Nestorian: Please do not attack me with misunderstood accusations before you consider
my words carefully.
Catholic: Whoever is not contradicted by someone else but contradicts himself cannot
complain rightly of “false accusations.” But if I have not understand the meaning of your
question entirely, attribute this to my ignorance until you explain it more clearly why you added,
“who, we agree, gave birth to Emmanuel,” when you required me to explain the meaning of the
term theotokos. For if, when you inquire about the meaning of the term Theotokos, you believed
495

Cf. Wisdom 6:16.
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that Emmanuel, who you say was born of the virgin, was also the Son of God, it would have
been enough to say only that—for this is the way we call the blessed virgin Theotokos. But by
adding, “who, we agree, gave birth to Emmanuel,” you indicate and therefore I can understand
that you believe that Emmanuel is not the Son of God.
Nestorian: Never—as you assert—have I believed Emmanuel to be other than the Son of
God, but I want to know the way in which the blessed virgin is called Theotokos by you.
Catholic: If Emmanuel, who, you confess, was born of the blessed virgin, has always
been believed to be the Son of God by you—and he is not “Son of God” unless he is God—then
we are completely right in calling the blessed virgin Theotokos.
Nestorian: So quickly do you think that you have explained the rationale behind the
question that we have proposed as if there is nothing more to be asked about this question.
Catholic: Please continue as you like without any delay.
2.
Nestorian: Although I do not hesitate from confessing that the blessed virgin is
Theotokos, I confess that she is Theotokos, not because she gave birth to God, but because she
gave birth to a man united to God.
Catholic: What was previously hidden is now revealed! For if the blessed virgin Mary did
not give birth to God, but a man united to God, without any doubt she is—according to you—
anthropotokos, that is, genetrix of a human. Therefore, how can you profess that the same virgin
is Theotokos, when you claim that she did not give birth to God but only a human?
Nestorian: It happened by a union that he who was born of the virgin is called “God.” It
is on account of God to whom he earned the right to be united and with whom he earned the right
to have one dignity and honor.
Catholic: Therefore, the blessed virgin—according to you—is Theotokos in name only,
through dignity and honor, not truly and rightly, since she did not truly and rightly give birth to
God the Word according to the flesh, but a man whom God granted [the right] to be joined with
Himself so that he might be called God—none of which is true.
3.
Nestorian: Because it is precisely this that troubles us so much, namely that you claim
that God was truly and rightly born from a woman and for this reason you assert that the blessed
virgin is Genetrix of God, I ask you, “Does he who begets truly and rightly beget [offspring] of
the same substance as himself, or of a different substance?”
Catholic: Your question is foolish and silly. For who is believed to beget [offspring] of a
different substance?
Nestorian: If you judge it foolish and silly to believe that someone begets [offspring] of a
different substance, it follows, therefore, that God the Word was truly and rightly born not from
his mother but the Father, since they share one and the same substance. Otherwise, the mother of
the Lord will doubtless be consubstantial not only with God the Word, to whom—according to
you—she is believed to give birth, but also with God the Father, with whom God the Word is
also consubstantial.
Catholic: The virgin is consubstantial with God the Word, not according to the divinity
that He shares as one and the same with the Father, but according to the flesh. Whoever does not
believe this is apart from the faith. Clearly, because [the blessed virgin] gave birth, not to some
man, who is not God by nature, but to God the Word incarnate who became man through
Himself, this is why she is truly and rightly believed to be the Theotokos.
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Nestorian: If the blessed virgin Mary gave birth to what is God by nature, she is then not
genetrix of flesh but genetrix of divinity. How it is that you claim that God the Word was born of
a virgin, not according to the divinity that he shares with the Father, but according to the flesh?
Catholic: She is not genetrix of divinity, as you claim that we believe, although she is
truly and rightly Genetrix of God, because she gave birth, not to the divinity of God the Word,
but to God the Word incarnate who became man through Himself, just as I said above.
4.
Nestorian: If we grant that God was truly and rightly born of a woman, I fear lest God the
Word, who is without a beginning, is understand to receive a beginning from the woman.
Catholic: And why should we not grant Him a beginning according to the flesh from the
woman, although He is without a beginning according to His divinity from the Father?
Nestorian: I do not understand how he, who is without beginning from the Father, is said
by you to have a beginning according to the flesh. Is it because he, who is without beginning
from the Father, is said to have received a beginning when he was changed from his divinity into
the flesh? Or is it because he, who is without beginning, is said to have a beginning when he took
on the flesh?
Catholic: It is in no way possible for God, who is without change, to be changed into
flesh. Instead, remaining God perfect in His own divinity but uniting Himself to flesh and the
rational soul, He began to exist as a human, which he was not before.496 By this reason, He, who
is without any beginning from the Father, is said to receive a beginning according to the flesh.
5.
Nestorian: Since our inquiry is engaged with the most important and intricate matters, I
ask that you patiently respond to what you are asked. And do not be provoked by what might
perhaps seem to be contradictory to you before you understand.
Catholic: You ask me to be patient as if I have been impatient so far in answering your
questions.
Nestorian: Not at all, but I ask that you continue on with the gentleness with which you
began.
Catholic: “It is a gift of God” [Ephesians 2:6].
Nestorian: Do you confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is in one or in two substances?
Catholic: In two, without any doubt. But they are united in an agreement regarding
nature, not regarding persons (naturali, non personali conuentione).
Nestorian: Before the question about which the matter at hand is concerned is finished,
you rush forward to another matter. Leaving aside the matter about the union of natures for now,
please respond absolutely to this question: do you assert that Christ, who you confess is in two
natures, is born only from the Father, or from his mother as well?
Catholic: I confess that one and the same Christ is born from the Father and his mother.
Nestorian: In different ways? Or, from the Father and his mother in one and the same
way?
Catholic: Without any doubt, in one way from the Father, and in another way from his
mother.
Nestorian: According to which way do you assert that he is born from the Father, that he
is born from his mother?

496

Cf. Ecclesiastes 3:13, 5:18; and Ephesians 2:8.
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Catholic: According to divinity he is born from the Father, but he also, one and the same,
is born from his mother according to humanity.
Nestorian: Why, therefore, do you truly and rightly call his mother “genetrix of God” and
not [genetrix] of that nature of which she is the mother, and to which the union of God the Word
has conferred the name and dignity of his own divinity?
Catholic: Whose nature of humanity do you believe this to be, which you want truly and
rightly to be from the virgin?
Nestorian: Christ the Lord obviously.
Catholic: How do you define “Christ?”
Nestorian: Christ is God and man.
Catholic: Was that nature of humanity, which you claim is truly and rightly from the
virgin, “made of God and a human” (Dei ergo et hominis facta est)?
Nestorian: Who could doubt this?
Catholic: Then how is it not absurd to believe that God and man assumed human nature
from the virgin? But if God and man are believed—according to you—to have assumed human
nature from the virgin, where, before God assumed human nature from the virgin, must the man
be believed to have been made so that God and a man can be believed to have assumed human
nature from the virgin?
Nestorian: I am amazed that you ridicule the Truth so recklessly.
Catholic: Never do I ridicule the Truth. I only refute your absurd answer with truest
reason.
Nestorian: You take offense, I think, when you hear that Christ is God and man.
Catholic: Hearing that Christ is God and man does not offend me, but it offends you, who
do not believe that Christ is God made man. For when I plainly reply to your questions that one
and the same [Christ] is begotten from the Father according to divinity and born from His mother
according to humanity, you, trying to show that God [was born] from the Father, and a man from
his mother, conclude from the following argument and take it upon yourself to teach that one
should not believe that the blessed virgin is truly and rightly genetrix of God, but of the human
nature of which she is the mother. If, therefore, God the Word formed himself as man when he
took on the flesh in his mother’s womb, it is without any doubt that the nature of humanity
assumed from the virgin [belonged] to no one else but Him who formed Himself a man from it.
Therefore, truly and rightly the blessed virgin is believed to be Genetrix of God according to the
flesh, since God was not changed into the nature of the flesh with the result that He who was
born was not God. Instead, He remained God and became man when He was born.
6.
Nestorian: Although [making arguments] up and down, you do nothing, as I see it, but
teach that he to whom the virgin gave birth is God by nature. But let me tell you, there are those
verses from the Gospel that never permit me to call him who was born from the virgin “God.”
Catholic: And what are these scriptural verses that prevent me from calling Him “God?”
Nestorian: Certainly those that we read were said to Joseph in a dream.
Catholic: Exactly what do we read was said to him?
Nestorian: “Take,” Matthew says, “the child and his mother, and flee to Egypt, for
Herod is about to search for the child, to destroy him” [cf. Matt 2:13]. And he also says, “For
those who were seeking the child’s soul (animam pueri) are dead” [Matt 2:20]. Why was not the
following said instead, “For those who were seeking God’s soul (animam Dei) are dead?” Or,
“Take God and flee to Egypt,” or even, “Herod is about to destroy God.” Is there anything more
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impious than this—to believe that God fled to Egypt for fear of a man? It is clear, therefore, that
you struggle with your arguments against the meaning of divine scripture, which teaches that he
is a “child,” that is, a human, although you try to assert that he is God by nature.
Catholic: While you are excessively fixated on these verses from divine scripture, which
you believe support your position, you profoundly disregard other passages. Or perhaps you
think the authority of the Old Testament, which says that the “child,” whom you deny to be God,
is “Mighty God and Lord” [cf. Is 9:6], is worthless and should be ignored? Does not Isaiah, that
most famous of prophets, proclaim, saying, “For a child has been born to us, a son given to us;
authority rests upon his shoulders; and he is named Wonderful Counselor, Admirable, Mighty
God, Lord, Prince of Peace, and Everlasting Father” [cf. Is 9:6]? How can you not believe these
words—unless perhaps you think that this prophetic statement contradicts the Gospel passages
that you quoted?
Nestorian: I do not think that this prophetic statement is inconsistent with the Gospel
passage, though this seems to be the case for you, who cannot yet understand their meaning. So
pay attention if you want to learn the clearest meaning of the prophetic statement quoted to you,
and see how it is not incompatible with our assertions. In fact, the prophet attests that “a child
has been born” and “a son given” is called “God,” not that he is God. And he is called, Isaiah
says, “Wonderful Conselor, Admirable, and Mighty God.” For everything that is signified does
not always exist as the meaning of the terms used to describe it (uocationis suae obtinent
proprietatem). Moses is obviously called “God,” but this appellation is never believed to be
true.497 From this we learn that the “child” is not God by nature, but is called “God” by the
prophet because of God to whom he is united.
Catholic: Your impiety is clear to all. For according to the meaning of your proposition:
though the same “child” is called Mighty God by the prophet, He is not—according to you—God
in substance. Moreover, although Moses is called “God,” as you say, He is not God in substance.
Therefore, although He is called “a child born,” He is not born in substance, since many are said
to be born who are not actually born in substance. For example, “A people will be born whom the
Lord made” [Ps 21:32]. Paul also [speaks this way] to those who already exist in substance,
“For though you might have ten thousand guardians in Christ, you do not have many fathers.
Indeed, in Christ Jesus I became your father” [1 Cor 2:15]. Finally, your interpretation even
contradicts what every catholic church confesses, that the Son of God is God born from the
Father in substance, and that it is false to teach, as the Arians do, that the Son is born from the
Father but not born from him in substance. Then, from where should the child who is God
believed to be born in substance, if he is understood—according to you—to be born in substance
from neither his mother nor the Father?
Nestorian: Please, I ask you, do not waste time in worthless matters. Finding the impiety
of the Arians abhorrent, we believe and profess that God the Son was born in the substance of
God the Father. We also confess plainly that the child was born in substance from the virgin. We
also—following the prophet—call him “God” on account of him to whom he is united.
Catholic: So the child is not God by nature, only in name like Moses?
Nestorian: If the child is God, not in name and dignity, but in nature, you either believe
that the flesh is consubstantial with God the Father, or you confess that an incorporeal child was
born from the virgin.
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Catholic: You claim that we believe the Son is incorporeal; on the contrary, we
proclaim—following the Gospel—that he is God “made flesh” [Jn 1:14]. We believe that His
flesh is consubstantial not with the God the Father, but His mother. His divinity is consubstantial,
not with His mother, but with God the Father.
Nestorian: I cannot immediately understand the murky and ambiguous meaning of your
claim, which sometimes confuses the [two] natures, other times clearly distinguishes them.
Therefore, if you proclaim his divinity’s consubstantiality with the Father and his flesh’s with his
mother, how do you, confusing the clear distinction of natures, again assert that he is God made
flesh, when God is not flesh, but spirit, as the Lord says, “God is spirit” [Jn 4:24]?
Catholic: Proclaiming the true union of natures, that of God the Word and flesh, we do
not confuse them; we unite them.
7.
Nestorian: When the Lord says, “What is born of the flesh is flesh, and what is born of
the Spirit is spirit” [Jn 3:6], how do you assert that the child born from the woman is God, not by
union, but by nature?
Catholic: Since He, that is, the flesh born of the flesh in the flesh is no different from
Him, the spirit born of the spirit in the spirit, we, therefore, proclaim that God, the Son of God, is
from two natures and in two natures united yet unmixed (ex duabus et in duabus naturis unitis et
inconfusis).
8.
Nestorian: But you confuse the difference between these two natures when you proclaim
him, who is called God through his union with God the Word, as God by nature. For if he who is
born of the virgin is God, not through union, but by nature, it is without any doubt that it is God,
not the child Jesus Christ, who was anointed. Since Christ is not believed to have been made God
but God is understood—according to you—to have been made Christ, the disciples then speak
falsely in the Acts of the Apostles when they give testimony that the child Jesus, not God, was
anointed, saying, “For in this city, in fact, both Herod and Pontius Pilate gathered together
against your holy child Jesus, whom you anointed” [cf. Acts 4:27].
Catholic: We do not confuse the difference of natures, as you said above, because we do
not believe that the divinity of the Word was changed into human nature, nor do we proclaim
that the human essence was intermingled with the divine essence.498 Instead, we confess, not that
Christ—as you assert—was made God, but that God was made Christ, with which you disagree.
[We believe this] because [scripture does] not say, “Although he was poor, he became rich,” but
“Although he was rich, he became poor, so that you might become rich” [cf. 2 Cor 8:9]. Nor
[does scripture say], “Although he was in the form of a slave, he took the form of God,” but,
“Although he was in the form of God, he took the form of a slave” [cf. Phil 2:7]. Likewise,
[scripture] does not say, “Although he was flesh, he became the Word,” but, “Although he was
Word, he became flesh” [cf. Jn 1:14]. As for what you say—if the child born of a virgin is God
by nature, then the disciples speak falsely in the Acts of the Apostles, giving testimony that not
God but the child Jesus was anointed—the disciples do not speak falsely, but rather you are led
astray, since you do not understand that God was anointed according to the flesh. For if you
believe that the disciples and the prophet spoke, not incompatibly, but in one spirit, hear the
prophet clearly teaching that God was anointed when he says, “Your throne, O God, endures
The order of the words imitates their own meaning: nec rursus humanam in deitatis transfusam essentiam
praedicamus.
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forever and ever. Your royal scepter is a scepter of equity; you love righteousness and hate
wickedness. Therefore God, your God, has anointed you with the oil of gladness beyond your
companions” [Ps 44:7–8]. It is clear from this that the child Jesus who was anointed is no other
than God, and that God who was anointed is no other than the child Jesus. So if there are not two
but only one Christ, do not doubt what the prophet and apostles proclaim.
9.
Nestorian: I completely deny claiming that there are two Christs, since I do not doubt that
the prophet and the disciples spoke in one spirit. But I refute your contradictory beliefs, since
you, allegedly from the prophet’s teaching, try to make him, who the prophet proclaims was
anointed, to be God by nature. For, although the prophet proclaims him as God anointed by God,
and teaches that he had companions, you teach the opposite, that the anointed one is God by
nature, although God has no companion according to his nature—God has no companions just as
he has no brothers. But we are taught that this [anointed one] has companions. About this the
apostle says, “Since, therefore, the children share flesh and blood, he himself likewise shared the
same things” [Heb 2:14], and he says, “I will tell of your name to my brothers and sisters; in the
midst of the congregation I will praise you” [Ps 21:23]. It is clear from this that he, who the
prophet testifies was anointed beyond your companions, is God, not by nature, but by union.
Catholic: How can you assert that you deny those who proclaim two Christs, when you
are clearly forced into proclaiming that there are two sons?
Nestorian: And when did you hear me proclaim that there are two sons?
Catholic: When you said that the anointed one is not he who is God by nature, but he who
the prophet taught us had companions, who is called God by union to God.
Nestorian: Not two, as you say, but I proclaim one son, since I profess that he who is God
by nature and he who is God by union to God have the single name of “Son” and have one
dignity. As to the fact that he who was anointed is God, not by nature, but by union with God,
hear blessed Peter’s words to Cornelius, “You know the message he sent to the people of Israel,
preaching peace by Jesus Christ—he is Lord of all. That message spread throughout Judea,
beginning in Galilee after the baptism that John announced: how God anointed Jesus of
Nazareth with the Holy Spirit and with power; how he went about doing good and healing all
who were oppressed by the devil, for God was with him” [Acts 10:36–8]. Without any doubt,
God is understood to be, not with God, but with Jesus of Nazareth [anointed] with the Holy
Spirit and power. For how is it not impious to believe that the anointed one is God by nature,
since without any doubt no nature can oppose God? But [Christ] was anointed because he was to
wage battle against the devil.
Catholic: You argue with cunning trickery, but still you do not cease from proclaiming
two sons. For if Jesus of Nazareth, whom God anointed with the Holy Spirit and with power, is
not God—as you claim—what God did the prophet proclaim would come from Lebanon, saying,
“God will come from Lebanon, the holy one from the densely clouded mountain” [cf. Hab 3:3]?
Even today Nazareth is shown to be in that part of Galilee which is at the foot of that mountain.
This is where Jesus Christ God, who the prophet proclaimed would come from Lebanon, deigned
to be reared according to the flesh. I am amazed that you endeavor to prove that Jesus Christ is
not God by nature, but by union with God and honor, [following] the scripture passage, “for God
was with him,” but you do not listen to the same Lord when he says, “Yet I am not alone because
the Father is with me” [Jn 16:32]. Jesus Christ from Nazareth, therefore, is God by nature—as
we have learned from the prophet—and God was with him, namely the Father, and this is certain
because he is revealed to be Lord of all as the apostle’s voice tells us. Otherwise, if God the Son
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must be understood to be with Jesus Christ and not the Father to be with the Son because
scripture says, “God was with him,” Jesus will, without any doubt, be equal to all the prophets or
certainly to Joseph the son of Jacob, since this is written about Joseph, “Because the Lord was
with him” [Gen 39:23]; God also says the following to Jacob when he sets out to Haran, “I will
be with you just as I was with your father” [cf. Gen 28:15]. Clearly it is impious to equate the
savior of all with the saved.
10.
Nestorian: We believe that the savior of all is not equal to the prophets, or to Jacob and
Joseph; he is incomparably superior, because, although God was with them, they were born, not
without the seed of a man, but according to the law of nature. Christ the Lord, however, was born
in a new form of birth, from the Holy Spirit and the virgin Mary, and in his very formation (in
ipsa prorsus formatione) [in the womb] he was made Christ.
Catholic: If Christ is not equal to the prophets, or to Joseph and the rest of the saints, he
will certainly—according to you—be equal to John the Baptist and Jeremiah, who were both
consecrated in their very formation (in ipsa formatione), just as God said to Jeremiah, “Before I
formed you in the womb I knew you, and before you were born I consecrated you” [Jer 1:5].499
Nestorian: Christ is not equal to those consecrated in the womb, since they were
consecrated in the womb, but he became Christ by his very makeup (in ipsa conformatione).500
They received a partial grace, but he was full of grace insofar as he was the only-begotten Son of
God.
Catholic: I do not understand how you say that he became Christ in His very makeup
(Christum in ipsa conformatione factum). Therefore, show clearly that he who is Christ is also
the one who in his very makeup became Christ.
Nestorian: Christ is, without any doubt, the only-begotten Son of the Father—
Catholic: Finally, you are coerced, though unwilling, by the Truth and have confessed
what you have so far fought against! For although you refused to say so far in our conversation
that God was made Christ, you have now, despite your avowal that he was not formed according
to the flesh by himself, confessed that God was made Christ in his very makeup.
Nestorian: Do not think that I am defeated by your sophistical arguments. I said,
therefore, that the only-begotten [Son] became Christ in his very makeup, because I believe that
God the Word was joined to the very makeup of the flesh.
Catholic: Whoever says the God the Word was joined to the makeup of the flesh teaches
that God the Word, did not adopt, in his own substance or person (substitentia siue persona),
human nature, but instead suggests that the substance of God the Word, while “it was stretched
throughout the lines of limbs,”501 was intermingled with the substance of the flesh. From this it
follows that you believe that is not one, but two substances or persons—one of God the Word
incarnate and one of the created man. However, the Catholic faith confesses, not [that he was
joined] in its very makeup—as you assert—but that God the Word himself was formed and was
made man according to the flesh by Himself, while the substance of His divinity remained intact.

Cf. Luke 1:14–5 for John the Baptist.
Here the “Nestorian” makes a distinction between formatio (translated “formation”) and conformatio (translated
with the generic “makeup”), as Catholicus states that he does not understand the disctinction immediately after this
claim.
501
Cf. Cicero, De Natura Deorum, 1.18.47.
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11.
Nestorian: How do you mean? Do you deny that God the Word exists as a substance
(subsistere)? This conclusion follows from what you said, namely “God the Word himself was
formed and was made man by himself”—although you sophistically claim that this same thing
happens without any diminishment of his divinity.
Catholic: In no way at all have I denied that God the Word exists as a substance.
Nestorian: What do you think about his flesh, or his humanity as a whole?
Catholic: I profess, without any doubt, that it also persists.
Nestorian: Because you say that God the Word and a man existed as substances, why do
you profess one and not two substances?
Catholic: Because I believe that God the Word was not united to a man who was already
persisting in his own substance, much less to flesh already formed and ensouled, through which
the person (persona) of any human is understood to exist. Instead, I believe that the substance or
person (subsistentiam siue personam) of God the Word took on human nature, which never
existed as a substance apart from the Word of God. Arising through Him and taken up by Him,
human nature belonging (proprie) to Him was made. And [His human nature] did not persist in
its own substance but in that by which it was taken up, namely the substance or person of God
the Word. Therefore, there are not two substances, but there is one substance or person with two
natures—the nature of the Word and the nature of flesh.
Nestorian: So human nature was made divinity?
Catholic: To think this at all is proof of extreme irrationality.
Nestorian: How, therefore, do you say that the nature belonging to (propriam) the Word
of God became human?
Catholic: Because [the human nature belonged] to no one else except God the Word
made man.
12.
Nestorian: How do you assert that God was made man? Do you claim that he is man
because he was changed (conuersum) into a man, or because he took on (susceptum) a human
made God?
Catholic: I have never dared to say that a man was taken up by God, but I say that God is
made man without any diminishment of His divinity. I do this so that I might not seem to
proclaim two persons in God the Son if I should say a man was taken up by God. Now God is
called the supporter of the saints and the faithful according to what is said in the song in Exodus
when it is said, “The Lord is my supporter (susceptor) and champion for my salvation” [Exodus
15:2], but it is better to say that human nature was taken up (susceptam) by God than a human
was taken up by God.
Nestorian: Certain ridiculous claims of yours have reached my ears: that a human and
human nature are different and not the same thing, when a human is nothing else but human
nature (cum homo non sit aliud nisi humana natura).
Catholic: This and nothing else is certainly the cause of your error. For because you
cannot discern the difference between person and nature, you think that a nature is exactly what a
person is—rather you believe that a nature cannot exist without a person. You confuse the terms
of “person” and “natures;” then you claim that there are certainly two persons just as there are
two natures of God’s only Son. For when we say that God the Word was born of the virgin
according to the flesh, you assume that we claim that the nature of His divinity was born of the
virgin. But if we were to believe this—and God forbid that we do—we would not claim that he
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was born of the virgin according to the flesh. Furthermore, when you hear [us say] that human
nature was taken up by God the Word, you believe that the person, that is, a human, was taken
up by Him, not that it is He Himself made human. Because of this you believe not that God the
Word was truly and rightly made, without any change (inconuertibiliter), human from her womb
(ex eius uisceribus), but that a human united to God was born of her.
13.
Nestorian: Because you charge us as incapable of differentiating nature and person, teach
us how nature can exist without a person, or teach us what terms can be linked specifically with
natures or with persons.
Catholic: There are terms that are both specific to natures and persons but also terms that
can refer to both. Those that are specific create no controversy, but the shared terms, which are
sophistically used by the falsely learned, cast a cloud of doubt upon the more simply minded.
Nestorian: What are these terms that cause and do not cause controversy?
Catholic: Divinity (divinitas), obviously and humanity (humanitas), flesh (caro) and
divine nature (deitas) are terms specific to natures. But Word (uerbum) and Jesus Christ (Iesus
Christus) and other terms like these are specific to the person, just as Paul and Peter are apostles.
But the terms “God” (Deus) and “human” (homo) can refer to both natures and persons. For
example, just as “God” signifies the whole divine nature of the Trinity, it also refers to each
person of the Trinity, for example, “God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit.” And
at the same time, the entire Trinity is One God. Moreover, “human” can signify both person and
nature. This is why some of the holy fathers are justified in saying that human [nature]
(hominem) was taken on by God, because they are referring, not to person—just like you—but
rather to nature.
14.
Nestorian: I agree with what you said, but please teach how there can be nature without
person.
Catholic: Although human nature is completely present in individual persons, no single
person or single human, that is, individual, is demonstrated to be humanity in its entirety.
Otherwise, innumerable persons and humans from this general humanity would never have
existed. Person, therefore, is differentiated from nature in that person signifies one individual
instantiation (res) of nature. Nature, on the other hand, is understood to indicate the common
material (communem materiem) from which many personae can exist as substances. Every
person, therefore, always contains nature, but every nature, however, does not necessarily
include a person. Otherwise, Catholics would claim that the Trinity, just as it has three persons,
would also have three natures.
Nestorian: You seem to me to assert a certain insubstantial and empty nature, since you
claim that it has no person.
Catholic: Does the nature of the supreme and incomprehensible Trinity seem to you to be
insubstantial? No Catholic doubts that this nature, though it is one and singular, exists in three
persons. However, because any creature runs a great risk in disputing about his own creator, let
us, with your permission, move to our, that is, human nature. If we should accidentally say
anything offensive about human nature, it would be accounted less serious, especially since this
very question lies before us so that, as far as possible, what is investigated might be made clear,
namely that the nature, which we say never exists as a substance in a person, might not seem to
you to be insubstantial.
Nestorian: So be it, as long as what is investigated is explicated.
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Catholic: The quality of nature (naturae qualitas), which is spread through many persons
and individual humans, should not seem to you to be insubstantial with the result that it is
nothing. Otherwise, how should the creator of natures be believed to have made all good things,
even very good things? Nature, therefore, which contains the strength and reason of common
material, is understood by slower minds to be insubstantial because they do not carefully
differentiate between the material of a person not yet visible and the person itself—the power of
nature reveals, as I said above, that this person, though it is not yet brought forth into the light, is
complete in all of the features of its parts, so to speak. So you incorrectly regard nature as
insubstantial, since no person can exist as a substance without nature. By this reasoning, when
we appraise damaged bodies, we say that they are “deficient in nature.” For nature must not be
believed to be either nothing or imperfect, because it lies hidden. Rather this strength is
completely in our parts, but it lies hidden, though complete and whole, according to the reason of
material in seed. For who will correctly judge an infant, who does not yet utilize reason, to
possess incomplete human nature? Because it is impossible to utilize reason before due time, it
will not be determined that the infant lacks anything with regard to the definition of human
nature, since a human, according to the ancient definition, is nothing else but “a rational, mortal
animal” (animal rationale mortale). Or perhaps someone, because infants do not utilize reason,
will endeavor to claim that they are irrational animals? Reason, certainly, arrives—not externally
but from within—at the appropriate time and enriches these children with the help of nature.
Human nature, therefore, which lies hidden in the material of seed, is neither nothing nor
imperfect before it is formed into its substance by God who creates from it, but it is perfect—by
this same reason Levi, long before he was planted in the womb and conceived, is said to have
paid tithes, though still in the loins of Abraham.502 No entity that does not exist can pay tithes.
This entity or nature, therefore, which is hidden, is understood by the less intelligent to be
insubstantial until it is brought to the light. When, however, the power of the seed through a
series of generation by God’s grace expands in a woman’s womb, what lay hidden expands into
parts and is revealed in its own person. God, therefore, condescended to unite Himself with this
human nature, which is the common, general nature for all humans, and without which, as I said
before, no person can exist as a substance. Moreover, He did this in a womb of a blessed virgin,
who deserved to conceive God because she was full of grace. So from the material of her womb
and without any seed of man, with appropriate power and strength, and without any diminishing
of His status, created Himself according to the flesh, proceeded into its limbs, became human,
endured a second nativity for our salvation, and finally advanced in the growth of age. Therefore,
Catholics proclaim that He was truly and rightly born of the blessed virgin according to the flesh.
Moreover, this same blessed virgin is truly and rightly believed to be the genetrix of God.
15.
Nestorian: Everything that you said above seemed to have been argued rationally, albeit
opaquely. This final conclusion bewilders, since it claims that God was made human and, what is
even more intolerable, it claims that God the Word had a second nativity, since no entity can be
born as a substance a second time. Therefore, how can you proclaim that God was made (factus)
human. Surely what is said “to come into being” (fieri) is that which does not seem to exist yet?
Or, is something transformed into something else from that which already exists, so that it ceases
to be what it once was?
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Cf. Hebrews 7:9–10.

185

Catholic: Certainly, therefore, the second nativity according to the flesh of our God
requires wonder and awe, and a great mystery of piety is proven beyond doubt, though it is
denied by the impious—it is not the case that he-who-was-not (qui non erat) was born, rather
He-who-was (qui erat) was born. Moreover, it was not the case that according to what-He-was
(quod erat), but rather according to what-He-was-not (quod non erat) was He formed by His
own power. For He who was born according to nature from the Father without a beginning was
also, the very same, born according to nature in time for us from His mother: the former
according to divinity, the latter according to humanity; the former God from God, the latter
human from human. Likewise, it was not according to what-He-was but according to what-Hewas-not, since God, who was, became human, which He was not, without any alteration of
Himself. Your argument is the following: you contend that He became or was born into him who
was something-that-He-was according to what-He-was. This has no relevance to us: we proclaim
that He, not according to what-He-was but according to what-He-was-not, was born a second
time and God became human. But if you agree, let this be the end of our discussion for now. If
there remain matters to be discussed, let them be examined at the beginning of another
conversation.
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Chapters of Book II
1. Concerning the natural union of God the Word, a union that was made in “His own
flesh.”
2. That Christ is taught to be composed of divinity and humanity.
3. About the following claim: “That one in another” (alterum in altero), that is, “that God
the Word dwells in a human.”
4. About the following verse from scripture: “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will
raise it up” [John 2:19].
5. That they read the following verse from scripture with a perverse sense of understanding:
“Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of Man and drink his blood, you have no life in you”
[John 6:54].
6. That they do not believe that He who was crucified by the Jews is Life.
7. That they claim that a human only and not God was crucified according to the flesh.
8. About the following verse from scripture: “The Lord of Glory was crucified” [cf. 1
Corinthians 2:8].
9. About the following claim: “One should confess that Christ, not God, suffered according
to the flesh. And about the following verse from scripture: “God made him both Lord and
Messiah” [Acts 2:36].
10. Concerning the testimonies on which they depend to demonstrate that he who suffered
for our salvation was only a human (purum hominem).
11. That they claim that the miracles and the passion are in no way of one and the same
person. And about the following verse from scripture: “It was fitting that he,503 for whom and
through whom all things exist, in bringing many children to glory, should make the author of
their salvation perfect through suffering” [Hebrews 2:10].
12. About the following sophistic claim: “God’s flesh suffered, but God did not suffer
according to the flesh.”
13. How they claim that God caused the sufferings “belonging to His flesh” (proprias carnis
suae).
14. That they assert that God suffered according to the flesh through some artifice, but that
God the Word did not suffer according to the flesh in any way.
15. That they deny that it was God who was seen, was touched, and suffered according to the
flesh on the authority of the following verse from scripture: “No one has ever seen God”
[John 1:18].
16. That they impiously assert that the Trinity dwells in Christ on the authority of the
following verse from scripture: “For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily”
[Colossians 2:9].
17. That they perversely assert that God the Son, not God the Father, dwells in Christ,
because of the following verse from scripture: “In Christ God was reconciling the world to
himself” [2 Corinthians 5:19].
18. That they assert that Christ, not Christ’s flesh, was created by the Holy Trinity and was
resurrected. Furthermore, that when they attempt to make this teaching they are found to
believe, like the Arians, that Christ is a creature.
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I have slightly modified the NRSV translation to reflect the ambiguity of this verse in question.
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19. About the following claim: “Saying that Christ is “one from the Trinity” (unum ex
trinitate) divides homousion.”
20. About the following claim: “Whatever is said to be from something (ex aliquo) is proof
that it is different from that something; therefore, one should not say that Christ is ‘one from
the Trinity’ (unum ex trinitate) but ‘one in the Trinity’ (unum in trinitate).” By this
perversity, the heretics themselves make the very same claim.
21. That they claim that Christ is one person (unam personam) from the Trinity (ex trinitate),
but that they foolishly deny that Christ is one from the trinity (unum ex trinitate). And that
they impiously plot that Christ, because he is not from two natures but from two persons, is
one person, and is one dignity and honor.
22. About the following claim: “We should not assert anything that is not contained in the
canonical scriptures.” And that they deceitfully claim that the Trinity does not exist without
Christ. Furthermore, that the following verse from scripture convincingly contradicts nearly
all of their crafty sophistries: “Behold, the man has become like one of us (unus ex nobis)”
[Genesis 3:22].
23. About the following, that they seem to say that God himself was born from a woman
through some artifice, yet they assert that Christ is in no way one from the Trinity (unum ex
trinitate). And about the following claim: “It is enough for us to make this confession, but we
refuse to use your terminology.”
24. That they sophistically say, “If you judge what both you and we say to be the same, how
can you consider us heretics, since we refuse to use your terminology so that we do not give
rise to other heretics?”
25. About the following claim: “We should assert nothing more than what is contained in the
words of the synod.” And that they consider heretics those who give the same response they
give: “We claim two natures but in different words, since we refuse to use your terminology
lest we seem to give rise to other heretics.”
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Book II
1.

Nestorian: I recall that, when you were asked in our previous discussion whether you
believed that Christ was in two natures, you answered that he was in two [natures], but they were
united in an agreement regarding natures (naturali conuentione).504 Because we suddenly rushed
forward to investigate another matter and say something about it, this issue was set aside there.
But now, since I believe that it is impious to and inconsistent with Catholic teaching—insofar as
I understand Catholic teaching—to believe that God the Word was naturally (naturaliter) united
to human nature, let us first investigate, if you are willing, how this can rightly be understood.
Catholic: In the previous discussion I examined many issues but could make no headway
with you, because your mind, desiring not to be corrected but to conquer, was opposed to
everything that was said. Instead it was intent on only one thing, how it could prattle on behalf of
its own position. There was no reason, therefore, to discuss the matter of most importance with
you any further. But lest you think that I do this because of lack of intelligence rather than out of
modesty, I am forced, against my better judgment, to respond to your objections. Unless I am
mistaken, your position is the following: it is sacrilegious and contrary to Catholic teaching to
believe that God the Word was united naturally (naturaliter) to human nature. Now it is pertinent
for you to explain more clearly why you think this.
Nestorian: Whatever happens naturally (naturaliter), is understood to occur not through the
will, but by necessity. Therefore, if God the Word was united (naturaliter) to the flesh belonging
to him (propriae carni), it must be believed that He did not do this out of compassion, but
because of a force of nature.
Catholic: According to your definition [of “naturally”], does everything that is said to happen
(fieri) naturally (naturaliter) happen through necessity, not through the will?
Nestorian: That is my definition. Certainly we experience (patimur) hunger, thirst, and the
need for sleep through necessity, not through the will. What does not happen (non fit) voluntarily
(uoluntarie), obviously happens through necessity of nature.
Catholic: What you say is appropriate to a composite and passible (passibilis) nature. For an
impassible and incomposite nature, however, doing (facere) something naturally (naturaliter) is
no other than doing something voluntarily (uoluntarie). Moreover, they are one and the same
thing, because in this case nature is not different from the will. Here, its nature is the will, and
the will is its nature (sed natura uoluntas est, et uoluntas natura). Were this not true, I ask you,
“Would you believe that God exists naturally or voluntarily?” If you say “voluntarily,” it follows
that God does not exist naturally. However, if you proceed to say “naturally,” God will exist—
according to you—through necessity, not by His will, and it is a great absurdity to believe this
about God. Furthermore, it is neither sacrilegious nor contrary to Catholic teaching to believe
that God the Word was united naturally to flesh belonging to Him, since it excludes those who
do not believe that an inviolable nature (inuiolabilem naturam) was naturally united with a
passible nature (naturae passibili), but rather claim that God was united—according to grace,
illumination, or certainly love—to a person (personae) of some unknown human (nescio
cuius...hominis) formed in [Mary’s] womb.
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2.

Nestorian: You seem to me to introduce a certain mixture and confusion (compositionem
quandam et confusionem) of natures, when you say that the natures were naturally united.
Catholic: Although we claim that our God Jesus Christ was composed (compositum) or
united (unitum) from divinity and humanity, we profoundly avoid, however, a confusion of
natures, because we believe that both natures remained perfect (manere perfectas).
Nestorian: “Composition” is understood to be contrary to “unity,” because [something] either
creates confusion, or it lacks division. Certainly everything put together through construction
(aedificia), which consists of composition, is obviously dismantled. Moreover, whatever is
composed by painters from different elements of nature is internally confused. Nothing among
them retains its own quality (proprietatem). How, therefore, can you say that the natures in
Christ are indivisible or unconfused (indiuisas aut inconfusas), when you claimed earlier that
Christ is composite (compositum)?
Catholic: What do you assert—that everything composite is passible or impassible?
Nestorian: Passible, certainly.
Catholic: What do you think about the incomposite?
Nestorian: Certainly it remains in a state of impassibility.
Catholic: What do you assert—that Christ is passible or impassible?
Nestorian: After the incarnation, certainly passible.
Catholic: Why, therefore, do you refuse to confess that “Christ the Son of the Living God”
[cf. Matt 16:16 & Jn 11:27] is composite?
Nestorian: According to His humanity, I obviously confess that Christ is composite, since I
believe that He is also passible because of His humanity.
Catholic: What is this? Do you claim that one and the same [Christ] was composed of
divinity and humanity after the incarnation but had been incomposite before the incarnation?
Nestorian: No. I say that the human that was assumed was composite, but that he, by whom
the human was assumed, is incomposite.
Catholic: It is revealed, without any doubt, that you believe in two sons: one composite, the
other incomposite.
Nestorian: Do you deny, therefore, that the nature of divinity is simple (simplicem) and
incomposite?
Catholic: I do not deny it.
Nestorian: Do you say that a human is composite or incomposite?
Catholic: Composite, obviously.
Nestorian: How, therefore, do you deny that Christ was composite, and also incomposite,
since you obviously confess that he is God and human?
Catholic: I confess that the Son of God is certainly God and human. I strongly oppose those
who confess that the Son of God was not one and the same Christ, who was incomposite before
the incarnation but composite after the incarnation.
Nestorian: You appear to declare a certain contradiction of the divine nature when you say
that the same [Christ] was incomposite before the incarnation and composite after the
incarnation. How can that uncircumscribed nature that is diffused everywhere be united,
according to composition (secundum compositionem), to a nature that is circumscribed and
constituted in a small area? Or perhaps, as I said, you impiously claim that either a limiting of
divinity (deitatis contractionem) or an expansion of flesh (carnis extensionem) occurred.
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Catholic: I think you believe that the divine essence (essentiam) is corporeal: you think that it
is gathered, on the one hand, in the flesh, and it is stretched out with the flesh.
Nestorian: Let no Christian soul believe this!
Catholic: What, then, do you think the divine nature is?
Nestorian: A great power (uirtutem), obviously, that is complete everywhere (ubique totam).
Catholic: “Complete everywhere,” do you say that this [power] exists [everywhere]
according to its totality (secundum totum)?
Nestorian: It is certainly not everywhere according to its totality, but rational beings are
contained (continentur) by it in one way, irrational beings in another way, and completely
inanimate entities in still another way.
Catholic: Is the whole power understood to be in each individual rational animal according to
its totality or partially (particulariter)?
Nestorian: Certainly partially, not according to its totality, because individual beings receive
“from its fullness” [Jn 1:16].
Catholic: How, therefore, is it complete everywhere if it is not complete in each individual
rational animal, but only there partially? Moreover, how can what is not matter (corpus) but
spirit (spiritus) be [anywhere] partially?
Nestorian: Indeed, it is complete in itself and is everywhere according to its totality.
However, insofar as it extends to its creation, it does not cause the rational animal to realize that
the power is present to it or within it, except insofar as the power judges [it should].
Catholic: I think you believe that God the Word is dissimilar to the Father in no way.
Nestorian: Arians and Eunomians, not Catholics, follow this teaching. Believing that the Son
is dissimilar to the Father in some part [is Catholic].
Catholic: You say, then, that [the Son] is completely, just as He is equal to the Father, united
to His own flesh? Or united in part, but not united in another?
Nestorian: Paul has taught the following: “In whom all the treasures of wisdom and
knowledge are hidden” [Col. 2:3].
Catholic: The whole power according to its totality, therefore, is united to the flesh, just as
the complete divinity of God the Word is equal to the Father?
Nestorian: No Christian doubts this.
Catholic: What is this? You assert either a lessening of divinity or an expansion of the flesh
has occurred—because it is not possible, as you say, for an uncircumscribed nature that is
diffused everywhere to be united, according to composition, to a nature that is circumscribed and
constituted in a small area?
Nestorian: I assert that neither a lessening of divinity nor an expansion of the flesh has
occurred, because this is appropriate for matter, not for spirit or power, which cannot be united to
the flesh according to composition. Obviously the divinity of the Word, as I said, is
uncircumscribed and contains everything.
Catholic: You say that a human exists as a composite or incomposite entity?
Nestorian: Composite.
Catholic: Composed of what entities?
Nestorian: Of soul and flesh obviously.
Catholic: Do you assert that the soul (anima) is consubstantial with the flesh, or of a different
nature?
Nestorian: Of a different nature.
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Catholic: Though it is not flesh, is it matter (corpus) or not? [I say this] because although all
flesh is matter, not all matter is flesh.
Nestorian: In no way do I claim that the soul is corporeal.
Catholic: What do you say it is then?
Nestorian: Spirit, obviously, but not uncircumscribed.
Catholic: Do you claim that the soul is completely diffused throughout every individual part,
or that a greater part of it is in a greater part, a lesser part of it in a lesser part?
Nestorian: I believe that it is complete in each part of its body. Though it is circumscribed, I
nevertheless think that it does not consist of parts, since, if parts of its body are removed, it still
persists without harm.
Catholic: If, therefore, the soul, which is not matter but spirit, is united to the flesh according
to composition, it experiences no limiting in a lesser part, no expansion in a greater part, but
without any confusion of itself it is believed to be complete in a greater part and complete in a
lesser part. How must the divinity of God the Word, which is united to its own flesh according to
composition, be believed to receive any lessening, expansion, or confusion? For by analogy of
the union of the soul with the flesh, a union that you do not deny happens according to
composition, all of the learned and famous fathers of the Church are shown to teach that a union
was made of God the Word with His own flesh.
Nestorian: No one doubts that everything composite consists of parts. A part, however, is less
than its whole. God the Word, therefore, is a part of Christ, who you assert is composed of
divinity and humanity. Furthermore, if God the Word is a part of Christ, God the Word is—
according to you—less than Christ, of whom he is a part. But if God is a part of Christ, how is he
God since he is incomplete?
Catholic: God the Word is not incomplete, because He did not need to assume the flesh in
order to be completed. Rather, in order that the flesh might be changed for the better and
perfected, He united Himself to the flesh and became composite, though He was previously
supremely simple, incomposite, and complete in every regard, obviously, insofar as He is God—
for it is written about Him, “He did not lack our goods” [Ps 15:2]. For assuming human nature
for our salvation neither added anything to nor subtracted anything from Him. Instead, He
ineffably glorified this nature through His union [with it]. Nor is God the Word less than Christ,
because He is Christ. Nor is He less than Himself, because He remained the same God when he
assumed the flesh, obviously remaining complete. Otherwise, if Christ is denied to be composite
after the incarnation, He remained, therefore, as He was before, namely simple and incomposite.
Moreover, because a supremely simple and incomposite entity accepts no passion (passionem) at
all within itself, just as you claimed before, Christ, therefore, did not—according to you—suffer
(perpessus) for human salvation. If, however, he suffered, although remaining simple and
incomposite, it is not true that a simple and incomposite nature is impassible (impassibilis). But
if a simple and incomposite nature is not impassible, then Christ’s divinity is passible
(passibilis). If, however, Christ’s divinity remains impassible—which it certainly does—it
follows that a simple and incomposite nature is not passible, because, although Christ preserves
the simplicity and impassibility of His divinity even after the union and composition, it must
nevertheless be believed—and rightly—according to the flesh united to Him that He was
composed with it. For this reason, when you refuse to assert that Christ was composed after the
incarnation, either you are forced to believe that the nature of Christ’s divinity is composite and
passible, or you insinuate that Christ, who you assert was simple and incomposite after the
incarnation as He was before it, did in no way suffer on behalf of human salvation.
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Nestorian: I do not believe that the divine nature is passible, since I said that it is supremely
simple and incomposite. I also confess that Christ suffered on behalf of human salvation, because
I understand Him to be not only God but also human. But I ask you, “Do you assert that this
composition was made in the womb of the virgin, or after ‘she had borne her firstborn son’
[Matt 1:25]?”
Catholic: In the womb, obviously. For how could I believe that He, who I claim was united to
the flesh according to composition, is God by nature if I were to assert that the composition of
natures occurred after His birth? For this belief is not belief in a composition or union, but in the
habitation of something in something else.
3.
Nestorian: You have clearly taught, though previously you seemed to have hidden it in your
ambiguous language, that the composition of natures in no way preserves their respective
qualities (proprietatem).
Catholic: How did I teach that the composition of natures does not preserve their respective
qualities?
Nestorian: By saying that you consider composition to be contrary to inhabitation.
Catholic: Just as union does not confuse natures, neither does composition, since the natures
of the soul and flesh, which are united according to composition, are not confused in themselves.
The habitation of something within something (alterius in altero) certainly [pertains] to two
entities. As for God and human, it is not one within another (alter in altero), but the same one is
both God and human (idem Deus, idem homo est).
4.
Nestorian: Although according to union one and the same is both God and human, according
to their natures, however, one is God, and the other is human. For if God Himself is also human
according to nature, how does He not say, “Destroy me,” instead of “Destroy this temple, and in
three days I will raise it up” [Jn 2:19]?
Catholic: I’m surprised that you remember Gospel passages that you believe support your
position, but pass over those that you realize are contrary as if you have never even heard of
them. But is He who says, “Destroy this temple,” not also the one who, after the woman pours
perfume over His head, is recounted as saying, “Let her be. She has performed a good service
for me. By pouring this ointment on my body she has prepared me for burial” [cf. Matt 26:10,
12]. Do you realize that the one who is buried is no other than he whose temple it was?
Nestorian: If he, whose temple it was, was buried, it follows that the temple is neither
“destroyed” nor “buried.”
Catholic: Because you seem to assert that one is buried and another is unburied with relation
to the term “temple,” please make clearer what you mean by “temple.”
Nestorian: There is no need for my own interpretation as the evangelist gives testimony—
after he records that the Lord says, Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up,” he
adds soon thereafter, “But he was speaking of the temple of his body” [Jn 2:21].
Catholic: This body, do you say that it is God’s or a human’s?
Nestorian: Obviously a human’s, but the human that was assumed.
Catholic: If it is true that this body belongs to the assumed human, this body of the assumed
human, therefore, is the “temple.”
Nestorian: It is not the temple of the assumed human, but of him who dwells invisibly in the
human.
Catholic: And who dwells invisibly in the temple?
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Nestorian: God obviously.
Catholic: So the body is not of the assumed human—as you claim—but it is God’s whose
temple it also is?
Nestorian: Were the body in which the invisible God dwells lifeless (exanime), the body
would certainly be God’s, not the assumed human’s. But because the body in which God dwells
is animated (animatum est), the body is not God’s but the assumed human’s.
Catholic: Therefore, it is not the body but the human that is God’s “temple?”
Nestorian: Does it not seem so to you?
Catholic: God forbid! For this is completely contrary to the testimony of the evangelist who
did not say, “He was speaking about the temple ‘of his human,’” but rather, “He was speaking
about the temple ‘of his body.’”
Nestorian: As it seems to me—you do not believe that Christ had a soul?
Catholic: May this slanderous charge be far removed from me!
Nestorian: How, therefore, do you reject, as if it is contrary, that we say that God dwells in a
human, if you agree that Christ has body and soul—?
Catholic: Because I confess, not that the body is belongs to the assumed human—as you
claim—but that the body is God’s, and I believe that the soul is His as well. Moreover, I
proclaim, not that God is “in a human” (in homine) but that God is “in a body” (in corpore).
Otherwise, saying that God is “in a human” is no different from saying [he is] a human
belonging to God (hominem Dei). In this understanding then, God is not a human, but Christ is
understood to be a human belonging to God (homo Dei), but this can be said about all who
faithfully serve God.
5.
Nestorian: If the body belongs to God, not to the assumed human, why is the verse not the
following, “Unless you eat the flesh of God,” instead of, “Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of
Man, you have no life in you” [Jn 10:53]?
Catholic: Though the flesh is “of the Son of Man,” the flesh of the Son of Man is
nevertheless the flesh of God. For if the flesh is not God’s, how is it able to bestow eternal life
upon the faithful?
Nestorian: Because this was granted to the flesh by God, as the flesh is united to God (sibi
unito).
Catholic: If the flesh is united to God, how is the flesh not God’s?
Nestorian: Because you contend, undeniably, against what is manifestly said in the Gospel, I
ask you, “Who is it said the following to his disciples just before his passion, ‘Take and eat from
this all of you. This is my body, which will be broken for you for the remission of sins’ [cf. Matt
26:26]?”
Catholic: The same one, certainly, who said, “I am the way, and the truth, and the life” [Jn
14:6].
6.
Nestorian: “The Life,” therefore, is touched by impious hands, “the Life” is crucified, “the
Life,” finally, dies? Furthermore, if “the Life” died, who must be believed to have bestowed life
on the dead?
Catholic: If He, who is “the Life,” was not crucified and died, the dead should have no hope
at all for life. But that He, who is “the Life,” was crucified and died, listen not to me but to
blessed Peter as he proclaimed to the Jews, “You asked to have a murderer given to you and you
killed the author of life” [Acts 3:14–5].
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Nestorian: Although God is rightly believed to be the “author of life,” we can, nevertheless,
also call humans “authors of life,” when we pass down how to live well. Teach more clearly, if
you can, that “the Life” was crucified and died.
Catholic: Although it is not humans who pass down how to live well but God alone who is
rightly believed to be the Author of Life, even if I teach from the scriptures that He, who is
“Life,” died and was crucified, you will still turn to other matters because you do not yield to the
truth, as you never cease from asking pointless questions.
Nestorian: If I refused to yield to the truth, I would have never brought forth those matters
that trouble me before us for discussion. But you, because you cannot respond to my objections,
accuse me of asking pointless questions.
Catholic: But the following is the case: It is not I but He—about whom the matter is
concerned—who responds to your objections for me. He marks you as His own adversary when
He says in Deuteronomy to His people Israel, “You will see your life hanging on the wood, and
you will not believe in it” [cf. Deut 28:66].
7.
Nestorian: Then how is “the Life” in itself (uita per se) able to hang on the wood on its own?
Catholic: In the same way that God, who is True Life, is believed to have become human.
Nestorian: So God was crucified by the Jews?
Catholic: Do not place your trust in me, but in the prophet who says, “Will anyone pierce
God? Yet your entire people is piercing me” [cf. Malac 3:8].505
Nestorian: That is entirely wrong. This reading is not found in the books approved by the
Church (in ecclesiasticis libris legitur), but the following is what is written in the prophet
Malachi, “Will anyone rob God? Yet your entire people is robbing me” [Malac 3:8].506
Catholic: Without any doubt, this verse, as you say, is contained in the ancient edition, but in
the new version, what I quote is found. But if you think the authority of the recent edition should
be questioned, listen to the apostle, who declares, “[They] crucified the Lord of Glory”
(Dominum gloriae crucifixum) [1 Cor 2:8].507
8.
Nestorian: If “the Lord of Glory” was crucified, should God also be believed to have been
crucified? Is James, therefore, the brother of God, because he is called “the brother of the Lord?”
Catholic: God is no different from the Lord, but the Lord Himself is God, as the prophet
attests, “Know that the Lord himself is God” [Ps 99:3]. Indeed, with complete correctness the
Lord of Glory is believed to be crucified by the Jews. Moreover, according to this saying of the
prophet, “James the Lord’s brother” [Gal 1:19], it is not contrary to the Truth to say that he is
the brother of God according to the flesh (secundum carnem).
9.
Nestorian: This teaching of yours is novel and intolerable. It preaches that God is passible,
despite what Peter the apostle manifestly says in the Acts of the Apostles about him who was
crucified by the Jews, namely, “Let it be known to all of you, and to all the people of Israel, that
this man is standing before you in good health by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, whom
you crucified, whom God raised from the dead” [Acts 4:10], and also, “Let the entire house of
Israel know with certainty that God has made him both Lord and Christ, this Jesus whom you
Si affigit homo deum, quia uos configitis me? tota gens. The Vulgate reads, “Si affliget homo Deum, quia uos
configitis me?” Contrast affigit with affliget. For a discussion of this discrepancy, see Chapter 4.
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Si supplantat homo deum, quia supplantatis me uos? tota gens.
507
Cf. the reading of the Vulgate, Dominum gloriae crucifixissent.
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crucified” [Acts 2:36]. Therefore, because the apostle gives testimony that he, whom the Jews
crucified, was made Lord and Christ by God, it is clear who the “Lord of Glory” should be
understood to be, or certainly, who the “one crucified by the Jews” should be believed to be. For
I do not believe that you have wandered into error so severe that you believe that the Son of God,
who was made the Lord by God, is God (filium Dei Deum a Deo factum dominum esse).508 We
have learned from the aforementioned quotation from the apostle and from the passage from the
prophet that you quoted that the word “lord” (dominus) does not always signify God. Sometimes
it only signifies God, sometimes it only signifies a human, but sometimes it signifies both God
and a human. By no means are we required to understand that God was crucified because the
apostle says “the Lord of Glory was crucified,” nor because he says “James the Lord’s brother,”
do we believe that [James] is God’s brother.
Catholic: As for the fact that Jesus of Nazareth is God, I think that I have sufficiently taught
this through reason (ratione) and [biblical] testimonies (testimoniis) in what I said above, but
everything is nothing to nonbelievers. As for what you think is a great error—that God was made
the Lord by God (Deum factum dominum a Deo credere)—thinking this because Peter said the
following about the crucified Jesus, “God has made him both Lord and Christ,” I ask you, was
he, who was Jesus but nevertheless not the Lord, made the Lord by God? Or, was he, who was
both Jesus and Lord, made the Lord by God?
Nestorian: How, if he were already Lord, would he become the Lord, since no one becomes
what he already is? But because he was not the Lord, he is said to become the Lord by God.
Catholic: So, was Jesus Lord before he was [Lord]?
Nestorian: He was not Lord before he became Lord.
Catholic: How have you said the following, “If he were Lord he would not become Lord by
God, but because he was not the Lord, then he was made Lord by God?
Nestorian: I have said this because he who became the Lord was not the Lord before he was
born. Nor did he become the Lord after he was born. Instead, while in the womb itself, by union
with the Son of God, he became the Lord.
Catholic: Therefore, the Son of God and Jesus are different, and Jesus became Lord by union
with the Son of God?
Nestorian: He is one and the same, just as I said above, in dignity and authority, but they are
not the same according to natures.
Catholic: They are, therefore, two according to natures, but in dignity and power he is one
Son? Then, which of them, must it be believed, “took on the form of a slave” [Phil 2:7]?
Nestorian: There are not two sons—you are dreaming [if you think I said that]—but one Son
of God, who we nevertheless believe is in two united natures, and who also, “although he was in
the form of God, took on the form a slave” [Phil 2:6–7].
Catholic: The Son of God, therefore, although he was both God and Lord, took on the form
of a slave, and became a slave in the form of a slave? Or, do you claim that believing this is
erroneous?
Nestorian: Whoever does not believe this is certainly a pagan.
Catholic: If this is not incorrect, believing that the Son of God, though he was already God
and Lord insofar as he is equal to God the Father, became a slave in the form of a slave, since he
also gives the following testimony about himself, when he says to the Father, “I am your servant
The more natural rendering of the Latin would be “that the Son of God, who was made God by God, is the Lord,”
but this cannot be the case.
508
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and the son of your maidservant” [Ps 115:16], then it is in no way erroneous to believe that God
the Son of God, because he became a slave, became Lord by God the Father. Moreover, not as
you say does [Lord (dominus) sometimes signify] God only, sometimes a human only, but
sometimes both God and a human. Instead “Lord” (dominus) must always be understood to
indicate God and likewise “God” the Lord, because no one else is proclaimed to be made the
Lord by God except him who taking up the form of a slave became a slave—since the Lord of
Glory, whom Paul proclaims was crucified by the Jews, existed before the ages (esset ante
saecula). Furthermore, there is what he cries to the Father, “Father, glorify your Son with the
same glory that He has had with you before the world was created” [Jn 17:5]. Is this not His
voice when He says, “Learn from me, since I am mild and humble of heart” [Matt 11:29]? For
never would God the Son of God become the Lord by God the Father unless, though He was
God, He became a slave by taking up the form of a slave. Nor would He have prayed to be
glorified by the Father unless, though He was glorious with the Father before the world was
created, He humbled Himself through His own will (sponte) for our salvation. Jesus God the Son
of God became the Lord and is gloried by the Father, not with the glory that He did not have, but
“with the glory that He had with the Father before the world was created.” Without any doubt, it
follows that Jesus is God by nature. Jesus, just as He became Lord by the Father, is also glorified
by God, as Peter the apostle proclaims when he says, “The God of Abraham and the God of
Isaac and the God of Jacob glorified his Son Jesus, whom you denied before Pilate, though he
wanted to acquit him” [Acts 3:13].
Nestorian: Unless you believe all of this on account of the union that was made between God
and the human, you are doubtlessly convicted of proclaiming that the Divinity is passible.
Catholic: In no way do I proclaim that the Divinity is passible; however, I strongly confess
that God suffered according to the flesh, because I recognize that Jesus Christ is truly God.
Nestorian: I completely deny that God suffered according to the flesh because this is never
read in the holy scriptures, but I profess, following Peter the apostle, that Christ suffered
according to the flesh.
Catholic: I confess both to be true—God and Christ suffered according to the flesh—since
“Christ, who is over all, God” [Rom 9:5]. You, however, hesitate to say that God suffered
according to the flesh because you do not believe that Christ is God. But if you do not deny that
Christ is God, saying that Christ suffered according to the flesh is exactly the same as saying that
God suffered according to the flesh, because Christ who suffered is, without any doubt, God.
Nestorian: If saying that God suffered according to the flesh is the very same thing as saying
that Christ suffered according to the flesh, then Christ—according to you—is not only the Son
but even the Father, because he is obviously God.
Catholic: Christ is not the Father, though He is God; nor is God identical to Christ. The Son,
however, is Christ, because [the Son] is not identical to [God]; but the Son is Christ God.
This is why Catholics confess both to be true—God and Christ suffered according to the flesh.
10.
Nestorian: If God is Christ, who is it who says to the Jews, “Why are you trying to kill me, a
man who has told you the truth that I heard from God” [Jn 7:40]?
Catholic: Certainly He about whom it is written, “For this reason the Jews were seeking all
the more to kill him, because he was not only breaking the sabbath, but was also calling God his
own Father, thereby making himself equal to God” [Jn 5:18]. Does any fraction of ambiguity
still remain for us to believe that Jesus Christ is God by nature? Since, if He were God by grace
and not by nature, He would never have made Himself equal to God.
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Nestorian: Is Paul mistaken, therefore, in saying, “Death came through a human being, the
resurrection of the dead has also come through a human being” [1 Cor 15:21]?
Catholic: Then how can “the resurrection of the dead” occur “through a human being” unless
the resurrection is that very human who proclaims in the gospel, “I am the resurrection and the
life” [Jn 11:25]? Furthermore, because the resurrection and life of all is nothing except God, it is
beyond any doubt that God and the human are an identical person (idem homo deus est), through
whom the apostle proclaims that there is resurrection.
Nestorian: Is the very same apostle found to be ignorant of this sacred matter when he says,
“[There is also one] mediator between God and humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human” [1
Tim 2:5]?
Catholic: Just as the apostle is not in ignorant of this sacred matter, so also does he not
contradict himself, saying, “[While we] wait for the manifestation of the glory of our great God
and Savior, Jesus Christ. He it is who gave himself for our sins” [cf. Tit 2:13–4]. Therefore,
because the human Jesus Christ, “the mediator between God and humankind,” is “our great God,
who gave himself for our sins,” it is not at all contradictory but one and the same thing to
confess, in any way, that both God and Christ suffered according to the flesh. This is why the
church recognizes that the miracles and the passion were of one and the same God. Moreover, if
anyone does not confess both to be true, he must either be avoided like a Jew or feared like a
Manichaean.
11.
Nestorian: You have advanced thus far with a sophistic and refined method of deception, but
now there can be no place for you to hide, since you have proclaimed that the miracles and
passion are of one and the same Son of God, since the apostle clearly teaches [in his letter] to the
Hebrews that the Lord Jesus Christ was brought to perfection through his passion by God the
Word, saying, “It was fitting that he, for whom and through whom all things exist, in bringing
many children to glory, should make the author of their salvation perfect through suffering”
[Hebrews 2:10].509 Do you realize that Jesus Christ, “for whom and through whom all things
exist, in bringing many children to glory, the author of their salvation” [cf. Heb 2:10], was
without any doubt perfected by God the Word through his suffering? How, therefore, should the
miracles and passion be believed to be of one and the same person when one is perfected by the
other through his passion?
Catholic: You have given me an easy path of escape, and the door lies wide open through
which I enter by the lead of Him who said, “I am the gate” [Jn 10:9]. And entering, I shall refute
you, not to deceive your ignorance and lack of faith with sophistries, as you claim, but rather
with the truest evidence from scripture (uerissimis documentis). Because you do not understand
the apostle’s meaning, you are convicted of proclaiming that one “Son of God” is passible and
another “Son of God” is impassible. For God the Word did not—as you claim—perfect the
author of our salvation through his passion, but God the Father perfected God the Son, Jesus
Christ, “for whom and through whom all things [exist], the author of His children’s salvation”
[cf. Heb 2:10], through His passion. Who, in fact, should understand “the author of His
children’s salvation, perfected through His passion” to be someone different from Him, “for
whom and through whom all things exist, in bringing many children to glory?” Especially since
[the apostle] before this passage said, “But we see Jesus, who for a little while was made a little
lower than the angels, now crowned with glory and honor because of the suffering of death, so
509
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that by the grace of God He might taste death for everyone” [Heb 2:9]. Then the apostle
immediately follows this by saying, “It was fitting that He”—that is, God the Father “for whom
and through whom all things [exist]”—“perfected ‘the author of the salvation for those’”—
namely, “He who brought those of His children to glory,” and, He who, “although He was equal
to the Father, was made a little lower than the angels, so that by the grace of God”—that is God
the Father—“might taste death for everyone.” But we learn this much more clearly and lucidly at
the beginning of the letter, “Long ago God spoke to our ancestors in many and various ways by
the prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us by a Son, whom he appointed heir of all
things through whom he also created the worlds. He is the reflection of God’s glory and the
exact imprint of God’s very being, and he sustains all things by his powerful word. When he had
made purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high, having become
as much superior to angels as the name he has inherited is more excellent than theirs” [Heb 1:1–
4]. Behold the “author of salvation,” “who brought many of his children to glory,” “who made
purification for sins,” which could not have happened “without the shedding of blood” [Heb
9:22]. The apostle makes the same teaching in another place, “[He is] the reflection of God’s
glory and the exact imprint of God’s very being, and he sustains all things by the power of his
powerful word” [cf. Heb 1:3]. For he is “superior to the angels,” and “he sat down at the right
hand of the Majesty,” though whom the worlds are proclaimed to be created. He, “who for a little
while was made a little lower than the angels,” “by the grace of God the Father,” as it is said, “he
tasted death for everyone.” About Him it is also said, “[He], for whom and through whom all
things [exist], brought many children to glory” [cf. Heb 2:10]. God the Word, “for whom and
through whom all things [exist],” is no other than the “author of salvation,” Jesus, “who made
purification for sins, who brought many children to glory, and who was made perfect by the
Father through His suffering.” The apostle also makes the same teaching about him in this verse,
“He who did not withhold his own Son, but gave him up for all of us” [Rom 8:32].
12.
Nestorian: Your argument accomplishes nothing except for teaching that God, who is
impassible and immortal, is passible and mortal insofar as He is in Himself.
Catholic: Since you deny that it is God who was crucified on behalf of human salvation, I ask
you, “Who do you claim was incarnate?”
Nestorian: The Word, obviously, just as the evangelist gives testimony, saying, “And the
Word became flesh and lived among us” [Jn 1:14].
Catholic: Did God the Word, who was incarnate, also suffer? Or, was the one who was
incarnate different from the one who suffered?
Nestorian: God, certainly, was incarnate. However, not God, but God’s flesh (caro Dei)
suffered.
Catholic: You have given me great hope for you. For thus far you claimed not that God’s
flesh, but the flesh of the assumed human suffered. Now you have confessed that it is God’s
flesh. But because it is not sufficiently clear what you are saying—that not God but His flesh
suffered—please explain this more clearly. For what you say seems very absurd. If God’s flesh
suffered, how did God not suffer according to the flesh? And, if God did not suffer according to
the flesh, how did God’s flesh suffer? Unless perhaps [you mean that] the Jews should be
understood to have crucified an inanimate flesh (carnem exanimem), divorced from God. But
because it is very foolish to believe that flesh without a soul was crucified by the Jews, it follows
that God’s animated flesh (caro animata Dei), which is obviously a human, is believed to be
crucified by the Jews. So if credibility is granted to your assertion—not God, but God’s flesh
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suffered—what else is believed than that a human belonging to God (homo dei) suffered? It is
even permitted to say this about Peter and Paul, since they also are called men of God (homines
Dei), and they suffered on His behalf.
13.
Nestorian: God certainly did not suffer, because proclaiming that God is passible is
blasphemy. Instead, God “caused the sufferings appropriate to His flesh” (sui corporis fecit
proprias passiones).510
Catholic: The word “proprietas”511 is understood in a number of ways (proprietas multis
intellegitur modis). For the Church is called His body (ecclesia corpus eius), and God caused
sufferings belonging to this same Church (eiusdem ecclesiae . . . proprias passiones), on behalf
of which He also speaks while He is positioned in heaven, “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute
me?” [Acts 9:4] Moreover, each of the faithful is a member of Him (unusquisque fidelium
membrum eius est), just as this same apostle teaches, saying, “Now you are the body of Christ
and individually members of it” [1 Cor 12:27]. But still further, that bread, in which the universal
Church participates in commemoration of the Lord’s passion, is His body (panis ille . . . corpus
eius est). How, therefore, do you claim that God “caused the sufferings belonging (proprias) to
His flesh?” You must make [your position] clear with examples.
Nestorian: I shall do so, as far as I can, in order to dissuade you from this position and that
you hereafter refrain from claiming that God the Word suffered according to the flesh, though
God’s flesh did suffer. God’s flesh is not called “God’s body” as the Church is, nor is it so called
like that bread, in which the universal Church participates in commemoration of Christ’s
passion.512 Instead, [God’s flesh] is called “God’s body,” as a garment is said to belong to any
human who wears it (alicuius hominis proprium, quod indutus est, uestimentum). When this
garment is torn by someone, the injury is related (refertur) to whoever is wearing the garment.
According to this reasoning, God “caused the sufferings belonging to His body.”
Catholic: God, therefore, causes the suffering belonging to His flesh through a relation
(secundum relationem), not through a true and intimate ownership (secundum ueram et intimam
proprietatem)? How, then, do you proclaim that God caused the suffering belonging to His flesh
if He causes suffering belonging to His flesh through a relation, not through ownership? What
ownership can a garment have for him who puts it on, when the garment in no way pertains to
his substance? For when we define “human” (homo), we do not include his garment because it
has no share in the same substance. Therefore, God causes—according to you—sufferings
belonging to His own Church rather than sufferings belonging to His body. For the Church is
called “God’s body,” since “God shared flesh and blood” [cf. Heb 2:14] and “was made the
head of the Church” [cf. Eph 5:23]. But the Church becomes a sharer in Him through faith, by
accepting the Holy Spirit. But you believe that God’s body is like a garment (instar uestimenti),
which seems to pertain in no way to the nature of His divinity or the nature of His flesh.
Furthermore, Isaiah proclaims that God’s garment is nothing other than God’s flesh, when he
I have translated proprias as “appropriate to” rathan than “belonging to” (the usual translation thus far) because
Catholicus questions the very meaning of the word “proprietas” below.
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denoting the active) with a noun related to the verb patior (“to suffer, experience,” a verb denoting the passive).
Since Nestorianus is unwilling to acknowledge that God is passible in any way, he has used language that attempts
to circumvent this issue. For him, God literally “caused His body to experience suffering,” a nonsensical or at least
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says, “Who is it that comes from Edom, from Bozrah in garments stained crimson?” [Is 63:1]
But if you also understand God’s garment to be nothing other than God’s flesh, it follows that
you should relate the tearing of the garment, that is, the suffering of His flesh to Him, whose
garment, that is, flesh, it is. Without any doubt, the injury and suffering should be believed to be
His, whose flesh and garment it is.
14.
Nestorian: Where in Holy Scripture did you read that the body of God the Word and not
rather the body of Christ is the Church?
Catholic: By this claim of yours, you make Christ different from God the Word. But if Christ
is not different from God the Word, and Christ in fact is God the Word, then just as Christ’s
body is the Church so also is the body of God the Word the Church. But if Christ’s body is not
the body of God the Word, how did you concede earlier that God’s flesh suffered?
Nestorian: I said that God’s flesh suffered, not God the Word. In dignity and honor Christ is
God—whose flesh, as I said, suffered—because God the Word dwelt in Christ. This is why I
denied that God also suffered but nevertheless confessed that God’s flesh suffered.
Catholic: Christ, therefore, is not “true God” [cf. 1 Jn 5:20], but because God the Word
dwelt in him, in honor and dignity, rather, in name only—according to you—is Christ called
“God.” How is this not contradictory to the meaning of John the Apostle, when he says, “We
know that the Son of God has come and has given us understanding so that we may know him
who is true God; and we are in him who is true, in his Son Jesus Christ. He is true God and
eternal life” [1 Jn 520]?
15.
Nestorian: If you do not call Christ “God” because of the honor and dignity of God’s
dwelling in him, you certainly represent God as seen and touched by humans.
Catholic: If God was not seen or touched by humans, how did that same John say,513 “We
declare to you what was from the beginning, what we have heard, what we have seen with our
eyes, what we have looked at and touched with our hands, concerning the word of life—this life
was revealed, and we have seen it and testify to it, and declare to you the eternal life that was
with the Father and was revealed to us” [1 Jn 1:1–2]? Read the individual passages closely, and
see that God was seen and touched by humans. This important apostle gives testimony that the
Word of Life, who was with the Father from the beginning, about whom they heard from the law
and the prophets, was ultimately seen and perceived with their own eyes, touched with their own
hands. And to prevent anyone from trying to claim that the “Word was with God” [in the sense
that the Word] is something outside of what God is, he adds, “this life was revealed, and we
have seen it and testify to it, and declare to you the eternal life that was with the Father and was
revealed to us.”
Nestorian: Then does the Lord lie when he says, “No one has ever seen God” [Jn 1:18, 1 Jn
4:12]? The apostle [Paul] also says the following about God, “Whom no one has ever seen or
can see” [1 Tim 6:16], and God says to Moses, “No one shall see my face and live” [Ex 33:20].
Catholic: If it is not God who was seen, how does He say, “Behold, I who am speaking am
present” [Is 52:6], and the prophet,514 “Our God comes and does not keep silence” [Ps 49:3]?
Nestorian: Should it be believed, therefore, that Divine Scripture contradicts itself?
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This is a reference to “No one has ever seen God” [Jn 1:18, 1 Jn 4:12]. See below and the chapters for Book II.
It seems that John Maxentius has reversed the attributions of these two scriptural passages.
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Catholic: Divine Scripture does not contradict itself in the eyes of those who understand it
piously. But it seems contradictory to those who are deceived by the spirit of heresy and cannot
grasp what its truths are. For the following is said, “No one has ever seen God,” and “No one
shall see my face and live,” because no one can see with their earthly eyes (corporeis oculis) the
nature of the divinity, which is obviously not matter (corpus) but spirit (spiritus). Furthermore,
the prefiguring that happened to Jacob teaches that God was to be seen by humans in His
assumed flesh—when in fact this very patriarch wrestles with someone ostensibly human and
when blessed by “this man,” he says, “I have seen God face to face, and yet my life is preserved”
[Gen 32:30]. Thomas also, after the resurrection of the Lord, felt and touched the Lord’s pierced
side, exclaiming, “My Lord and my God” [Jn 20:28].
Nestorian: You have unwittingly supported my position strongly. For because the divine
nature is not material, but spirit, as you have just professed, there is no doubt about what nature
is seen or pierced. When his disciples were in doubt about him, this same Lord said, “Touch me
and see; for a spirit does not have flesh and bones as you see that I have” [Lk 24:39]. Therefore,
the Lord Jesus Christ, who was pierced, was seen and touched. When the apostle recognized him
after the resurrection, he exclaims and says, “My Lord and my God.” It is clear from this that
Jesus Christ is not God, though Thomas saw and touched [Jesus Christ] risen from the dead. It is
also clear that Christ is God only insofar as God, “whom no one will see and live,” dwells in
him.
Catholic: In no way did Thomas call Him, whom he saw and touched, God on account of
[God] dwelling in Him! This is removed from the apostolic faith; this is believing in two sons.
Instead, [the apostle] gives testimony that He, whose wounds he touched, is his Lord and God.
For the apostles, [Jesus Christ] is not God by dignity, but God by nature. Jeremiah clearly gives
testimony about Him, who was seen and touched, saying, “This is our God; no other can be
compared to him. He found the whole way to knowledge, and gave her to his servant Jacob and
to Israel, whom he loved. Afterward she appeared on earth and lived with humankind” [Bar
3:36–9].515 Jesus Christ, the God-man, appeared and lived with humankind, and to Him no other
can be compared.
Nestorian: If no other “God” can be compared to him, who was pierced and crucified by the
Jews, who is the “God” who resurrected the “God” when there is no other “God” who can be
compared with the crucified [“God”]?
Catholic: Still you do not abandon your idiosyncratic position (a propria intentione) by
which you believe that Christ is no other than one of those about whom God says, “I will live in
them and walk among them, and I will be their God, and they shall be my people” [2 Cor 6:16].
16.
Nestorian: But about none of them does the apostle give the testimony that he gives about
Christ, saying, “For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily” [Col 2:9].
Catholic: How do you understand the phrase, “the whole fullness of deity dwelling in
Christ?”
Nestorian: The entire Trinity, obviously.
Catholic: Christ, therefore, is a fourth, and in him the entire Trinity dwells.
Nestorian: Is Paul a liar, then, when he makes his claim?
Catholic: Paul is no liar, because he does not say that the Trinity dwells in Christ. He does
not think that Christ is separate from the Trinity.
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Nestorian: If the Trinity does not dwell in Christ, how does “the whole fullness of deity
dwell” in Christ? Either the whole fullness of deity does not dwell in Christ if the Trinity does
not dwell in Christ; or, if the whole fullness of deity does dwell in Christ, the Trinity obviously
dwells in Christ.
Catholic: The whole fullness of deity does dwell in Christ, yet the Trinity does not dwell in
Christ. Otherwise, this would not be a Trinity, but a “Quarternity” (quarternitas). Though no one
doubts that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are the Trinity, Christ is certainly understood
to be a fourth [person] if the Trinity dwells in him. Paul, therefore, does not teach that the Trinity
dwells in Christ when he says, “For in him the whole fullness of deity dwells bodily.” Instead, he
teaches that the Father dwells in Christ.
Nestorian: If the whole fullness of deity dwelling in Christ should be understood as the
Father alone, then there is no room for the Son and the Holy Spirit to be God.
Catholic: Do you assert that the Father is completely and perfectly God (plenum et perfectum
Deum)? Or, do you testify that His perfection and completeness is the Son and the Holy Spirit?
Nestorian: [The Father] is obviously completely and perfectly [God].
Catholic: But the Father being completely and perfectly God prevents the Son and the Holy
Spirit from being God? But if it is impious to believe such a thing, it follows that it is not
contradictory—in fact, it is completely congruent with the Truth to understand the whole fullness
of deity as the Father, since, just as He is His own fullness, the Son is His own fullness and the
Holy Spirit likewise. And at the same time, all of them, that is, the whole Trinity, are not three,
but one fullness of deity, since the Father is perfect, the Son is perfect, and the Holy Spirit is
perfect, yet they are not three perfections but a single perfection. For if the Son, as John gives
testimony about Him, is called a “fullness”—“From his fullness we have all received” [Jn
1:16]—how should it be denied that the Father is a fullness?
Nestorian: Is the deity of the Trinity singular, and the Trinity one God? Or are there three
gods and three deities?
Catholic: Beyond any doubt the deity of the Trinity is singular, and the Trinity is one God.
Nestorian: If, therefore, the deity of the Trinity is singular, and the Trinity is one God, how
does the Trinity not dwell in Christ since the fullness of deity, which is one and singular, dwells
in Christ?
Catholic: There is no doubt—according to my position (apud nos)—that Christ exists as a
substance in two natures, namely one of divinity and one of humanity. Moreover, because the
deity of the whole Trinity is one and singular, Christ is therefore—according to you—the Trinity
and a humanity, because he exists as a substance both from the deity of the whole Trinity, which
is one and singular, and from humanity. But if Christ is the Trinity and a humanity, then the
Trinity does not dwell in Christ; the Trinity is Christ.
17.
Nestorian: Christ is not the Trinity nor a humanity, but Christ nevertheless is from a perfect
deity and perfect humanity. The Trinity dwells in him, but Christ is not a fourth [person], as you
reckon. For no one doubts that the Father dwells in the Son and the Son in the Father, from both
of whom the Holy Spirit is not separated. But God the Son, in whom the Father dwells, is “in
Christ reconciling the world to himself” [cf. 2 Cor 5:19] in the sense that, because the Son is
joined to him [sc. Christ], the Son and Christ are one and the same. By this reasoning, the Trinity
dwells in Christ, but Christ is not a fourth [person].
Catholic: This is not reason; this is a great absurdity! Thus far you have contended that the
Trinity dwells in Christ through the following verse, “For in him the whole fullness of deity
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dwells bodily” [Col 2:9], but now you claim not that the entire Trinity but that only God the Son
dwells in Christ on the authority of the following verse, In Christ, God was reconciling the world
to himself” [2 Cor 5:19]. Nevertheless, because the Father dwells in the Son, the Son dwells in
the Father, and the Holy Spirit is not separated from them, you still, according to this “logic,”
claim that the entire Trinity dwells in Christ, yet you say this is not a “Quarternity,” though the
Trinity dwells in Christ, because God the Word is within Christ so that, because of the Son’s
union [with him], the Son and Christ are one. But whether you claim that the Trinity or God the
Word dwells in Christ, you are convicted of proclaiming a “Quarternity,” not the Trinity.
Nestorian: In what way am I convicted of proclaiming a “Quarternity” and not the Trinity,
whether I say the Trinity or God the Son dwells in Christ?
Catholic: For the following reason: if the Trinity, which is the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit as we said above, dwells in Christ, then Christ is understood beyond any doubt to be a
fourth [person] in whom the Trinity dwells. Furthermore, if God the Son dwells in Christ, Christ
is not he, and if Christ is not he, they are certainly two, namely God the Son and Christ, in whom
[the Son] dwells—though you sophistically argue that they are one in order to deceive those of
simpler mind. For the apostle taught in the above passage that God the Father, not God the Son,
dwells in Christ and reconciles the world to Himself. After this he says, “So if anyone is in
Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything has become
new. All this is from God, who reconciled us to himself through Christ” [2 Cor 5:17–8]. But if
there is some doubt about what God he means [when he says “‘God’] reconciled the world to
Himself through Christ”—whether the Father or the Son is meant—let us learn [the answer] from
the Lord Himself, “The Father who dwells in me does his works” [Jn 14:10].
18.
Nestorian: Is the power and activity (uirtus et operatio) of the Trinity one and equal, or
diverse?
Catholic: Entirely one.
Nestorian: Was everything that was created created by the entire Trinity, or does this seem to
you not to be the case?
Catholic: “Whatever the Father does, the Son does likewise” [Jn 5:19]. Furthermore, the
Father and the Son do nothing without the Holy Spirit.
Nestorian: Do you say that every mortal being (mortale) is created or uncreated?
Catholic: Certainly created.
Nestorian: If therefore everything that dies is a creature, Christ, who died on behalf of our
sins, is also a creature. Moreover, because there is no creature that the Trinity did not create,
certainly Christ, who we believe died for our sins, was created by the entire Trinity and was
resurrected from the dead, because the power and activity of the Trinity is one. But if it is not
contrary to the Truth to believe that Christ was created and was resurrected, just as reason has
taught, by the entire Trinity, then this will also be consistent with the Truth, to confess that the
entire Trinity dwells in Christ, who beyond any doubt was resurrected from the dead by it.
Catholic: This position is completely impious and sacrilegious; it can only be compared to
the blasphemies of the Arians, who deny that Christ is God but claim that He is a creature. For
the entire Trinity, as you impiously argue, did not create and resurrect Christ, who died on behalf
of our sins, since Christ, who died on behalf of our sins, is separate from or alien to [the Trinity],
but is instead one from the Trinity (unus ex ipsa trinitate). Christ, then, was not created or
resurrected by the entire Trinity, but it was clearly the flesh of Christ. And because the flesh does
not belong to someone else (alterius) but belongs to Christ Himself, Christ created and
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resurrected Himself according to the flesh with the Father and the Holy Spirit. For even the
apostle gives testimony that Christ was resurrected by the Father, not by the entire Trinity, when
he says, “Paul an apostle—sent neither by human commission nor from human authorities but
through Jesus Christ and God the Father, who raised him from the dead” [Gal 1:1]. Although he
said, “Neither by human commission nor from human authorities,” he does not proclaim Christ
to be God alone and not human. Because [Paul] was writing to the Galatians, who were nearly
led astray by the Jewish pseudo-prophets, he tempers his language so that, when they hear that
God died and was resurrected by God, they are not scandalized, believing that two gods are
proclaimed by him. He also does this so that they do not believe that Christ was only a man,
resurrected from the dead.
19.
Nestorian: Although you condemn my assertion as impious and comparable to the Arian
blasphemies because I have said that Christ, who died on behalf of our sins, is a creature—since
obviously every creature is mortal and whatever is uncreated is immortal516—you reckon that I
have proclaimed a “Quarternity,” because I said the same Christ was both created by the entire
Trinity and resurrected from the dead. Instead, it is you who are clearly proven—like the
Arians—to divide homousion and proclaim a “Quarternity,” not the Trinity.
Catholic: Though your claim that every creature is mortal is made very ignorantly,
nevertheless where do you prove that I divide homousion and proclaim a “Quarternity,” not the
Trinity?
Nestorian: In saying that [Christ] is one from the Trinity (unum ex trinitate).
Catholic: Teach me, please, how I bring division to the Trinity or how I introduce a
“Quarternity” instead of the Trinity when I speak these words.
Nestorian: Everything that exists in created things (factis) cannot exist in uncreated entities
(infectis). The Trinity is certainly uncreated (infecta). Among other things, number (numerus)
exists in created things. In number there is the order (ordo) of first and second. In order there is a
gradation (gradatio) of greater and lesser. But the Trinity has neither order nor gradation. And by
the reasoning that what is in number is not in the Trinity, then there is no number in the Trinity.
It is therefore inconsistent with the Truth to say that Christ is one (unum) from the Trinity,
because one is a word pertaining to number. And because number is inherently divisible (quia
omnis numerus in diuisione est), saying that [Christ] subsists (subsistere) as one from the Trinity,
which consists (constat) in unity, not division, effectively divides homousion.
Catholic: With your numerous and excessive arguments you have accomplished nothing but
to reveal that you, after all this labor, are Sabellian in your thought—Sabellius claimed that just
as there is one nature of the Trinity, so also is there one substance or person of the Trinity. If
number does not—as you attempt [to claim]—pertain to the Trinity in any way, there is no
Trinity, only a complete union (unio tota) according to its totality. And if the union is complete
in its totality, how is there a Trinity? Or perhaps you contend [that it is a Trinity] in name alone,
[claiming] like Sabellius, as I said above, and like Paul of Samosata that it is not a Trinity in
substances and persons. But if you claim that the Trinity exists in reality and substances (in rebus
et subsistentiis), and you say that the Father is one, the Son is another, and the Holy Spirit is
another, how is the Trinity not enumerated (numeratur)? The very fact that it is called “Trinity”
signifies nothing but number. The Trinity, therefore, is enumerated, yet it is not enumerated. It is
not enumerated according to nature, as it is written, “His wisdom is beyond number” [Ps 146:5].
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However it is enumerated according to persons, since the Trinity is three persons, the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit. Not only, therefore, is there a numerical singularity (singularis
numerus) in the Trinity, but a plurality (pluralis) is admitted as well—but not everything that is
in number can be conferred to the Trinity. According to the plurality of number, the following is
said, “Let us make humankind in our image, according to our likeness” [Gen 1:26], “We—that
is, the Father and I—will come to them and make our home with them” [Jn 14:23], and “I and the
Father are one” [Jn 10:30]—one (unum) according to nature, we (sumus) according to persons.
From this we learn that “one” is not a number, though it is the origin or beginning of number,
and it always exists as whole and indivisible. Otherwise, if you consider “one” to be number,
then the Trinity will be enumerated not only according to persons but also according to nature.
And because—as you say—number is inherently divisible, homousion is divided by you, not us,
since you believe that “one” can be enumerated or divided. But if “one,” which is complete and
indivisible, cannot be divisible in any way, we have not divided homousion, since we confess
that Christ is truly one from the Trinity. For not everything that is enumerated is likewise divided
in actuality, though everything that is divided in actuality is also at the same time enumerated.
We make a statement about number (numeramus) when we say that the sun has two powers—
namely light and heat—but we do not, nevertheless, divide them in reality, because we perceive
them in thought alone. Likewise we also make a statement about number when we say that
Christ our Lord [is] in two united natures, but we do not divide these very natures in reality,
because we separate them in thought alone. We enumerate and separate the Trinity, as was said
above, according to persons, but we do not separate or enumerate it according to nature, which is
singular and unified because [the Trinity] is a “unity” (unitas), a “singularity” (singularitas), or
what I think it is best called, a “union” of deity (unio deitatis)—it is neither separated nor
enumerated. Christ, therefore, is said to be one from the Trinity, yet homousion is not divided,
since according to what is not enumerated in the Trinity is Christ asserted to be one from the
Trinity especially because “one” is never, as was said above, considered number, and everything
that is enumerated in thought (intellectu) is not also divided in reality. With regard to this Paul
says, “There is one God, the Father, from whom are all things, and one Lord, Jesus Christ,
through whom are all things” [cf. 1 Cor 8:6]. So by reason and by divine testimonies your
conclusion, held together by many syllogisms, is taught to be empty and foolish because it
claims that saying that Christ is one from the Trinity is inconsistent with the Truth, as [it claims
that] “one” pertains to number and number is inherently divisible.
20.
Nestorian: Whatever is said to be from something (ex aliquo), either through generation
(generationem) or through procession (processionem), reveals that it is different from whatever it
comes (alterum ostendit ex aliquo). For God is said to be from God through generation such as
the Son from the Father. Likewise, the Holy Spirit [is said to be from God] through procession,
as it is written, “We have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit that is from God” [1
Cor 2:12]. But if Christ is from the Trinity, he is either different through generation and is the
son of the Trinity, or he is different through procession by proceeding from the Trinity. And
what you think that you say about us, that [we say that] Christ is a fourth and separate from
Trinity, it is you who are instead guilty of proclaiming this when you say that Christ is from the
Trinity. It is my conclusion, therefore, that it is Catholic to make this assertion: Christ is one in
the Trinity (in trinitate), not one from the Trinity.
Catholic: Just as the one is revealed to be different from the other through generation and
procession, so also through creation doubtlessly is the one taught to be different from the other,
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since the following is also said about a creature, “All things come from God” [1 Cor 11:12].
Therefore, those who assert that Christ was created and resurrected by the Trinity clearly make
Christ a fourth [person] and separate from the Trinity. Because you tried to make this claim
earlier, you now teach that one is different from another through generation and procession and
refuse to say “through creation,” lest you appear to contradict yourself. We, however, confess
that Christ is “one” from Trinity, not through generation, procession, or creation, but according
to number just as we are accustomed to indicate any specific person as “one” of two, or three, or
even many people. In this way there is no decrease or increase of that number from which some
one person is specifically indicated. For neither is the number of apostles decreased or increased
when the following is said, “One of you will betray me” [Mk 14:18]. John does not separate
himself from the twelve or prove that he is a thirteenth [apostle] when he says the following
about himself, “One of his disciples—the one whom Jesus loved—was reclining next to him”
[Jn13:23]. Or obviously some increase or decrease happened among the two disciples walking to
Emmaus when the following is said, “One of them, whose name was Cleopas” [Lk 24:18].
Therefore, neither an increase nor a decrease happens to the Trinity by saying that Christ is one
from the Trinity. Instead, by showing that He is one from the Trinity by specific signification, we
reject those who proclaim that there is a confusion of substances, and we declare that those who
believe that He is separate from the Trinity are actually strangers from the Catholic Truth. But
because you judge this to be contrary to the Truth, you are either caught in believing that there is
a confusion of substances, or you understand Christ to be entirely separate from the Trinity.
Saying that Christ is one in the Trinity but denying that He is one from the Trinity is not
consistent with Catholics—as you claim—but consistent with those who claim that, because
Christ was created by the Trinity, He is one in the Trinity, thereby preventing Him from being
one from the Trinity (unum de trinitate), that is, they understand that He [is associated with the
Trinity in the sense] not of being (esse), but of being occupied (inesse). Just as each of us is “in
the Trinity,” because God is one and “in him we live and move and have our being” [Acts
17:28], or certainly just as when it is said that “the Father is in the Son,” the one is taught to be
different from the other, so also when it is said that “Christ is in the Trinity, someone removed
from the Trinity is understood to be in the Trinity—but beyond any doubt [this argument] is
nothing but professing a Quarternity.517
21.
Nestorian: I make no objection to you except that I think it is better to confess that Christ is
not one from the Trinity but one person from the Trinity (unam personam ex trinitate), especially
because the Trinity has three persons.
Catholic: Catholics are not unaware that some say that Christ is “one person from the
Trinity” in such a way that he who was crucified according to the flesh on our behalf is not one
person from the Trinity. For they do not believe that Christ’s person is one from two natures
united naturally, but they suggest that Christ’s person is one from two persons joined through
association and grace. So they say that Christ is one person from the Trinity, but they still refuse
to confess that Christ is one from the Trinity. You prove that you are one of them (ex quibus te
unum)518 because you say that Christ is one person from the Trinity but refuse to say that He is
one from the Trinity. For who is foolish and crazy enough to say that “Peter is one person from
humanity (ex hominibus una persona) but is not one of humanity (unus ex hominibus)?” This is
The sarcasm expressed in this final sentence is a rarity for this dialogue.
The Catholic cleverly uses the philosophical language under discussion to make a subtle joke at his opponent’s
expense.
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the Catholic definition: we confess that God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, with His own
flesh, is one from the Trinity (unum ex trinitate), though He is not of the substance of the Trinity
according to the flesh.
22.
Nestorian: Never will I confess that Christ is one from the Trinity because this is never found
in canonical scripture. This example that you want to give about Peter has nothing to do with the
matter at hand because every individual can be separated from one another, but believing this
about the indivisible and inseparable Trinity is proven to be completely impious. This, however,
should be confessed—without Christ there is no Trinity.
Catholic: If you protest that you say only what is contained in canonical scripture, then where
did you read in it that “Christ is one in the Trinity,” or “one person from the Trinity,” or certainly
that “there is no Trinity without Christ?” And when this is said, who does not understand that
those who make this assertion proclaim a “Quarternity?” For if there is no Trinity without Christ,
the Trinity, therefore, is with Christ. For God the Trinity is also with each of us, since we are not
from it, but in it just as I have given proof above following the apostle’s testimony. Christ,
therefore, is a fourth [person], with whom the Trinity—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—
is. But because you believe that saying that Christ is one from the Trinity is contrary to the Truth,
whose voice do you say it is in the following verse, “Behold, the man has become like one of us”
[Gen 3:22]?
Nestorian: God’s, no doubt.
Catholic: Then God is not one, but many from whom one says to the others, “The man has
become like one of us?”
Nestorian: There are not many gods, but one God—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.
Catholic: So you assert that this voice belongs to that God, who is the Father, the Son, and
the Holy Spirit? And if this voice belongs to that God, to whom does He say, “Behold the man
has become like one of us?”
Nestorian: God, obviously, the Father to the Son.
Catholic: Since the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are doubtless one God, the Trinity,
when the Father says the following to the Son, “Behold the man has become like one of us,” does
the phrase “like one of us” mean the same thing as “we who are the Trinity?”
Nestorian: Although it is permissible for the Father to speak to the Son this way, I
nevertheless confess what is said in scripture, even if I do not want to. I do not, however, dare to
say what scripture does not express in its very words. But it is enough for me, in order to avoid
the charge of sophistry, to say only this about the Son, what is contained in the [Nicene] creed—
God, the only begotten Son of the Father, born from (de) the Holy Spirit of (ex) the virgin Mary.
Catholic: But even he who was condemned at Ephesus [sc. Nestorius] said that God was born
of a virgin, not because he confesses that God was truly and rightly born of a virgin, but on
account of a union made between God the Word and the man whom the virgin bore.
23.
Nestorian: I say that God the Word was born according to the flesh of a woman.
Catholic: Do you profess that God the Word, who you say was born of a woman, is outside
the Trinity, is the Trinity, or is one from the Trinity?
Nestorian: I confess that God the Word is not the Trinity, is not outside the Trinity, and is not
one from the Trinity. Instead, I confess that God the Son of God for our salvation was born of a
woman according to the flesh and suffered. I refuse, however, to use your language (tuis . . . uti
sermonibus), nor do I confess that he is one from the Trinity.
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Catholic: It is not, as it seems to me, that you do not want to use my language because these
words are not mine, but the words of Truth. Rather, you want to misuse your own language (tuis
. . . abuti) like a heretic by denying the very thing that you are saying. For even the Arians agree
with us that there are three persons—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—but they are
condemned because they refuse to say “homousion.” Likewise, the followers of Paul of
Samosata agree with us about homousion but are convicted heretics because they deny that the
Trinity has three persons. Furthermore, as for those who agree that God the Word was born
according to the flesh of a virgin but refuse to say that He is one from the Trinity—either they,
like Sabellius, are understood to assert that the entire Trinity only has one person, or they are
convicted of proclaiming that God the Word is someone other—I do not know who—than He
who is from the Trinity.
Nestorian: It is one thing to proclaim three persons and deny that the Trinity has one essence,
and confess homousion and in no way accept that there are three persons—since [both of these
double statements] are substantially (rebus ipsis) different from the Truth. It is another matter to
agree in concepts (rebus) and disagree only in words (uerbis).
Catholic: What is this! You agree that it is Catholic and consistent with the Truth to say that
Christ is from the Trinity?
Nestorian: I do not want to pursue this matter with you any longer.
Catholic: No other reason prevents you from pursuing the matter further with me than
because you are convicted of proclaiming, like a heretic, [some other] God the Word—I do not
know who—but not Him, who is one from the Trinity just as the Manicheans do. For if you were
in disagreement, not in sense, but only in words, you would certainly agree that proclaiming
Christ as one from the Trinity would be entirely Catholic.
24.
Nestorian: Does what I say and what you say not seem to you to be the same thing? Or do
you say that someone else—I do not know who—and not God the Word Jesus Christ is one from
the Trinity?
Catholic: It is always He, and I never recognize anyone else.
Nestorian: So if we are in agreement, do you dare name me a heretic if I refuse to use your
language so that, though I would appease you, I do not seem to provide other heretics with an
opportunity for their own error?
Catholic: If Christ should not be proclaimed “one from the Trinity” so that we do not seem to
grant heretics an opportunity, then we should not confess three persons and the Trinity lest we
give the Arians an opportunity. Or, we should not confess homousion lest we seem like the
follows of Paul of Samosata. Finally, we should deny two natures, since Nestorius always and
everywhere professed them. I do not know if there is anything that we should confess then. But
even so, if someone should say to you, “I confess that the blessed virgin is Christotokos, but I
still refuse to agree that she is also Theotokos,” do you pronounce him a Catholic or a heretic?
Nestorian: Obviously I pronounce him a heretic, because a synod has already made a
statement about this just like all of those examples that you gave above.519
Catholic: Again, if someone says, “I confess that Christ is one nature of God the Word,
namely incarnate and animate, but of rational and intellectual quality (incarnatam et animatam
rationali et intellectuali),520 but I do not dare proclaim that he has two natures,” or again if
519
520

Cf. Book I.2–4.
Such grammatical gymnastics are similar to those found in II.13.
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someone says, “I believe that Christ is from (de) two natures, but I cannot believe that he is in
(in) two natures lest I give an opportunity to the heretics,” how do you judge about such persons?
Do you dare name them heretics, though they are understood to confess in different language that
there are two natures in Christ, but so that they do not seem to give an opportunity to heretics
they refuse to express two [natures] explicitly (uerbis ipsis)?
25.
Nestorian: Not only do I consider such people contrary to the Truth, but I also anathematize
them. For this and no other reason do we not communicate with the Egyptians.
Catholic: If you not only censure as heretics but even anathematize those who proclaim two
natures in different language but refuse to express this same idea explicitly, and if you likewise
condemn those who say that blessed Mary is Christotokos but refuse to proclaim her Theotokos,
though it is true that Christ is God and God is Christ, then how will we judge them Catholics and
not heretics when they say that God the Word was born according to the flesh from a virgin and
suffered in the flesh on our behalf but deny that He is one from the holy and indivisible Trinity—
especially because they claim that this statement is in no way consistent with the Catholic faith?
Nestorian: But a synod has made explicit statements about the two natures and the term
“Theotokos.” No synod has made a statement about the latter issue.
Catholic: Do you think, then, that we should say nothing except what is contained in synodal
documents?
Nestorian: Nothing at all.
Catholic: If someone pressed you whether God the Father was begotten or unbegotten, what
would you respond to him?
Nestorian: Unbegotten, obviously.
Catholic: But if he should say to you, “I do not accept this because no synod has made a
statement about this.”
Nestorian: I respond, “Because it has not forbidden saying this.”
Catholic: But if he presses you that the word “Trinity” should not be used because no synod
has made a statement about this?
Nestorian: I make the same response and nothing else, “Just as it did not state that it must be
said, so also did it in no way prohibit it.”
Catholic: But if he should say the opposite, “Just as it did not prohibit it, it is no way right to
say what is not contained in council documents,” what will you respond to this?
Nestorian: I can prove this from the writing of the Fathers.
Catholic: But even we proved that Christ is one from the Trinity by the Fathers’ writings.
Nestorian: Although I believe even this is easily taught from the writings of the Fathers, I
still refuse to say this, and I will not continue the discussion further with you. Instead I will cling
steadfast to my position.
Catholic: I was truly amazed that you could conquer human glory so that you suffer no
misunderstanding, insofar as you accept, through the censure of divine scripture, the position
against which you have just recently fought as consistent with the Truth. Yet because you are
determined to enclose yourself within your own position rather than endorse a true confession
with a love of eternal blessedness, I can never consider you anything but a heretic, since you
deny that God the Word, our Lord Jesus Christ, who suffered in the flesh for our salvation, is one
from the holy and indivisible Trinity, to whom is honor and glory forever and ever. Amen.
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